Biblio
Real-time clock circuits are widely used in modern electronic systems to provide time information to the systems at the beginning of the system power-on. In this paper, we present two types of Hardware Trojan designs that employ the time information as the trigger conditions. One is a real-time based Trojan, which will attack a system at some specific realworld time. The other is a relative-time based Trojan, which will be triggered when a specific time period passes after the system is powered on. In either case when a Trojan is triggered its payload may corrupt the system or leakage internal information to the outside world. Experimental results show that the extra power consumption, area overhead and delay time are all quite small and thus the detection of the Trojans is difficult by using traditional side-channel detection methods.
Runtime memory vulnerabilities, especially present in widely used languages as C and C++, are exploited by attackers to corrupt code pointers and hijack the execution flow of a program running on a target system to force it to behave abnormally. This is the principle of modern Code Reuse Attacks (CRAs) and of famous attack paradigms as Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) and Jump-Oriented Programming (JOP), which have defeated the previous defenses against malicious code injection such as Data Execution Prevention (DEP). Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) is a promising approach to protect against such runtime attacks. Recently, many CFI solutions have been proposed, with both hardware and software implementations. But how can a defense based on complying with a graph calculated a priori efficiently deal with something unpredictable as exceptions and interrupt requests? The present paper focuses on this dichotomy by analysing some of the CFI-based defenses and showing how the unexpected trigger of an interrupt and the sudden execution of an Interrupt Service Routine (ISR) can circumvent them.
In this paper, we develop a statistical framework for image steganography in which the cover and stego messages are modeled as multivariate Gaussian random variables. By minimizing the detection error of an optimal detector within the generalized adopted statistical model, we propose a novel Gaussian embedding method. Furthermore, we extend the formulation to cost-based steganography, resulting in a universal embedding scheme that works with embedding costs as well as variance estimators. Experimental results show that the proposed approach avoids embedding in smooth regions and significantly improves the security of the state-of-the-art methods, such as HILL, MiPOD, and S-UNIWARD.
Steganography means hiding secrete message in cover object in a way that no suspicious from the attackers, the most popular steganography schemes is image steganography. A very common questions that asked in the field are: 1- what is the embedding scheme used?, 2- where is (location) the secrete messages are embedded?, and 3- how the sender will tell the receiver about the locations of the secrete message?. Here in this paper we are deal with and aimed to answer questions number 2 and 3. We used the popular scheme in image steganography which is least significant bits for embedding in edges positions in color images. After we separate the color images into its components Red, Green, and Blue, then we used one of the components as an index to find the edges, while other one or two components used for embedding purpose. Using this technique we will guarantee the same number and positions of edges before and after embedding scheme, therefore we are guaranteed extracting the secrete message as it's without any loss of secrete messages bits.
Accountability and privacy are considered valuable but conflicting properties in the Internet, which at present does not provide native support for either. Past efforts to balance accountability and privacy in the Internet have unsatisfactory deployability due to the introduction of new communication identifiers, and because of large-scale modifications to fully deployed infrastructures and protocols. The IPv6 is being deployed around the world and this trend will accelerate. In this paper, we propose a private and accountable proposal based on IPv6 called PAVI that seeks to bootstrap accountability and privacy to the IPv6 Internet without introducing new communication identifiers and large-scale modifications to the deployed base. A dedicated quantitative analysis shows that the proposed PAVI achieves satisfactory levels of accountability and privacy. The results of evaluation of a PAVI prototype show that it incurs little performance overhead, and is widely deployable.
