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2023-05-12
Chen, Haojie, Rao, Bo, Zhou, Song, Liang, Yunfeng, Li, Yangbo, Ren, Zhengkang, Mao, Feiyue, Zhao, Chuanxu, Li, Shuhao, Hu, Bo et al..  2022.  The installation of the island divertor coils on the J–TEXT tokamak. 2022 IEEE 5th International Electrical and Energy Conference (CIEEC). :2808–2811.
In order to investigate the effect of island divertor on the peak heat load reduction in a tokamak, a new island divertor was developed and installed in J-TEXT tokamak. The engineering design takes into account the complexity of the device based on the physical design, and also needs to ensure the insulation performance of the coil. Before installing the coil, electromagnetic forces on conductors and thermal conditions were simulated, the electromagnetic force on the magnetic island divertor coil will not cause damage to the coil, and there will be no thermal failure behavior.
2023-03-03
Gunathilake, Nilupulee A., Al-Dubai, Ahmed, Buchanan, William J., Lo, Owen.  2022.  Electromagnetic Side-Channel Attack Resilience against PRESENT Lightweight Block Cipher. 2022 6th International Conference on Cryptography, Security and Privacy (CSP). :51–55.
Lightweight cryptography is a novel diversion from conventional cryptography that targets internet-of-things (IoT) platform due to resource constraints. In comparison, it offers smaller cryptographic primitives such as shorter key sizes, block sizes and lesser energy drainage. The main focus can be seen in algorithm developments in this emerging subject. Thus, verification is carried out based upon theoretical (mathematical) proofs mostly. Among the few available side-channel analysis studies found in literature, the highest percentage is taken by power attacks. PRESENT is a promising lightweight block cipher to be included in IoT devices in the near future. Thus, the emphasis of this paper is on lightweight cryptology, and our investigation shows unavailability of a correlation electromagnetic analysis (CEMA) of it. Hence, in an effort to fill in this research gap, we opted to investigate the capabilities of CEMA against the PRESENT algorithm. This work aims to determine the probability of secret key leakage with a minimum number of electromagnetic (EM) waveforms possible. The process initially started from a simple EM analysis (SEMA) and gradually enhanced up to a CEMA. This paper presents our methodology in attack modelling, current results that indicate a probability of leaking seven bytes of the key and upcoming plans for optimisation. In addition, introductions to lightweight cryptanalysis and theories of EMA are also included.
2019-02-14
Nozaki, Yusuke, Yoshikawa, Masaya.  2018.  EM Based Machine Learning Attack for XOR Arbiter PUF. Proceedings of the 2Nd International Conference on Machine Learning and Soft Computing. :19-23.

The physical unclonable functions (PUFs) have been attracted attention to prevent semiconductor counterfeits. However, the risk of machine learning attack for an arbiter PUF, which is one of the typical PUFs, has been reported. Therefore, an XOR arbiter PUF, which has a resistance against the machine learning attack, was proposed. However, in recent years, a new machine learning attack using power consumption during the operation of the PUF circuit was reported. Also, it is important that the detailed tamper resistance verification of the PUFs to consider the security of the PUFs in the future. Therefore, this study proposes a new machine learning attack using electromagnetic waveforms for the XOR arbiter PUF. Experiments by an actual device evaluate the validity of the proposed method and the security of the XOR arbiter PUF.

2017-11-20
Nozaki, Y., Ikezaki, Y., Yoshikawa, M..  2016.  Tamper resistance of IoT devices against electromagnnetic analysis. 2016 IEEE International Meeting for Future of Electron Devices, Kansai (IMFEDK). :1–2.

Lightweight block ciphers, which are required for IoT devices, have attracted attention. Simeck, which is one of the most popular lightweight block ciphers, can be implemented on IoT devices in the smallest area. Regarding the hardware security, the threat of electromagnetic analysis has been reported. However, electromagnetic analysis of Simeck has not been reported. Therefore, this study proposes a dedicated electromagnetic analysis for a lightweight block cipher Simeck to ensure the safety of IoT devices in the future. To our knowledge, this is the first electromagnetic analysis for Simeck. Experiments using a FPGA prove the validity of the proposed method.

2017-04-03
Genkin, Daniel, Pachmanov, Lev, Pipman, Itamar, Tromer, Eran, Yarom, Yuval.  2016.  ECDSA Key Extraction from Mobile Devices via Nonintrusive Physical Side Channels. Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security. :1626–1638.

We show that elliptic-curve cryptography implementations on mobile devices are vulnerable to electromagnetic and power side-channel attacks. We demonstrate full extraction of ECDSA secret signing keys from OpenSSL and CoreBitcoin running on iOS devices, and partial key leakage from OpenSSL running on Android and from iOS's CommonCrypto. These non-intrusive attacks use a simple magnetic probe placed in proximity to the device, or a power probe on the phone's USB cable. They use a bandwidth of merely a few hundred kHz, and can be performed cheaply using an audio card and an improvised magnetic probe.