Biblio
Cyber-physical systems (CPS) are often network integrated to enable remote management, monitoring, and reporting. Such integration has made them vulnerable to cyber attacks originating from an untrusted network (e.g., the internet). Once an attacker breaches the network security, he could corrupt operations of the system in question, which may in turn lead to catastrophes. Hence there is a critical need to detect intrusions into mission-critical CPS. Signature based detection may not work well for CPS, whose complexity may preclude any succinct signatures that we will need. Specification based detection requires accurate definitions of system behaviour that similarly can be hard to obtain, due to the CPS's complexity and dynamics, as well as inaccuracies and incompleteness of design documents or operation manuals. Formal models, to be tractable, are often oversimplified, in which case they will not support effective detection. In this paper, we study a behaviour-based machine learning (ML) approach for the intrusion detection. Whereas prior unsupervised ML methods have suffered from high missed detection or false-positive rates, we use a high-fidelity CPS testbed, which replicates all main physical and control components of a modern water treatment facility, to generate systematic training data for a supervised method. The method does not only detect the occurrence of a cyber attack at the physical process layer, but it also identifies the specific type of the attack. Its detection is fast and robust to noise. Furthermore, its adaptive system model can learn quickly to match dynamics of the CPS and its operating environment. It exhibits a low false positive (FP) rate, yet high precision and recall.