Biblio
Cryptojacking (also called malicious cryptocurrency mining or cryptomining) is a new threat model using CPU resources covertly “mining” a cryptocurrency in the browser. The impact is a surge in CPU Usage and slows the system performance. In this research, in-browsercryptojacking mitigation has been built as an extension in Google Chrome using Taint analysis method. The method used in this research is attack modeling with abuse case using the Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attack as a testing for mitigation. The proposed model is designed so that users will be notified if a cryptojacking attack occurs. Hence, the user is able to check the script characteristics that run on the website background. The results of this research show that the taint analysis is a promising method to mitigate cryptojacking attacks. From 100 random sample websites, the taint analysis method can detect 19 websites that are infcted by cryptojacking.
With the recent boom in the cryptocurrency market, hackers have been on the lookout to find novel ways of commandeering users' machine for covert and stealthy mining operations. In an attempt to expose such under-the-hood practices, this paper explores the issue of browser cryptojacking, whereby miners are secretly deployed inside browser code without the knowledge of the user. To this end, we analyze the top 50k websites from Alexa and find a noticeable percentage of sites that are indulging in this exploitative exercise often using heavily obfuscated code. Furthermore, mining prevention plug-ins, such as NoMiner, fail to flag such cleverly concealed instances. Hence, we propose a machine learning solution based on hardware-assisted profiling of browser code in real-time. A fine-grained micro-architectural footprint allows us to classify mining applications with \textbackslashtextgreater99% accuracy and even flags them if the mining code has been heavily obfuscated or encrypted. We build our own browser extension and show that it outperforms other plug-ins. The proposed design has negligible overhead on the user's machine and works for all standard off-the-shelf CPUs.
Blockchain networks which employ Proof-of-Work in their consensus mechanism may face inconsistencies in the form of forks. These forks are usually resolved through the application of block selection rules (such as the Nakamoto consensus). In this paper, we investigate the cause and length of forks for the Bitcoin network. We develop theoretical formulas which model the Bitcoin consensus and network protocols, based on an Erdös-Rényi random graph construction of the overlay network of peers. Our theoretical model addresses the effect of key parameters on the fork occurrence probability, such as block propagation delay, network bandwidth, and block size. We also leverage this model to estimate the weight of fork branches. Our model is implemented using the network simulator OMNET++ and validated by historical Bitcoin data. We show that under current conditions, Bitcoin will not benefit from increasing the number of connections per node.
Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies secure a decentralized consensus protocol by incentives. The protocol participants, called miners, generate (mine) a series of blocks, each containing monetary transactions created by system users. As incentive for participation, miners receive newly minted currency and transaction fees paid by transaction creators. Blockchain bandwidth limits lead users to pay increasing fees in order to prioritize their transactions. However, most prior work focused on models where fees are negligible. In a notable exception, Carlsten et al. [17] postulated that if incentives come only from fees then a mining gap would form\textasciitilde— miners would avoid mining when the available fees are insufficient. In this work, we analyze cryptocurrency security in realistic settings, taking into account all elements of expenses and rewards. To study when gaps form, we analyze the system as a game we call the gap game. We analyze the game with a combination of symbolic and numeric analysis tools in a wide range of scenarios. Our analysis confirms Carlsten et al.'s postulate; indeed, we show that gaps form well before fees are the only incentive, and analyze the implications on security. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that different miners choose different gap sizes to optimize their utility, even when their operating costs are identical. Alarmingly, we see that the system incentivizes large miner coalitions, reducing system decentralization. We describe the required conditions to avoid the incentive misalignment, providing guidelines for future cryptocurrency design.
The underlying or core technology of Bitcoin cryptocurrency has become a blessing for human being in this era. Everything is gradually changing to digitization in this today's epoch. Bitcoin creates virtual money using Blockchain that's become popular over the world. Blockchain is a shared public ledger, and it includes all transactions which are confirmed. It is almost impossible to crack the hidden information in the blocks of the Blockchain. However, there are certain security and technical challenges like scalability, privacy leakage, selfish mining, etc. which hampers the wide application of Blockchain. In this paper, we briefly discuss this emerging technology namely Blockchain. In addition, we extrapolate in-depth insight on Blockchain technology.
