Biblio

Demand response has emerged as one of the most promising methods for the deployment of sustainable energy systems. Attempts to democratize demand response and establish programs for residential consumers have run into scalability issues and risks of leaking sensitive consumer data. In this work, we propose a privacy-friendly, incentive-based demand response market, where consumers offer their flexibility to utilities in exchange for a financial compensation. Consumers submit encrypted offer which are aggregated using Computation Over Encrypted Data to ensure consumer privacy and the scalability of the approach. The optimal allocation of flexibility is then determined via double-auctions, along with the optimal consumption schedule for the users with respect to the day-ahead electricity prices, thus also shielding participants from high electricity prices. A case study is presented to show the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

Masking requires splitting sensitive variables into at least d+1 shares to provide security against DPA attacks at order d. To this date, this minimal number has only been deployed in software implementations of cryptographic algorithms and in the linear parts of their hardware counterparts. So far there is no hardware construction that achieves this lower bound if the function is nonlinear and the underlying logic gates can glitch. In this paper, we give practical implementations of the AES using d+1 shares aiming at first- and second-order security even in the presence of glitches. To achieve this, we follow the conditions presented by Reparaz et al. at CRYPTO 2015 to allow hardware masking schemes, like Threshold Implementations, to provide theoretical higher-order security with d+1 shares. The decrease in number of shares has a direct impact in the area requirements: our second-order DPA resistant core is the smallest in area so far, and its S-box is 50% smaller than the current smallest Threshold Implementation of the AES S-box with similar security and attacker model. We assess the security of our masked cores by practical side-channel evaluations. The security guarantees are met with 100 million traces.