Biblio

Ransomware is a growing threat that encrypts auser's files and holds the decryption key until a ransom ispaid by the victim. This type of malware is responsible fortens of millions of dollars in extortion annually. Worse still, developing new variants is trivial, facilitating the evasion of manyantivirus and intrusion detection systems. In this work, we presentCryptoDrop, an early-warning detection system that alerts a userduring suspicious file activity. Using a set of behavior indicators, CryptoDrop can halt a process that appears to be tampering witha large amount of the user's data. Furthermore, by combininga set of indicators common to ransomware, the system can beparameterized for rapid detection with low false positives. Ourexperimental analysis of CryptoDrop stops ransomware fromexecuting with a median loss of only 10 files (out of nearly5,100 available files). Our results show that careful analysis ofransomware behavior can produce an effective detection systemthat significantly mitigates the amount of victim data loss.

Attacks of Ransomware are increasing, this form of malware bypasses many technical solutions by leveraging social engineering methods. This means established methods of perimeter defence need to be supplemented with additional systems. Honeypots are bogus computer resources deployed by network administrators to act as decoy computers and detect any illicit access. This study investigated whether a honeypot folder could be created and monitored for changes. The investigations determined a suitable method to detect changes to this area. This research investigated methods to implement a honeypot to detect ransomware activity, and selected two options, the File Screening service of the Microsoft File Server Resource Manager feature and EventSentry to manipulate the Windows Security logs. The research developed a staged response to attacks to the system along with thresholds when there were triggered. The research ascertained that witness tripwire files offer limited value as there is no way to influence the malware to access the area containing the monitored files.

Currently, different forms of ransomware are increasingly threatening Internet users. Modern ransomware encrypts important user data, and it is only possible to recover it once a ransom has been paid. In this article we show how software-defined networking can be utilized to improve ransomware mitigation. In more detail, we analyze the behavior of popular ransomware - CryptoWall - and, based on this knowledge, propose two real-time mitigation methods. Then we describe the design of an SDN-based system, implemented using OpenFlow, that facilitates a timely reaction to this threat, and is a crucial factor in the case of crypto ransomware. What is important is that such a design does not significantly affect overall network performance. Experimental results confirm that the proposed approach is feasible and efficient.

Android is currently the most widely used mobile environment. This trend encourages malware writers to develop specific attacks targeting this platform with threats designed to covertly collect data or financially extort victims, the so-called ransomware. In this paper we use formal methods, in particular model checking, to automatically dissect ransomware samples. Starting from manual inspection of few samples, we define a set of rule in order to check whether the behaviours we find are representative of ransomware functionalities.

Future wars will be cyber wars and the attacks will be a sturdy amalgamation of cryptography along with malware to distort information systems and its security. The explosive Internet growth facilitates cyber-attacks. Web threats include risks, that of loss of confidential data and erosion of consumer confidence in e-commerce. The emergence of cyber hack jacking threat in the new form in cyberspace is known as ransomware or crypto virus. The locker bot waits for specific triggering events, to become active. It blocks the task manager, command prompt and other cardinal executable files, a thread checks for their existence every few milliseconds, killing them if present. Imposing serious threats to the digital generation, ransomware pawns the Internet users by hijacking their system and encrypting entire system utility files and folders, and then demanding ransom in exchange for the decryption key it provides for release of the encrypted resources to its original form. We present in this research, the anatomical study of a ransomware family that recently picked up quite a rage and is called CTB locker, and go on to the hard money it makes per user, and its source C&C server, which lies with the Internet's greatest incognito mode-The Dark Net. Cryptolocker Ransomware or the CTB Locker makes a Bitcoin wallet per victim and payment mode is in the form of digital bitcoins which utilizes the anonymity network or Tor gateway. CTB Locker is the deadliest malware the world ever encountered.

Cybercrimes today are focused over returns, especially in the form of monetary returns. In this paper - through a literature study and conducting interviews for the people victimized by ransomware and a survey with random set of victimized and non-victimized by ransomware - conclusions about the dependence of ransomware on demographics like age and education areshown. Increasing threats due to ease of transfer of ransomware through internet arealso discussed. Finally, low level awarenessamong company professionals is confirmed and reluctance to payment on being a victim is found as a common trait.

Extortion using digital platforms is an increasing form of crime. A commonly seen problem is extortion in the form of an infection of a Crypto Ransomware that encrypts the files of the target and demands a ransom to recover the locked data. By analyzing the four most common Crypto Ransomwares, at writing, a clear vulnerability is identified; all infections rely on tools available on the target system to be able to prevent a simple recovery after the attack has been detected. By renaming the system tool that handles shadow copies it is possible to recover from infections from all four of the most common Crypto Ransomwares. The solution is packaged in a single, easy to use script.