A blockchain is a distributed ledger forming a distributed consensus on a history of transactions, and is the underlying technology for the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. However, its applications are far beyond the financial sector. The transaction verification process for cryptocurrencies is much slower than traditional digital transaction systems. One approach to increase transaction speed and scalability is to identify a solution that offers faster Proof of Work. In this paper, we propose a method for accelerating the process of Proof of Work based on parallel mining rather than solo mining. The goal is to ensure that no more than two or more miners put the same effort into solving a specific block. The proposed method includes a process for selection of a manager, distribution of work and a reward system. This method has been implemented in a test environment that contains all the characteristics needed to perform Proof of Work for Bitcoin and has been tested, using a variety of case scenarios, by varying the difficulty level and number of validators. Preliminary results show improvement in the scalability of Proof of Work up to 34% compared to the current system.
In the past years, the security of Bitcoin-like protocols has been intensively studied. However, previous investigations are mainly focused on the single-mode version of Bitcoin protocol, where the protocol is running among full nodes (miners). In this paper we initiate the study of multi-mode cryptocurrency protocols. We generalize the recent framework by Garay et al (Eurocrypt 2015) with new security de nitions that capture the security of realistic cryptocurrency systems. e.g. Bitcoin with full and lightweight nodes. As an immediate application of our new framework, we analyze the security of existing blockchain pruning proposals for Bitcoin and Ethereum aiming to improve the storage e ciency of network nodes by pruning unnecessary information from the ledger.
In blockchain-based systems, malicious behaviour can be detected using auditable information in transactions managed by distributed ledgers. Besides cryptocurrency, blockchain technology has recently been used for other applications, such as file storage. However, most of existing blockchain- based file storage systems can not revoke a user efficiently when multiple users have access to the same file that is encrypted. Actually, they need to update file encryption keys and distribute new keys to remaining users, which significantly increases computation and bandwidth overheads. In this work, we propose a blockchain and proxy re-encryption based design for encrypted file sharing that brings a distributed access control and data management. By combining blockchain with proxy re-encryption, our approach not only ensures confidentiality and integrity of files, but also provides a scalable key management mechanism for file sharing among multiple users. Moreover, by storing encrypted files and related keys in a distributed way, our method can resist collusion attacks between revoked users and distributed proxies.
Mining is the foundation of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies such as Bitcoin rewarding the miner for finding blocks for new transactions. The Monero currency enables mining with standard hardware in contrast to special hardware (ASICs) as often used in Bitcoin, paving the way for in-browser mining as a new revenue model for website operators. In this work, we study the prevalence of this new phenomenon. We identify and classify mining websites in 138M domains and present a new fingerprinting method which finds up to a factor of 5.7 more miners than publicly available block lists. Our work identifies and dissects Coinhive as the major browser-mining stakeholder. Further, we present a new method to associate mined blocks in the Monero blockchain to mining pools and uncover that Coinhive currently contributes 1.18% of mined blocks having turned over 1293 Moneros in June 2018.
