Biblio
Recently, the novel networking technology Software-Defined Networking(SDN) and Service Function Chaining(SFC) are rapidly growing, and security issues are also emerging for SDN and SFC. However, the research about security and safety on a novel networking environment is still unsatisfactory, and the vulnerabilities have been revealed continuously. Among these security issues, this paper addresses the ARP Poisoning attack to exploit SFC vulnerability, and proposes a method to defend the attack. The proposed method recognizes the repetitive ARP reply which is a feature of ARP Poisoning attack, and detects ARP Poisoning attack. The proposed method overcomes the limitations of the existing detection methods. The proposed method also detects the presence of an attack more accurately.
Smart Internet of Things (IoT) applications will rely on advanced IoT platforms that not only provide access to IoT sensors and actuators, but also provide access to cloud services and data analytics. Future IoT platforms should thus provide connectivity and intelligence. One approach to connecting IoT devices, IoT networks to cloud networks and services is to use network federation mechanisms over the internet to create network slices across heterogeneous platforms. Network slices also need to be protected from potential external and internal threats. In this paper we describe an approach for enforcing global security policies in the federated cloud and IoT networks. Our approach allows a global security to be defined in the form of a single service manifest and enforced across all federation network segments. It relies on network function virtualisation (NFV) and service function chaining (SFC) to enforce the security policy. The approach is illustrated with two case studies: one for a user that wishes to securely access IoT devices and another in which an IoT infrastructure administrator wishes to securely access some remote cloud and data analytics services.
Two emerging architectural paradigms, i.e., Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Function Virtualization (NFV), enable the deployment and management of Service Function Chains (SFCs). A SFC is an ordered sequence of abstract Service Functions (SFs), e.g., firewalls, VPN-gateways, traffic monitors, that packets have to traverse in the route from source to destination. While this appealing solution offers significant advantages in terms of flexibility, it also introduces new challenges such as the correct configuration and ordering of SFs in the chain to satisfy overall security requirements. This paper presents a formal model conceived to enable the verification of correct policy enforcements in SFCs. Software tools based on the model can then be designed to cope with unwanted network behaviors (e.g., security flaws) deriving from incorrect interactions of SFs of the same SFC.