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Filters: Author is Rodrigues, Bruno  [Clear All Filters]
2021-09-07
Franco, Muriel Figueredo, Rodrigues, Bruno, Scheid, Eder John, Jacobs, Arthur, Killer, Christian, Granville, Lisandro Zambenedetti, Stiller, Burkhard.  2020.  SecBot: a Business-Driven Conversational Agent for Cybersecurity Planning and Management. 2020 16th International Conference on Network and Service Management (CNSM). :1–7.
Businesses were moving during the past decades to-ward full digital models, which made companies face new threats and cyberattacks affecting their services and, consequently, their profits. To avoid negative impacts, companies' investments in cybersecurity are increasing considerably. However, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) operate on small budgets, minimal technical expertise, and few personnel to address cybersecurity threats. In order to address such challenges, it is essential to promote novel approaches that can intuitively present cybersecurity-related technical information.This paper introduces SecBot, a cybersecurity-driven conversational agent (i.e., chatbot) for the support of cybersecurity planning and management. SecBot applies concepts of neural networks and Natural Language Processing (NLP), to interact and extract information from a conversation. SecBot can (a) identify cyberattacks based on related symptoms, (b) indicate solutions and configurations according to business demands, and (c) provide insightful information for the decision on cybersecurity investments and risks. A formal description had been developed to describe states, transitions, a language, and a Proof-of-Concept (PoC) implementation. A case study and a performance evaluation were conducted to provide evidence of the proposed solution's feasibility and accuracy.
2020-09-28
Killer, Christian, Rodrigues, Bruno, Stiller, Burkhard.  2019.  Security Management and Visualization in a Blockchain-based Collaborative Defense. 2019 IEEE International Conference on Blockchain and Cryptocurrency (ICBC). :108–111.
A cooperative network defense is one approach to fend off large-scale Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks. In this regard, the Blockchain Signaling System (BloSS) is a multi-domain, blockchain-based, cooperative DDoS defense system, where each Autonomous System (AS) is taking part in the defense alliance. Each AS can exchange attack information about ongoing attacks via the Ethereum blockchain. However, the currently operational implementation of BloSS is not interactive or visualized, but the DDoS mitigation is automated. In realworld defense systems, a human cybersecurity analyst decides whether a DDoS threat should be mitigated or not. Thus, this work presents the design of a security management dashboard for BloSS, designed for interactive use by cyber security analysts.
2017-09-15
Rodrigues, Bruno, Quintão Pereira, Fernando Magno, Aranha, Diego F..  2016.  Sparse Representation of Implicit Flows with Applications to Side-channel Detection. Proceedings of the 25th International Conference on Compiler Construction. :110–120.

Information flow analyses traditionally use the Program Dependence Graph (PDG) as a supporting data-structure. This graph relies on Ferrante et al.'s notion of control dependences to represent implicit flows of information. A limitation of this approach is that it may create O(textbarItextbar x textbarEtextbar) implicit flow edges in the PDG, where I are the instructions in a program, and E are the edges in its control flow graph. This paper shows that it is possible to compute information flow analyses using a different notion of implicit dependence, which yields a number of edges linear on the number of definitions plus uses of variables. Our algorithm computes these dependences in a single traversal of the program's dominance tree. This efficiency is possible due to a key property of programs in Static Single Assignment form: the definition of a variable dominates all its uses. Our algorithm correctly implements Hunt and Sands system of security types. Contrary to their original formulation, which required O(IxI) space and time for structured programs, we require only O(I). We have used our ideas to build FlowTracker, a tool that uncovers side-channel vulnerabilities in cryptographic algorithms. FlowTracker handles programs with over one-million assembly instructions in less than 200 seconds, and creates 24% less implicit flow edges than Ferrante et al.'s technique. FlowTracker has detected an issue in a constant-time implementation of Elliptic Curve Cryptography; it has found several time-variant constructions in OpenSSL, one issue in TrueCrypt and it has validated the isochronous behavior of the NaCl library.