Biblio
Interactive systems are developed according to requirements, which may be, for instance, documentation, prototypes, diagrams, etc. The informal nature of system requirements may be a source of problems: it may be the case that a system does not implement the requirements as expected, thus, a way to validate whether an implementation follows the requirements is needed. We propose a novel approach to validating a system using formal models of the system. In this approach, a set of traces generated from the execution of the real interactive system is searched over the state space of the formal model. The scalability of the approach is demonstrated by an application to an industrial system in the nuclear plant domain. The combination of trace analysis and formal methods provides feedback that can bring improvements to both the real interactive system and the formal model.
As information security became an increasing concern for software developers and users, requirements engineering (RE) researchers brought new insight to security requirements. Security requirements aim to address security at the early stages of system design while accommodating the complex needs of different stakeholders. Meanwhile, other research communities, such as usable privacy and security, have also examined these requirements with specialized goal to make security more usable for stakeholders from product owners, to system users and administrators. In this paper we report results from conducting a literature survey to compare security requirements research from RE Conferences with the Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS). We report similarities between the two research areas, such as common goals, technical definitions, research problems, and directions. Further, we clarify the differences between these two communities to understand how they can leverage each other’s insights. From our analysis, we recommend new directions in security requirements research mainly to expand the meaning of security requirements in RE to reflect the technological advancements that the broader field of security is experiencing. These recommendations to encourage cross- collaboration with other communities are not limited to the security requirements area; in fact, we believe they can be generalized to other areas of RE.