Cryptocurrencies record transactions in a decentralized data structure called a blockchain. Two of the most popular cryptocurrencies, Bitcoin and Ethereum, support the feature to encode rules or scripts for processing transactions. This feature has evolved to give practical shape to the ideas of smart contracts, or full-fledged programs that are run on blockchains. Recently, Ethereum's smart contract system has seen steady adoption, supporting tens of thousands of contracts, holding millions dollars worth of virtual coins. In this paper, we investigate the security of running smart contracts based on Ethereum in an open distributed network like those of cryptocurrencies. We introduce several new security problems in which an adversary can manipulate smart contract execution to gain profit. These bugs suggest subtle gaps in the understanding of the distributed semantics of the underlying platform. As a refinement, we propose ways to enhance the operational semantics of Ethereum to make contracts less vulnerable. For developers writing contracts for the existing Ethereum system, we build a symbolic execution tool called Oyente to find potential security bugs. Among 19, 336 existing Ethereum contracts, Oyente flags 8, 833 of them as vulnerable, including the TheDAO bug which led to a 60 million US dollar loss in June 2016. We also discuss the severity of other attacks for several case studies which have source code available and confirm the attacks (which target only our accounts) in the main Ethereum network.

Thanks to their anonymity (pseudonymity) and elimination of trusted intermediaries, cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin have created or stimulated growth in many businesses and communities. Unfortunately, some of these are criminal, e.g., money laundering, illicit marketplaces, and ransomware. Next-generation cryptocurrencies such as Ethereum will include rich scripting languages in support of smart contracts, programs that autonomously intermediate transactions. In this paper, we explore the risk of smart contracts fueling new criminal ecosystems. Specifically, we show how what we call criminal smart contracts (CSCs) can facilitate leakage of confidential information, theft of cryptographic keys, and various real-world crimes (murder, arson, terrorism). We show that CSCs for leakage of secrets (a la Wikileaks) are efficiently realizable in existing scripting languages such as that in Ethereum. We show that CSCs for theft of cryptographic keys can be achieved using primitives, such as Succinct Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge (SNARKs), that are already expressible in these languages and for which efficient supporting language extensions are anticipated. We show similarly that authenticated data feeds, an emerging feature of smart contract systems, can facilitate CSCs for real-world crimes (e.g., property crimes). Our results highlight the urgency of creating policy and technical safeguards against CSCs in order to realize the promise of smart contracts for beneficial goals.

Smart contracts are programs that execute autonomously on blockchains. Their key envisioned uses (e.g. financial instruments) require them to consume data from outside the blockchain (e.g. stock quotes). Trustworthy data feeds that support a broad range of data requests will thus be critical to smart contract ecosystems. We present an authenticated data feed system called Town Crier (TC). TC acts as a bridge between smart contracts and existing web sites, which are already commonly trusted for non-blockchain applications. It combines a blockchain front end with a trusted hardware back end to scrape HTTPS-enabled websites and serve source-authenticated data to relying smart contracts. TC also supports confidentiality. It enables private data requests with encrypted parameters. Additionally, in a generalization that executes smart-contract logic within TC, the system permits secure use of user credentials to scrape access-controlled online data sources. We describe TC's design principles and architecture and report on an implementation that uses Intel's recently introduced Software Guard Extensions (SGX) to furnish data to the Ethereum smart contract system. We formally model TC and define and prove its basic security properties in the Universal Composibility (UC) framework. Our results include definitions and techniques of general interest relating to resource consumption (Ethereum's "gas" fee system) and TCB minimization. We also report on experiments with three example applications. We plan to launch TC soon as an online public service.

We study the strategic considerations of miners participating in the bitcoin's protocol. We formulate and study the stochastic game that underlies these strategic considerations. The miners collectively build a tree of blocks, and they are paid when they create a node (mine a block) which will end up in the path of the tree that is adopted by all. Since the miners can hide newly mined nodes, they play a game with incomplete information. Here we consider two simplified forms of this game in which the miners have complete information. In the simplest game the miners release every mined block immediately, but are strategic on which blocks to mine. In the second more complicated game, when a block is mined it is announced immediately, but it may not be released so that other miners cannot continue mining from it. A miner not only decides which blocks to mine, but also when to release blocks to other miners. In both games, we show that when the computational power of each miner is relatively small, their best response matches the expected behavior of the bitcoin designer. However, when the computational power of a miner is large, he deviates from the expected behavior, and other Nash equilibria arise.