Consider the following set-up for the plot of a possible future episode of the TV series Black Mirror: human brains can be connected directly to the net and MiningMind Inc. has developed a technology that merges a reward system with a cryptojacking engine that uses the human brain to mine cryptocurrency (or to carry out some other mining activity). Part of our brain will be committed to cryptographic calculations (mining), leaving the remaining part untouched for everyday operations, i.e., for our brain's normal daily activity. In this short paper, we briefly argue why this set-up might not be so far fetched after all, and explore the impact that such a technology could have on our lives and our society. This article is summarized in: the morning paper an interesting/influential/important paper from the world of CS every weekday morning, as selected by Adrian Colyer
A wave of alternative coins that can be effectively mined without specialized hardware, and a surge in cryptocurrencies' market value has led to the development of cryptocurrency mining ( cryptomining ) services, such as Coinhive, which can be easily integrated into websites to monetize the computational power of their visitors. While legitimate website operators are exploring these services as an alternative to advertisements, they have also drawn the attention of cybercriminals: drive-by mining (also known as cryptojacking ) is a new web-based attack, in which an infected website secretly executes JavaScript code and/or a WebAssembly module in the user's browser to mine cryptocurrencies without her consent. In this paper, we perform a comprehensive analysis on Alexa's Top 1 Million websites to shed light on the prevalence and profitability of this attack. We study the websites affected by drive-by mining to understand the techniques being used to evade detection, and the latest web technologies being exploited to efficiently mine cryptocurrency. As a result of our study, which covers 28 Coinhive-like services that are widely being used by drive-by mining websites, we identified 20 active cryptomining campaigns. Motivated by our findings, we investigate possible countermeasures against this type of attack. We discuss how current blacklisting approaches and heuristics based on CPU usage are insufficient, and present MineSweeper, a novel detection technique that is based on the intrinsic characteristics of cryptomining code, and, thus, is resilient to obfuscation. Our approach could be integrated into browsers to warn users about silent cryptomining when visiting websites that do not ask for their consent.
With the rise in worth and popularity of cryptocurrencies, a new opportunity for criminal gain is being exploited and with little currently offered in the way of defence. The cost of mining (i.e., earning cryptocurrency through CPU-intensive calculations that underpin the blockchain technology) can be prohibitively expensive, with hardware costs and electrical overheads previously offering a loss compared to the cryptocurrency gained. Off-loading these costs along a distributed network of machines via malware offers an instantly profitable scenario, though standard Anti-virus (AV) products offer some defences against file-based threats. However, newer fileless malicious attacks, occurring through the browser on seemingly legitimate websites, can easily evade detection and surreptitiously engage the victim machine in computationally-expensive cryptomining (cryptojacking). With no current academic literature on the dynamic opcode analysis of cryptomining, to the best of our knowledge, we present the first such experimental study. Indeed, this is the first such work presenting opcode analysis on non-executable files. Our results show that browser-based cryptomining within our dataset can be detected by dynamic opcode analysis, with accuracies of up to 100%. Further to this, our model can distinguish between cryptomining sites, weaponized benign sites, de-weaponized cryptomining sites and real world benign sites. As it is process-based, our technique offers an opportunity to rapidly detect, prevent and mitigate such attacks, a novel contribution which should encourage further future work.
In this paper, we examine the recent trend to- wards in-browser mining of cryptocurrencies; in particular, the mining of Monero through Coinhive and similar code- bases. In this model, a user visiting a website will download a JavaScript code that executes client-side in her browser, mines a cryptocurrency - typically without her consent or knowledge - and pays out the seigniorage to the website. Websites may consciously employ this as an alternative or to supplement advertisement revenue, may offer premium content in exchange for mining, or may be unwittingly serving the code as a result of a breach (in which case the seigniorage is collected by the attacker). The cryptocurrency Monero is preferred seemingly for its unfriendliness to large-scale ASIC mining that would drive browser-based efforts out of the market, as well as for its purported privacy features. In this paper, we survey this landscape, conduct some measurements to establish its prevalence and profitability, outline an ethical framework for considering whether it should be classified as an attack or business opportunity, and make suggestions for the detection, mitigation and/or prevention of browser-based mining for non- consenting users.
The concept of cyber-physical production systems is highly discussed amongst researchers and industry experts, however, the implementation options for these systems rely mainly on obsolete technologies. Despite the fact that the blockchain is most often associated with cryptocurrency, it is fundamentally wrong to deny the universality of this technology and the prospects for its application in other industries. For example, in the insurance sector or in a number of identity verification services. This article discusses the deployment of the CPPS backbone network based on the Ethereum private blockchain system. The structure of the network is described as well as its interaction with the help of smart contracts, based on the consumption of cryptocurrency for various operations.
