Biblio

Side-channel attacks have been a constant threat to computing systems. In recent times, vulnerabilities in the architecture were discovered and exploited to mount and execute a state-of-the-art attack such as Spectre. The Spectre attack exploits a vulnerability in the Intel-based processors to leak confidential data through the covert channel. There exist some defenses to mitigate the Spectre attack. Among multiple defenses, hardware-assisted attack/intrusion detection (HID) systems have received overwhelming response due to its low overhead and efficient attack detection. The HID systems deploy machine learning (ML) classifiers to perform anomaly detection to determine whether the system is under attack. For this purpose, a performance monitoring tool profiles the applications to record hardware performance counters (HPC), utilized for anomaly detection. Previous HID systems assume that the Spectre is executed as a standalone application. In contrast, we propose an attack that dynamically generates variations in the injected code to evade detection. The attack is injected into a benign application. In this manner, the attack conceals itself as a benign application and gen-erates perturbations to avoid detection. For the attack injection, we exploit a return-oriented programming (ROP)-based code-injection technique that reuses the code, called gadgets, present in the exploited victim's (host) memory to execute the attack, which, in our case, is the CR-Spectre attack to steal sensitive data from a target victim (target) application. Our work focuses on proposing a dynamic attack that can evade HID detection by injecting perturbations, and its dynamically generated variations thereof, under the cloak of a benign application. We evaluate the proposed attack on the MiBench suite as the host. From our experiments, the HID performance degrades from 90% to 16%, indicating our Spectre-CR attack avoids detection successfully.

As millions of IoT devices are interconnected together for better communication and computation, compromising even a single device opens a gateway for the adversary to access the network leading to an epidemic. It is pivotal to detect any malicious activity on a device and mitigate the threat. Among multiple feasible security threats, malware (malicious applications) poses a serious risk to modern IoT networks. A wide range of malware can replicate itself and propagate through the network via the underlying connectivity in the IoT networks making the malware epidemic inevitable. There exist several techniques ranging from heuristics to game-theory based technique to model the malware propagation and minimize the impact on the overall network. The state-of-the-art game-theory based approaches solely focus either on the network performance or the malware confinement but does not optimize both simultaneously. In this paper, we propose a throughput-aware game theory-based end-to-end IoT network security framework to confine the malware epidemic while preserving the overall network performance. We propose a two-player game with one player being the attacker and other being the defender. Each player has three different strategies and each strategy leads to a certain gain to that player with an associated cost. A tailored min-max algorithm was introduced to solve the game. We have evaluated our strategy on a 500 node network for different classes of malware and compare with existing state-of-the-art heuristic and game theory-based solutions.

Cybersecurity for the past decades has been in the front line of global attention as a critical threat to the information technology infrastructures. According to recent security reports, malicious software (a.k.a. malware) is rising at an alarming rate in numbers as well as harmful purposes to compromise security of computing systems. To address the high complexity and computational overheads of conventional software-based detection techniques, Hardware-Supported Malware Detection (HMD) has proved to be efficient for detecting malware at the processors' microarchitecture level with the aid of Machine Learning (ML) techniques applied on Hardware Performance Counter (HPC) data. Existing ML-based HMDs while accurate in recognizing known signatures of malicious patterns, have not explored detecting unknown (zero-day) malware data at run-time which is a more challenging problem, since its HPC data does not match any known attack applications' signatures in the existing database. In this work, we first present a review of recent ML-based HMDs utilizing built-in HPC registers information. Next, we examine the suitability of various standard ML classifiers for zero-day malware detection and demonstrate that such methods are not capable of detecting unknown malware signatures with high detection rate. Lastly, to address the challenge of run-time zero-day malware detection, we propose an ensemble learning-based technique to enhance the performance of the standard malware detectors despite using a small number of microarchitectural features that are captured at run-time by existing HPCs. The experimental results demonstrate that our proposed approach by applying AdaBoost ensemble learning on Random Forrest classifier as a regular classifier achieves 92% F-measure and 95% TPR with only 2% false positive rate in detecting zero-day malware using only the top 4 microarchitectural features.

The sheer size of IoT networks being deployed today presents an "attack surface" and poses significant security risks at a scale never before encountered. In other words, a single device/node in a network that becomes infected with malware has the potential to spread malware across the network, eventually ceasing the network functionality. Simply detecting and quarantining the malware in IoT networks does not guarantee to prevent malware propagation. On the other hand, use of traditional control theory for malware confinement is not effective, as most of the existing works do not consider real-time malware control strategies that can be implemented using uncertain infection information of the nodes in the network or have the containment problem decoupled from network performance. In this work, we propose a two-pronged approach, where a runtime malware detector (HaRM) that employs Hardware Performance Counter (HPC) values to detect the malware and benign applications is devised. This information is fed during runtime to a stochastic model predictive controller to confine the malware propagation without hampering the network performance. With the proposed solution, a runtime malware detection accuracy of 92.21% with a runtime of 10ns is achieved, which is an order of magnitude faster than existing malware detection solutions. Synthesizing this output with the model predictive containment strategy lead to achieving an average network throughput of nearly 200% of that of IoT networks without any embedded defense.

Hardware security architectures and primitives are becoming increasingly important in practice providing trust anchors and trusted execution environment to protect modern software systems. Over the past two decades we have witnessed various hardware security solutions and trends from Trusted Platform Modules (TPM), performance counters for security, ARM's TrustZone, and Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs), to very recent advances such as Intel's Software Guard Extension (SGX). Unfortunately, these solutions are rarely used by third party developers, make strong trust assumptions (including in manufacturers), are too expensive for small constrained devices, do not easily scale, or suffer from information leakage. Academic research has proposed a variety of solutions, in hardware security architectures, these advancements are rarely deployed in practice.

Wearable personal health monitoring systems can offer a cost effective solution for human healthcare. These systems must provide both highly accurate, secured and quick processing and delivery of vast amount of data. In addition, wearable biomedical devices are used in inpatient, outpatient, and at home e-Patient care that must constantly monitor the patient's biomedical and physiological signals 24/7. These biomedical applications require sampling and processing multiple streams of physiological signals with strict power and area footprint. The processing typically consists of feature extraction, data fusion, and classification stages that require a large number of digital signal processing and machine learning kernels. In response to these requirements, in this paper, a low-power, domain-specific many-core accelerator named Power Efficient Nano Clusters (PENC) is proposed to map and execute the kernels of these applications. Experimental results show that the manycore is able to reduce energy consumption by up to 80% and 14% for DSP and machine learning kernels, respectively, when optimally parallelized. The performance of the proposed PENC manycore when acting as a coprocessor to an Intel Atom processor is compared with existing commercial off-the-shelf embedded processing platforms including Intel Atom, Xilinx Artix-7 FPGA, and NVIDIA TK1 ARM-A15 with GPU SoC. The results show that the PENC manycore architecture reduces the energy by as much as 10X while outperforming all off-the-shelf embedded processing platforms across all studied machine learning classifiers.