Control-Flow Hijacking attacks are the dominant attack vector against C/C++ programs. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) solutions mitigate these attacks on the forward edge, i.e., indirect calls through function pointers and virtual calls. Protecting the backward edge is left to stack canaries, which are easily bypassed through information leaks. Shadow Stacks are a fully precise mechanism for protecting backwards edges, and should be deployed with CFI mitigations. We present a comprehensive analysis of all possible shadow stack mechanisms along three axes: performance, compatibility, and security. For performance comparisons we use SPEC CPU2006, while security and compatibility are qualitatively analyzed. Based on our study, we renew calls for a shadow stack design that leverages a dedicated register, resulting in low performance overhead, and minimal memory overhead, but sacrifices compatibility. We present case studies of our implementation of such a design, Shadesmar, on Phoronix and Apache to demonstrate the feasibility of dedicating a general purpose register to a security monitor on modern architectures, and Shadesmar's deployability. Our comprehensive analysis, including detailed case studies for our novel design, allows compiler designers and practitioners to select the correct shadow stack design for different usage scenarios. Shadow stacks belong to the class of defense mechanisms that require metadata about the program's state to enforce their defense policies. Protecting this metadata for deployed mitigations requires in-process isolation of a segment of the virtual address space. Prior work on defenses in this class has relied on information hiding to protect metadata. We show that stronger guarantees are possible by repurposing two new Intel x86 extensions for memory protection (MPX), and page table control (MPK). Building on our isolation efforts with MPX and MPK, we present the design requirements for a dedicated hardware mechanism to support intra-process memory isolation, and discuss how such a mechanism can empower the next wave of highly precise software security mitigations that rely on partially isolated information in a process.
Critical Infrastructures (CIs) use Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for remote control and monitoring. Sophisticated security measures are needed to address malicious intrusions, which are steadily increasing in number and variety due to the massive spread of connectivity and standardisation of open SCADA protocols. Traditional Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) cannot detect attacks that are not already present in their databases. Therefore, in this paper, we assess Machine Learning (ML) for intrusion detection in SCADA systems using a real data set collected from a gas pipeline system and provided by the Mississippi State University (MSU). The contribution of this paper is two-fold: 1) The evaluation of four techniques for missing data estimation and two techniques for data normalization, 2) The performances of Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Random Forest (RF) are assessed in terms of accuracy, precision, recall and F1score for intrusion detection. Two cases are differentiated: binary and categorical classifications. Our experiments reveal that RF detect intrusions effectively, with an F1score of respectively \textbackslashtextgreater 99%.
In view of the great threat posed by malware and the rapid growing trend about malware variants, it is necessary to determine the category of new samples accurately for further analysis and taking appropriate countermeasures. The network behavior based classification methods have become more popular now. However, the behavior profiling models they used usually only depict partial network behavior of samples or require specific traffic selection in advance, which may lead to adverse effects on categorizing advanced malware with complex activities. In this paper, to overcome the shortages of traditional models, we raise a comprehensive behavior model for profiling the behavior of malware network activities. And we also propose a corresponding malware classification method which can extract and compare the major behavior of samples. The experimental and comparison results not only demonstrate our method can categorize samples accurately in both criteria, but also prove the advantage of our profiling model to two other approaches in accuracy performance, especially under scenario based criteria.
An important source of cyber-attacks is malware, which proliferates in different forms such as botnets. The botnet malware typically looks for vulnerable devices across the Internet, rather than targeting specific individuals, companies or industries. It attempts to infect as many connected devices as possible, using their resources for automated tasks that may cause significant economic and social harm while being hidden to the user and device. Thus, it becomes very difficult to detect such activity. A considerable amount of research has been conducted to detect and prevent botnet infestation. In this paper, we attempt to create a foundation for an anomaly-based intrusion detection system using a statistical learning method to improve network security and reduce human involvement in botnet detection. We focus on identifying the best features to detect botnet activity within network traffic using a lightweight logistic regression model. The network traffic is processed by Bro, a popular network monitoring framework which provides aggregate statistics about the packets exchanged between a source and destination over a certain time interval. These statistics serve as features to a logistic regression model responsible for classifying malicious and benign traffic. Our model is easy to implement and simple to interpret. We characterized and modeled 8 different botnet families separately and as a mixed dataset. Finally, we measured the performance of our model on multiple parameters using F1 score, accuracy and Area Under Curve (AUC).
