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2021-02-10
Ivanov, P., Baklanov, V., Dymova, E..  2020.  Covert Channels of Data Communication. 2020 Ural Symposium on Biomedical Engineering, Radioelectronics and Information Technology (USBEREIT). :0557—0558.
The article is dedicated to covert channels of data communication in the protected operating system based on the Linux kernel with mandatory access control. The channel which is not intended by developers violates security policy and can lead to disclosure of confidential information. In this paper the covert storage channels are considered. Authors show opportunities to violate the secrecy policy in the protected operating system based on the Linux kernel experimentally. The first scenario uses time stamps of the last access to the files (“atime” stamp), the second scenario uses unreliable mechanism of the automatic login to the user session with another level of secrecy. Then, there are some recommendations to prevent these violations. The goal of this work is to analyze the methods of using covert channels, both previously known and new. The result of the article is recommendations allowing to eliminate security threats which can be embodied through covert channels.
2019-09-05
Nasseralfoghara, M., Hamidi, H..  2019.  Web Covert Timing Channels Detection Based on Entropy. 2019 5th International Conference on Web Research (ICWR). :12-15.

Todays analyzing web weaknesses and vulnerabilities in order to find security attacks has become more urgent. In case there is a communication contrary to the system security policies, a covert channel has been created. The attacker can easily disclosure information from the victim's system with just one public access permission. Covert timing channels, unlike covert storage channels, do not have memory storage and they draw less attention. Different methods have been proposed for their identification, which generally benefit from the shape of traffic and the channel's regularity. In this article, an entropy-based detection method is designed and implemented. The attacker can adjust the amount of channel entropy by controlling measures such as changing the channel's level or creating noise on the channel to protect from the analyst's detection. As a result, the entropy threshold is not always constant for detection. By comparing the entropy from different levels of the channel and the analyst, we conclude that the analyst must investigate traffic at all possible levels.

2017-12-12
Chow, J., Li, X., Mountrouidou, X..  2017.  Raising flags: Detecting covert storage channels using relative entropy. 2017 IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics (ISI). :25–30.

This paper focuses on one type of Covert Storage Channel (CSC) that uses the 6-bit TCP flag header in TCP/IP network packets to transmit secret messages between accomplices. We use relative entropy to characterize the irregularity of network flows in comparison to normal traffic. A normal profile is created by the frequency distribution of TCP flags in regular traffic packets. In detection, the TCP flag frequency distribution of network traffic is computed for each unique IP pair. In order to evaluate the accuracy and efficiency of the proposed method, this study uses real regular traffic data sets as well as CSC messages using coding schemes under assumptions of both clear text, composed by a list of keywords common in Unix systems, and encrypted text. Moreover, smart accomplices may use only those TCP flags that are ever appearing in normal traffic. Then, in detection, the relative entropy can reveal the dissimilarity of a different frequency distribution from this normal profile. We have also used different data processing methods in detection: one method summarizes all the packets for a pair of IP addresses into one flow and the other uses a sliding moving window over such a flow to generate multiple frames of packets. The experimentation results, displayed by Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves, have shown that the method is promising to differentiate normal and CSC traffic packet streams. Furthermore the delay of raising an alert is analyzed for CSC messages to show its efficiency.