Biblio
With self-driving cars making their way on to our roads, we ask not what it would take for them to gain acceptance among consumers, but what impact they may have on other drivers. How they will be perceived and whether they will be trusted will likely have a major effect on traffic flow and vehicular safety. This work first undertakes an exploratory factor analysis to validate a trust scale for human-robot interaction and shows how previously validated metrics and general trust theory support a more complete model of trust that has increased applicability in the driving domain. We experimentally test this expanded model in the context of human-automation interaction during simulated driving, revealing how using these dimensions uncovers significant biases within human-robot trust that may have particularly deleterious effects when it comes to sharing our future roads with automated vehicles.
A3 is an execution management environment that aims to make network-facing applications and services resilient against zero-day attacks. A3 recently underwent two adversarial evaluations of its defensive capabilities. In one, A3 defended an App Store used in a Capture the Flag (CTF) tournament, and in the other, a tactically relevant network service in a red team exercise. This paper describes the A3 defensive technologies evaluated, the evaluation results, and the broader lessons learned about evaluations for technologies that seek to protect critical systems from zero-day attacks.
Automobiles provide comfort and mobility to owners. While they make life more meaningful they also pose challenges and risks in their safety and security mechanisms. Some modern automobiles are equipped with anti-theft systems and enhanced safety measures to safeguard its drivers. But at times, these mechanisms for safety and secured operation of automobiles are insufficient due to various mechanisms used by intruders and car thieves to defeat them. Drunk drivers cause accidents on our roads and thus the need to safeguard the driver when he is intoxicated and render the car to be incapable of being driven. These issues merit an integrated approach to safety and security of automobiles. In the light of these challenges, an integrated microcontroller-based hardware and software system for safety and security of automobiles to be fixed into existing vehicle architecture, was designed, developed and deployed. The system submodules are: (1) Two-step ignition for automobiles, namely: (a) biometric ignition and (b) alcohol detection with engine control, (2) Global Positioning System (GPS) based vehicle tracking and (3) Multisensor-based fire detection using neuro-fuzzy logic. All submodules of the system were implemented using one microcontroller, the Arduino Mega 2560, as the central control unit. The microcontroller was programmed using C++11. The developed system performed quite well with the tests performed on it. Given the right conditions, the alcohol detection subsystem operated with a 92% efficiency. The biometric ignition subsystem operated with about 80% efficiency. The fire detection subsystem operated with a 95% efficiency in locations registered with the neuro-fuzzy system. The vehicle tracking subsystem operated with an efficiency of 90%.
A distributed cyber control system comprises various types of assets, including sensors, intrusion detection systems, scanners, controllers, and actuators. The modeling and analysis of these components usually require multi-disciplinary approaches. This paper presents a modeling and dynamic analysis of a distributed cyber control system for situational awareness by taking advantage of control theory and time Petri net. Linear time-invariant systems are used to model the target system, attacks, assets influences, and an anomaly-based intrusion detection system. Time Petri nets are used to model the impact and timing relationships of attacks, vulnerability, and recovery at every node. To characterize those distributed control systems that are perfectly attackable, algebraic and topological attackability conditions are derived. Numerical evaluation is performed to determine the impact of attacks on distributed control system.
A distributed cyber control system comprises various types of assets, including sensors, intrusion detection systems, scanners, controllers, and actuators. The modeling and analysis of these components usually require multi-disciplinary approaches. This paper presents a modeling and dynamic analysis of a distributed cyber control system for situational awareness by taking advantage of control theory and time Petri net. Linear time-invariant systems are used to model the target system, attacks, assets influences, and an anomaly-based intrusion detection system. Time Petri nets are used to model the impact and timing relationships of attacks, vulnerability, and recovery at every node. To characterize those distributed control systems that are perfectly attackable, algebraic and topological attackability conditions are derived. Numerical evaluation is performed to determine the impact of attacks on distributed control system.