Botnet is one of the major threats on the Internet for committing cybercrimes, such as DDoS attacks, stealing sensitive information, spreading spams, etc. It is a challenging issue to detect modern botnets that are continuously improving for evading detection. In this paper, we propose a machine learning based botnet detection system that is shown to be effective in identifying P2P botnets. Our approach extracts convolutional version of effective flow-based features, and trains a classification model by using a feed-forward artificial neural network. The experimental results show that the accuracy of detection using the convolutional features is better than the ones using the traditional features. It can achieve 94.7% of detection accuracy and 2.2% of false positive rate on the known P2P botnet datasets. Furthermore, our system provides an additional confidence testing for enhancing performance of botnet detection. It further classifies the network traffic of insufficient confidence in the neural network. The experiment shows that this stage can increase the detection accuracy up to 98.6% and decrease the false positive rate up to 0.5%.
Hardware Trojans, implantable at a myriad of points within the supply chain, are difficult to detect and identify. By emulating systems on programmable hardware, the authors have created a tool from which to create and evaluate Trojan attack signatures and therefore enable better Trojan detection (for in-service systems) and prevention (for in-design systems).
In traditional steganographic schemes, RGB three channels payloads are assigned equally in a true color image. In fact, the security of color image steganography relates not only to data-embedding algorithms but also to different payload partition. How to exploit inter-channel correlations to allocate payload for performance enhancement is still an open issue in color image steganography. In this paper, a novel channel-dependent payload partition strategy based on amplifying channel modification probabilities is proposed, so as to adaptively assign the embedding capacity among RGB channels. The modification probabilities of three corresponding pixels in RGB channels are simultaneously increased, and thus the embedding impacts could be clustered, in order to improve the empirical steganographic security against the channel co-occurrences detection. Experimental results show that the new color image steganographic schemes incorporated with the proposed strategy can effectively make the embedding changes concentrated mainly in textured regions, and achieve better performance on resisting the modern color image steganalysis.
In this paper, we propose a new authentication method to prevent authentication vulnerability of Claim Token method of Membership Service provide in Private BlockChain. We chose Hyperledger Fabric v1.0 using JWT authentication method of membership service. TOTP, which generate OTP tokens and user authentication codes that generate additional time-based password on existing authentication servers, has been applied to enforce security and two-factor authentication method to provide more secure services.
This research aims to identify some vulnerabilities of advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks using multiple simulated attacks in a virtualized environment. Our experimental study shows that while updating the antivirus software and the operating system with the latest patches may help in mitigating APTs, APT threat vectors could still infiltrate the strongest defenses. Accordingly, we highlight some critical areas of security concern that need to be addressed.
This paper describes the work done to design a SoC platform for real-time on-line pattern search in TCP packets for Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) applications. The platform is based on a Xilinx Zynq programmable SoC and includes an accelerator that implements a pattern search engine that extends the original Boyer-Moore algorithm with timing and logical rules, that produces a very complex set of rules. Also, the platform implements different modes of operation, including SIMD and MISD parallelism, which can be configured on-line. The platform is scalable depending of the analysis requirement up to 8 Gbps. High-Level synthesis and platform based design methodologies have been used to reduce the time to market of the completed system.
Deep Neural Network (DNN) has recently become the “de facto” technique to drive the artificial intelligence (AI) industry. However, there also emerges many security issues as the DNN based intelligent systems are being increasingly prevalent. Existing DNN security studies, such as adversarial attacks and poisoning attacks, are usually narrowly conducted at the software algorithm level, with the misclassification as their primary goal. The more realistic system-level attacks introduced by the emerging intelligent service supply chain, e.g. the third-party cloud based machine learning as a service (MLaaS) along with the portable DNN computing engine, have never been discussed. In this work, we propose a low-cost modular methodology-Stealth Infection on Neural Network, namely “SIN2”, to demonstrate the novel and practical intelligent supply chain triggered neural Trojan attacks. Our “SIN2” well leverages the attacking opportunities built upon the static neural network model and the underlying dynamic runtime system of neural computing framework through a bunch of neural Trojaning techniques. We implement a variety of neural Trojan attacks in Linux sandbox by following proposed “SIN2”. Experimental results show that our modular design can rapidly produce and trigger various Trojan attacks that can easily evade the existing defenses.
