Biblio

On the Internet, trust is difficult to obtain. With the rise of the possibility of obtaining gratis x509 certificates in an automated fashion, the use of TLS for establishing secure connections has significantly increased. However, other use cases, such as end-to-end encrypted messaging, do not yet have an easy method of managing trust in the public keys. This is particularly true for personal communication where two people want to securely exchange messages. While centralised solutions, such as Signal, exist, decentralised and federated protocols lack a way of conveniently and securely exchanging personal certificates. This paper presents a protocol and an implementation for certifying OpenPGP certificates. By offering multiple means of data transport protocols, it achieves robust and resilient certificate exchange between an attestee, the party whose key certificate is to be certified, and an attestor, the party who will express trust in the certificate once seen. The data can be transferred either via the Internet or via proximity-based technologies, i.e. Bluetooth or link-local networking. The former presents a challenge when the parties interested in exchanging certificates are not physically close, because an attacker may tamper with the connection. Our evaluation shows that a passive attacker learns nothing except the publicly visible metadata, e.g. the timings of the transfer while an active attacker can either have success with a very low probability or be detected by the user.

The semantics of online authentication in the web are rather straightforward: if Alice has a certificate binding Bob's name to a public key, and if a remote entity can prove knowledge of Bob's private key, then (barring key compromise) that remote entity must be Bob. However, in reality, many websites' and the majority of the most popular ones-are hosted at least in part by third parties such as Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) or web hosting providers. Put simply: administrators of websites who deal with (extremely) sensitive user data are giving their private keys to third parties. Importantly, this sharing of keys is undetectable by most users, and widely unknown even among researchers. In this paper, we perform a large-scale measurement study of key sharing in today's web. We analyze the prevalence with which websites trust third-party hosting providers with their secret keys, as well as the impact that this trust has on responsible key management practices, such as revocation. Our results reveal that key sharing is extremely common, with a small handful of hosting providers having keys from the majority of the most popular websites. We also find that hosting providers often manage their customers' keys, and that they tend to react more slowly yet more thoroughly to compromised or potentially compromised keys.

SSL and TLS are used to secure the most commonly used Internet protocols. As a result, the ecosystem of SSL certificates has been thoroughly studied, leading to a broad understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the certificates accepted by most web browsers. Prior work has naturally focused almost exclusively on "valid" certificates–those that standard browsers accept as well-formed and trusted–and has largely disregarded certificates that are otherwise "invalid." Surprisingly, however, this leaves the majority of certificates unexamined: we find that, on average, 65% of SSL certificates advertised in each IPv4 scan that we examine are actually invalid. In this paper, we demonstrate that despite their invalidity, much can be understood from these certificates. Specifically, we show why the web's SSL ecosystem is populated by so many invalid certificates, where they originate from, and how they impact security. Using a dataset of over 80M certificates, we determine that most invalid certificates originate from a few types of end-user devices, and possess dramatically different properties than their valid counterparts. We find that many of these devices periodically reissue their (invalid) certificates, and develop new techniques that allow us to track these reissues across scans. We present evidence that this technique allows us to uniquely track over 6.7M devices. Taken together, our results open up a heretofore largely-ignored portion of the SSL ecosystem to further study.

The semantics of online authentication in the web are rather straightforward: if Alice has a certificate binding Bob's name to a public key, and if a remote entity can prove knowledge of Bob's private key, then (barring key compromise) that remote entity must be Bob. However, in reality, many websites' and the majority of the most popular ones-are hosted at least in part by third parties such as Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) or web hosting providers. Put simply: administrators of websites who deal with (extremely) sensitive user data are giving their private keys to third parties. Importantly, this sharing of keys is undetectable by most users, and widely unknown even among researchers. In this paper, we perform a large-scale measurement study of key sharing in today's web. We analyze the prevalence with which websites trust third-party hosting providers with their secret keys, as well as the impact that this trust has on responsible key management practices, such as revocation. Our results reveal that key sharing is extremely common, with a small handful of hosting providers having keys from the majority of the most popular websites. We also find that hosting providers often manage their customers' keys, and that they tend to react more slowly yet more thoroughly to compromised or potentially compromised keys.

Processes to automate the selection of appropriate algorithms for various matrix computations are described. In particular, processes to check for, and certify, various matrix properties of black-box matrices are presented. These include sparsity patterns and structural properties that allow "superfast" algorithms to be used in place of black-box algorithms. Matrix properties that hold generically, and allow the use of matrix preconditioning to be reduced or eliminated, can also be checked for and certified –- notably including in the small-field case, where this presently has the greatest impact on the efficiency of the computation.