Bitcoin provides two incentives for miners: block rewards and transaction fees. The former accounts for the vast majority of miner revenues at the beginning of the system, but it is expected to transition to the latter as the block rewards dwindle. There has been an implicit belief that whether miners are paid by block rewards or transaction fees does not affect the security of the block chain. We show that this is not the case. Our key insight is that with only transaction fees, the variance of the block reward is very high due to the exponentially distributed block arrival time, and it becomes attractive to fork a "wealthy" block to "steal" the rewards therein. We show that this results in an equilibrium with undesirable properties for Bitcoin's security and performance, and even non-equilibria in some circumstances. We also revisit selfish mining and show that it can be made profitable for a miner with an arbitrarily low hash power share, and who is arbitrarily poorly connected within the network. Our results are derived from theoretical analysis and confirmed by a new Bitcoin mining simulator that may be of independent interest.We discuss the troubling implications of our results for Bitcoin's future security and draw lessons for the design of new cryptocurrencies.

Motivated by the impossibility of achieving fairness in secure computation [Cleve, STOC 1986], recent works study a model of fairness in which an adversarial party that aborts on receiving output is forced to pay a mutually predefined monetary penalty to every other party that did not receive the output. These works show how to design protocols for secure computation with penalties that guarantees that either fairness is guaranteed or that each honest party obtains a monetary penalty from the adversary. Protocols for this task are typically designed in an hybrid model where parties have access to a "claim-or-refund" transaction functionality denote FCR*. In this work, we obtain improvements on the efficiency of these constructions by amortizing the cost over multiple executions of secure computation with penalties. More precisely, for computational security parameter λ, we design a protocol that implements l = poly\vphantom\\(λ) instances of secure computation with penalties where the total number of calls to FCR* is independent of l.

Cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin and 250 similar alt-coins, embody at their core a blockchain protocol –- a mechanism for a distributed network of computational nodes to periodically agree on a set of new transactions. Designing a secure blockchain protocol relies on an open challenge in security, that of designing a highly-scalable agreement protocol open to manipulation by byzantine or arbitrarily malicious nodes. Bitcoin's blockchain agreement protocol exhibits security, but does not scale: it processes 3–7 transactions per second at present, irrespective of the available computation capacity at hand. In this paper, we propose a new distributed agreement protocol for permission-less blockchains called ELASTICO. ELASTICO scales transaction rates almost linearly with available computation for mining: the more the computation power in the network, the higher the number of transaction blocks selected per unit time. ELASTICO is efficient in its network messages and tolerates byzantine adversaries of up to one-fourth of the total computational power. Technically, ELASTICO uniformly partitions or parallelizes the mining network (securely) into smaller committees, each of which processes a disjoint set of transactions (or "shards"). While sharding is common in non-byzantine settings, ELASTICO is the first candidate for a secure sharding protocol with presence of byzantine adversaries. Our scalability experiments on Amazon EC2 with up to \$1, 600\$ nodes confirm ELASTICO's theoretical scaling properties.

Motivated by the impossibility of achieving fairness in secure computation [Cleve, STOC 1986], recent works study a model of fairness in which an adversarial party that aborts on receiving output is forced to pay a mutually predefined monetary penalty to every other party that did not receive the output. These works show how to design protocols for secure computation with penalties that tolerate an arbitrary number of corruptions. In this work, we improve the efficiency of protocols for secure computation with penalties in a hybrid model where parties have access to the "claim-or-refund" transaction functionality. Our first improvement is for the ladder protocol of Bentov and Kumaresan (Crypto 2014) where we improve the dependence of the script complexity of the protocol (which corresponds to miner verification load and also space on the blockchain) on the number of parties from quadratic to linear (and in particular, is completely independent of the underlying function). Our second improvement is for the see-saw protocol of Kumaresan et al. (CCS 2015) where we reduce the total number of claim-or-refund transactions and also the script complexity from quadratic to linear in the number of parties.

The blockchain emerges as an innovative tool which proves to be useful in a number of application scenarios. A number of large industrial players, such as IBM, Microsoft, Intel, and NEC, are currently investing in exploiting the blockchain in order to enrich their portfolio of products. A number of researchers and practitioners speculate that the blockchain technology can change the way we see a number of online applications today. Although it is still early to tell for sure, it is expected that the blockchain will stimulate considerable changes to a large number of products and will positively impact the digital experience of many individuals around the globe. In this tutorial, we overview, detail, and analyze the security provisions of Bitcoin and its underlying blockchain-effectively capturing recently reported attacks and threats in the system. Our contributions go beyond the mere analysis of reported vulnerabilities of Bitcoin; namely, we describe and evaluate a number of countermeasures to deter threats on the system-some of which have already been incorporated in the system. Recall that Bitcoin has been forked multiple times in order to fine-tune the consensus (i.e., the block generation time and the hash function), and the network parameters (e.g., the size of blocks). As such, the results reported in this tutorial are not only restricted to Bitcoin, but equally apply to a number of "altcoins" which are basically clones/forks of the Bitcoin source code. Given the increasing number of alternative blockchain proposals, this tutorial extracts the basic security lessons learnt from the Bitcoin system with the aim to foster better designs and analysis of next-generation secure blockchain currencies and technologies.