Software attacks are commonly performed against embedded systems in order to access private data or to run restricted services. In this work, we demonstrate some vulnerabilities of commonly use processor which can be leveraged by hackers to attack a system. The targeted devices are based on open processor architectures OpenRISC and RISC-V. Several software exploits are discussed and demonstrated while a hardware countermeasure is proposed and validated on OpenRISC against Return Oriented Programming attack.
This paper investigates practical strategies for distributing payload across images with content-adaptive steganography and for pooling outputs of a single-image detector for steganalysis. Adopting a statistical model for the detector's output, the steganographer minimizes the power of the most powerful detector of an omniscient Warden, while the Warden, informed by the payload spreading strategy, detects with the likelihood ratio test in the form of a matched filter. Experimental results with state-of-the-art content-adaptive additive embedding schemes and rich models are included to show the relevance of the results.
This paper provides a proof-of-concept demonstration of the potential benefit of using logical implications for detection of combinational hardware trojans. Using logic simulation, valid logic implications are selected and added to to the checker circuitry to detect payload delivery by a combinational hardware trojan. Using combinational circuits from the ISCAS benchmark suite, and a modest hardware budget for the checker, simulation results show that the probability of a trojan escaping detection using our approach was only 16%.
Semiconductor design houses are increasingly becoming dependent on third party vendors to procure intellectual property (IP) and meet time-to-market constraints. However, these third party IPs cannot be trusted as hardware Trojans can be maliciously inserted into them by untrusted vendors. While different approaches have been proposed to detect Trojans in third party IPs, their limitations have not been extensively studied. In this paper, we analyze the limitations of the state-of-the-art Trojan detection techniques and demonstrate with experimental results how to defeat these detection mechanisms. We then propose a Trojan detection framework based on information flow security (IFS) verification. Our framework detects violation of IFS policies caused by Trojans without the need of white-box knowledge of the IP. We experimentally validate the efficacy of our proposed technique by accurately identifying Trojans in the trust-hub benchmarks. We also demonstrate that our technique does not share the limitations of the previously proposed Trojan detection techniques.
We introduce $μ$DTNSec, the first fully-implemented security layer for Delay/Disruption-Tolerant Networks (DTN) on microcontrollers. It provides protection against eavesdropping and Man-in-the-Middle attacks that are especially easy in these networks. Following the Store-Carry-Forward principle of DTNs, an attacker can simply place itself on the route between source and destination. Our design consists of asymmetric encryption and signatures with Elliptic Curve Cryptography and hardware-backed symmetric encryption with the Advanced Encryption Standard. $μ$DTNSec has been fully implemented as an extension to $μ$DTN on Contiki OS and is based on the Bundle Protocol specification. Our performance evaluation shows that the choice of the curve (secp128r1, secp192r1, secp256r1) dominates the influence of the payload size. We also provide energy measurements for all operations to show the feasibility of our security layer on energy-constrained devices.
Detecting botnets and advanced persistent threats is a major challenge for network administrators. An important component of such malware is the command and control channel, which enables the malware to respond to controller commands. The detection of malware command and control channels could help prevent further malicious activity by cyber criminals using the malware. Detection of malware in network traffic is traditionally carried out by identifying specific patterns in packet payloads. Now bot writers encrypt the command and control payloads, making pattern recognition a less effective form of detection. This paper focuses instead on an effective anomaly based detection technique for bot and advanced persistent threats using a data mining approach combined with applied classification algorithms. After additional tuning, the final test on an unseen dataset, false positive rates of 0% with malware detection rates of 100% were achieved on two examined malware threats, with promising results on a number of other threats.
Ransomware techniques have evolved over time with the most resilient attacks making data recovery practically impossible. This has driven countermeasures to shift towards recovery against prevention but in this paper, we model ransomware attacks from an infection vector point of view. We follow the basic infection chain of crypto ransomware and use Bayesian network statistics to infer some of the most common ransomware infection vectors. We also employ the use of attack and sensor nodes to capture uncertainty in the Bayesian network.