Biblio
Internet of Things (IoT) is a revolutionary expandable network which has brought many advantages, improving the Quality of Life (QoL) of individuals. However, IoT carries dangers, due to the fact that hackers have the ability to find security gaps in users' IoT devices, which are not still secure enough and hence, intrude into them for malicious activities. As a result, they can control many connected devices in an IoT network, turning IoT into Botnet of Things (BoT). In a botnet, hackers can launch several types of attacks, such as the well known attacks of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) and Man in the Middle (MitM), and/or spread various types of malicious software (malware) to the compromised devices of the IoT network. In this paper, we propose a novel hybrid Artificial Intelligence (AI)-powered honeynet for enhanced IoT botnet detection rate with the use of Cloud Computing (CC). This upcoming security mechanism makes use of Machine Learning (ML) techniques like the Logistic Regression (LR) in order to predict potential botnet existence. It can also be adopted by other conventional security architectures in order to intercept hackers the creation of large botnets for malicious actions.
Cryptographic protocols are the basis for the security of any protected system, including the electronic voting system. One of the most effective ways to analyze protocol security is to use verifiers. In this paper, the formal verifier SPIN was used to analyze the security of the cryptographic protocol for e-voting, which is based on model checking using linear temporal logic (LTL). The cryptographic protocol of electronic voting is described. The main structural units of the Promela language used for simulation in the SPIN verifier are described. The model of the electronic voting protocol in the language Promela is given. The interacting parties, transferred data, the order of the messages transmitted between the parties are described. Security of the cryptographic protocol using the SPIN tool is verified. The simulation of the protocol with active intruder using the man in the middle attack (MITM) to substitute data is made. In the simulation results it is established that the protocol correctly handles the case of an active attack on the parties' authentication.
The exploitation of Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) has been described as both easy and impossible, where is the truth? PostStuxnet works have included a plethora of ICS focused cyber security research activities, with topics covering device maturity, network protocols, and overall cyber security culture. We often hear the notion of ICSs being highly vulnerable due to a lack of inbuilt security mechanisms, considered a low hanging fruit to a variety of low skilled threat actors. While there is substantial evidence to support such a notion, when considering targeted attacks on ICS, it is hard to believe an attacker with limited resources, such as a script kiddie or hacktivist, using publicly accessible tools and exploits alone, would have adequate knowledge and resources to achieve targeted operational process manipulation, while simultaneously evade detection. Through use of a testbed environment, this paper provides two practical examples based on a Man-In-The-Middle scenario, demonstrating the types of information an attacker would need obtain, collate, and comprehend, in order to begin targeted process manipulation and detection avoidance. This allows for a clearer view of associated challenges, and illustrate why targeted ICS exploitation might not be possible for every malicious actor.
In this paper, cyber physical system is analyzed from security perspective. A double closed-loop security control structure and algorithm with defense functions is proposed. From this structure, the features of several cyber attacks are considered respectively. By this structure, the models of information disclosure, denial-of-service (DoS) and Man-in-the-Middle Attack (MITM) are proposed. According to each kind attack, different models are obtained and analyzed, then reduce to the unified models. Based on this, system security conditions are obtained, and a defense scenario with detail algorithm is design to illustrate the implementation of this program.
We present the design and implementation of a trust-on-first-use (TOFU) policy for OpenPGP. When an OpenPGP user verifies a signature, TOFU checks that the signer used the same key as in the past. If not, this is a strong indicator that a key is a forgery and either the message is also a forgery or an active man-in-the-middle attack (MitM) is or was underway. That is, TOFU can proactively detect new attacks if the user had previously verified a message from the signer. And, it can reactively detect an attack if the signer gets a message through. TOFU cannot, however, protect against sustained MitM attacks. Despite this weakness, TOFU's practical security is stronger than the Web of Trust (WoT), OpenPGP's current trust policy, for most users. The problem with the WoT is that it requires too much user support. TOFU is also better than the most popular alternative, an X.509-based PKI, which relies on central servers whose certification processes are often sloppy. In this paper, we outline how TOFU can be integrated into OpenPGP; we address a number of potential attacks against TOFU; and, we show how TOFU can work alongside the WoT. Our implementation demonstrates the practicality of the approach.
There are currently no requirements (technical or otherwise) that routing paths must be contained within national boundaries. Indeed, some paths experience international detours, i.e., originate in one country, cross international boundaries and return to the same country. In most cases these are sensible traffic engineering or peering decisions at ISPs that serve multiple countries. In some cases such detours may be suspicious. Characterizing international detours is useful to a number of players: (a) network engineers trying to diagnose persistent problems, (b) policy makers aiming at adhering to certain national communication policies, (c) entrepreneurs looking for opportunities to deploy new networks, or (d) privacy-conscious states trying to minimize the amount of internal communication traversing different jurisdictions. In this paper we characterize international detours in the Internet during the month of January 2016. To detect detours we sample BGP RIBs every 8 hours from 461 RouteViews and RIPE RIS peers spanning 30 countries. We use geolocation of ASes which geolocates each BGP prefix announced by each AS, mapping its presence at IXPs and geolocation infrastructure IPs. Finally, we analyze each global BGP RIB entry looking for detours. Our analysis shows more than 5K unique BGP prefixes experienced a detour. 132 prefixes experienced more than 50% of the detours. We observe about 544K detours. Detours either last for a few days or persist the entire month. Out of all the detours, more than 90% were transient detours that lasted for 72 hours or less. We also show different countries experience different characteristics of detours.