Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Author is Ruoti, Scott  [Clear All Filters]
2017-09-27
O'Neill, Mark, Ruoti, Scott, Seamons, Kent, Zappala, Daniel.  2016.  TLS Proxies: Friend or Foe? Proceedings of the 2016 Internet Measurement Conference. :551–557.
We measure the prevalence and uses of TLS proxies using a Flash tool deployed with a Google AdWords campaign. We generate 2.9 million certificate tests and find that 1 in 250 TLS connections are TLS-proxied. The majority of these proxies appear to be benevolent, however we identify over 1,000 cases where three malware products are using this technology nefariously. We also find numerous instances of negligent, duplicitous, and suspicious behavior, some of which degrade security for users without their knowledge. Distinguishing these types of practices is challenging in practice, indicating a need for transparency and user awareness.
2017-09-11
Afanasyev, Alexander, Halderman, J. Alex, Ruoti, Scott, Seamons, Kent, Yu, Yingdi, Zappala, Daniel, Zhang, Lixia.  2016.  Content-based Security for the Web. Proceedings of the 2016 New Security Paradigms Workshop. :49–60.

The World Wide Web has become the most common platform for building applications and delivering content. Yet despite years of research, the web continues to face severe security challenges related to data integrity and confidentiality. Rather than continuing the exploit-and-patch cycle, we propose addressing these challenges at an architectural level, by supplementing the web's existing connection-based and server-based security models with a new approach: content-based security. With this approach, content is directly signed and encrypted at rest, enabling it to be delivered via any path and then validated by the browser. We explore how this new architectural approach can be applied to the web and analyze its security benefits. We then discuss a broad research agenda to realize this vision and the challenges that must be overcome.

2017-08-18
Afanasyev, Alexander, Halderman, J. Alex, Ruoti, Scott, Seamons, Kent, Yu, Yingdi, Zappala, Daniel, Zhang, Lixia.  2016.  Content-based Security for the Web. Proceedings of the 2016 New Security Paradigms Workshop. :49–60.

The World Wide Web has become the most common platform for building applications and delivering content. Yet despite years of research, the web continues to face severe security challenges related to data integrity and confidentiality. Rather than continuing the exploit-and-patch cycle, we propose addressing these challenges at an architectural level, by supplementing the web's existing connection-based and server-based security models with a new approach: content-based security. With this approach, content is directly signed and encrypted at rest, enabling it to be delivered via any path and then validated by the browser. We explore how this new architectural approach can be applied to the web and analyze its security benefits. We then discuss a broad research agenda to realize this vision and the challenges that must be overcome.