Biblio
From signal processing to emerging deep neural networks, a range of applications exhibit intrinsic error resilience. For such applications, approximate computing opens up new possibilities for energy-efficient computing by producing slightly inaccurate results using greatly simplified hardware. Adopting this approach, a variety of basic arithmetic units, such as adders and multipliers, have been effectively redesigned to generate approximate results for many error-resilient applications.In this work, we propose SECO, an approximate exponential function unit (EFU). Exponentiation is a key operation in many signal processing applications and more importantly in spiking neuron models, but its energy-efficient implementation has been inadequately explored. We also introduce a cross-layer design method for SECO to optimize the energy-accuracy trade-off. At the algorithm level, SECO offers runtime scaling between energy efficiency and accuracy based on approximate Taylor expansion, where the error is minimized by optimizing parameters using discrete gradient descent at design time. At the circuit level, our error analysis method efficiently explores the design space to select the energy-accuracy-optimal approximate multiplier at design time. In tandem, the cross-layer design and runtime optimization method are able to generate energy-efficient and accurate approximate EFU designs that are up to 99.7% accurate at a power consumption of 3.73 pJ per exponential operation. SECO is also evaluated on the adaptive exponential integrate-and-fire neuron model, yielding only 0.002% timing error and 0.067% value error compared to the precise neuron model.
Due to the recent technological development, home appliances and electric devices are equipped with high-performance hardware device. Since demand of hardware devices is increased, production base become internationalized to mass-produce hardware devices with low cost and hardware vendors outsource their products to third-party vendors. Accordingly, malicious third-party vendors can easily insert malfunctions (also known as "hardware Trojans'') into their products. In this paper, we design six kinds of hardware Trojans at a gate-level netlist, and apply a neural-network (NN) based hardware-Trojan detection method to them. The designed hardware Trojans are different in trigger circuits. In addition, we insert them to normal circuits, and detect hardware Trojans using a machine-learning-based hardware-Trojan detection method with neural networks. In our experiment, we learned Trojan-infected benchmarks using NN, and performed cross validation to evaluate the learned NN. The experimental results demonstrate that the average TPR (True Positive Rate) becomes 72.9%, the average TNR (True Negative Rate) becomes 90.0%.
Different applications concurrently running on modern MPSoCs can interfere with each other when they use shared resources. This interference can cause side channels, i.e., sources of unintended information flow between applications. To prevent such side channels, we propose a hybrid mapping methodology that attempts to ensure spatial isolation, i.e., a mutually-exclusive allocation of resources to applications in the MPSoC. At design time and as a first step, we compute compact and connected application mappings (called shapes). In a second step, run-time management uses this information to map multiple spatially segregated shapes to the architecture. We present and evaluate a (fast) heuristic and an (exact) SAT-based mapper, demonstrating the viability of the approach.