Bitcoin, a peer-to-peer payment system and digital currency, is often involved in illicit activities such as scamming, ransomware attacks, illegal goods trading, and thievery. At the time of writing, the Bitcoin ecosystem has not yet been mapped and as such there is no estimate of the share of illicit activities. This paper provides the first estimation of the portion of cyber-criminal entities in the Bitcoin ecosystem. Our dataset consists of 854 observations categorised into 12 classes (out of which 5 are cybercrime-related) and a total of 100,000 uncategorised observations. The dataset was obtained from the data provider who applied three types of clustering of Bitcoin transactions to categorise entities: co-spend, intelligence-based, and behaviour-based. Thirteen supervised learning classifiers were then tested, of which four prevailed with a cross-validation accuracy of 77.38%, 76.47%, 78.46%, 80.76% respectively. From the top four classifiers, Bagging and Gradient Boosting classifiers were selected based on their weighted average and per class precision on the cybercrime-related categories. Both models were used to classify 100,000 uncategorised entities, showing that the share of cybercrime-related is 29.81% according to Bagging, and 10.95% according to Gradient Boosting with number of entities as the metric. With regard to the number of addresses and current coins held by this type of entities, the results are: 5.79% and 10.02% according to Bagging; and 3.16% and 1.45% according to Gradient Boosting.
Bitcoin is the most famous cryptocurrency currently operating with a total marketcap of almost 7 billion USD. This innovation stands strong on the feature of pseudo anonymity and strives on its innovative de-centralized architecture based on the Blockchain. The Blockchain is a distributed ledger that keeps a public record of all the transactions processed on the bitcoin protocol network in full transparency without revealing the identity of the sender and the receiver. Over the course of 2016, cryptocurrencies have shown some instances of abuse by criminals in their activities due to its interesting nature. Darknet marketplaces are increasing the volume of their businesses in illicit and illegal trades but also cryptocurrencies have been used in cases of extortion, ransom and as part of sophisticated malware modus operandi. We tackle these challenges by developing an analytical capability that allows us to map relationships on the blockchain and filter crime instances in order to investigate the abuse in law enforcement local environment. We propose a practical bitcoin analytical process and an analyzing system that stands alone and manages all data on the blockchain in real-time with tracing and visualizing techniques rendering transactions decipherable and useful for law enforcement investigation and training. Our system adopts combination of analyzing methods that provides statistics of address, graphical transaction relation, discovery of paths and clustering of already known addresses. We evaluated our system in the three criminal cases includes marketplace, ransomware and DDoS extortion. These are practical training in law enforcement, then we determined whether our system could help investigation process and training.
As the most successful cryptocurrency to date, Bitcoin constitutes a target of choice for attackers. While many attack vectors have already been uncovered, one important vector has been left out though: attacking the currency via the Internet routing infrastructure itself. Indeed, by manipulating routing advertisements (BGP hijacks) or by naturally intercepting traffic, Autonomous Systems (ASes) can intercept and manipulate a large fraction of Bitcoin traffic. This paper presents the first taxonomy of routing attacks and their impact on Bitcoin, considering both small-scale attacks, targeting individual nodes, and large-scale attacks, targeting the network as a whole. While challenging, we show that two key properties make routing attacks practical: (i) the efficiency of routing manipulation; and (ii) the significant centralization of Bitcoin in terms of mining and routing. Specifically, we find that any network attacker can hijack few (\textbackslashtextless;100) BGP prefixes to isolate 50% of the mining power-even when considering that mining pools are heavily multi-homed. We also show that on-path network attackers can considerably slow down block propagation by interfering with few key Bitcoin messages. We demonstrate the feasibility of each attack against the deployed Bitcoin software. We also quantify their effectiveness on the current Bitcoin topology using data collected from a Bitcoin supernode combined with BGP routing data. The potential damage to Bitcoin is worrying. By isolating parts of the network or delaying block propagation, attackers can cause a significant amount of mining power to be wasted, leading to revenue losses and enabling a wide range of exploits such as double spending. To prevent such effects in practice, we provide both short and long-term countermeasures, some of which can be deployed immediately.