Biblio

This publication deals with the robust attitude stabilization of a quadrotor subject to stealthy actuator attacks. Based first on the nonlinear model of the system, the sector non-linearity approach will be applied in order to deduce a polytopic Takagi-sugeno model. In parallel, a polytopic fuzzy T-S modeling of the data-deception malicious attacks (time-varying parameters) is presented. After some mathematical development, it will be shown that our original nonlinear system subject to stealthy actuator attacks can be represented as an uncertain polytopic T-S system. Based on this latest model, basic concepts for attitude stabilization will be used to implement the control law. The stabilization conditions will be given in terms of Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs) deduced from a classical Lyapunov approach. In order to highlight the efficiency of the proposed approach, simulation results will be given.

The security of Cyber-physical systems has been a hot topic in recent years. There are two main focuses in this area: Firstly, what kind of attacks can avoid detection, i.e., the stealthiness of attacks. Secondly, what kind of systems can stay stable under stealthy attacks, i.e., the invulnerability of systems. In this paper, we will give a detailed characterization for stealthy attacks and detection criterion for such attacks. We will also study conditions for the vulnerability of a stochastic linear system under stealthy attacks.

Incentive-driven advanced attacks have become a major concern to cyber-security. Traditional defense techniques that adopt a passive and static approach by assuming a fixed attack type are insufficient in the face of highly adaptive and stealthy attacks. In particular, a passive defense approach often creates information asymmetry where the attacker knows more about the defender. To this end, moving target defense (MTD) has emerged as a promising way to reverse this information asymmetry. The main idea of MTD is to (continuously) change certain aspects of the system under control to increase the attacker's uncertainty, which in turn increases attack cost/complexity and reduces the chance of a successful exploit in a given amount of time. In this paper, we go one step beyond and show that MTD can be further improved when combined with information disclosure. In particular, we consider that the defender adopts a MTD strategy to protect a critical resource across a network of nodes, and propose a Bayesian Stackelberg game model with the defender as the leader and the attacker as the follower. After fully characterizing the defender's optimal migration strategies, we show that the defender can design a signaling scheme to exploit the uncertainty created by MTD to further affect the attacker's behavior for its own advantage. We obtain conditions under which signaling is useful, and show that strategic information disclosure can be a promising way to further reverse the information asymmetry and achieve more efficient active defense.

While attacks on information systems have for most practical purposes binary outcomes (information was manipulated/eavesdropped, or not), attacks manipulating the sensor or control signals of Industrial Control Systems (ICS) can be tuned by the attacker to cause a continuous spectrum in damages. Attackers that want to remain undetected can attempt to hide their manipulation of the system by following closely the expected behavior of the system, while injecting just enough false information at each time step to achieve their goals. In this work, we study if attack-detection can limit the impact of such stealthy attacks. We start with a comprehensive review of related work on attack detection schemes in the security and control systems community. We then show that many of those works use detection schemes that are not limiting the impact of stealthy attacks. We propose a new metric to measure the impact of stealthy attacks and how they relate to our selection on an upper bound on false alarms. We finally show that the impact of such attacks can be mitigated in several cases by the proper combination and configuration of detection schemes. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our algorithms through simulations and experiments using real ICS testbeds and real ICS systems.

Advanced persistent threat (APT) is becoming a major threat to cyber security. As APT attacks are often launched by well funded entities that are persistent and stealthy in achieving their goals, they are highly challenging to combat in a cost-effective way. The situation becomes even worse when a sophisticated attacker is further assisted by an insider with privileged access to the inside information. Although stealthy attacks and insider threats have been considered separately in previous works, the coupling of the two is not well understood. As both types of threats are incentive driven, game theory provides a proper tool to understand the fundamental tradeoffs involved. In this paper, we propose the first three-player attacker-defender-insider game to model the strategic interactions among the three parties. Our game extends the two-player FlipIt game model for stealthy takeover by introducing an insider that can trade information to the attacker for a profit. We characterize the subgame perfect equilibria of the game with the defender as the leader and the attacker and the insider as the followers, under two different information trading processes. We make various observations and discuss approaches for achieving more efficient defense in the face of both APT and insider threats.