Visible to the public Biblio

Filters: Keyword is DNS security  [Clear All Filters]
2021-08-02
Zhou, Zan, Xu, Changqiao, Ma, Tengchao, Kuang, Xiaohui.  2020.  Multi-vNIC Intelligent Mutation: A Moving Target Defense to thwart Client-side DNS Cache Attack. ICC 2020 - 2020 IEEE International Conference on Communications (ICC). :1—6.
As massive research efforts are poured into server-side DNS security enhancement in online cloud service platforms, sophisticated APTs tend to develop client-side DNS attacks, where defenders only have limited resources and abilities. The collaborative DNS attack is a representative newest client-side paradigm to stealthily undermine user cache by falsifying DNS responses. Different from existing static methods, in this paper, we propose a moving target defense solution named multi-vNIC intelligent mutation to free defenders from arduous work and thwart elusive client-side DNS attack in the meantime. Multiple virtual network interface cards are created and switched in a mutating manner. Thus attackers have to blindly guess the actual NIC with a high risk of exposure. Firstly, we construct a dynamic game-theoretic model to capture the main characteristics of both attacker and defender. Secondly, a reinforcement learning mechanism is developed to generate adaptive optimal defense strategy. Experiment results also highlight the security performance of our defense method compared to several state-of-the-art technologies.
2018-01-10
Rotenberg, Nadav, Shulman, Haya, Waidner, Michael, Zeltser, Benjamin.  2017.  Authentication-Bypass Vulnerabilities in SOHO Routers. Proceedings of the SIGCOMM Posters and Demos. :68–70.
SOHO routers act as a gateway to the Internet for Small Office/Home Office networks. Despite the important role that they fulfill, there is a long history of vulnerabilities allowing attackers to breach security and availability of the clients and services on SOHO networks. Following the multiple disclosures and recommendations for patches in the last two decades it seems an obvious question to verify whether the reality meets the expectation. We focus on an important class of vulnerabilities called 'authentication bypass', which allow an attacker to take control over a network device by subverting the authentication procedure. We perform a stealthy and non disruptive evaluation of authentication bypass vulnerabilities in SOHO routers. Our study focuses on a number of selected countries, to detect presence of vulnerable devices. The results of our study are worrisome: we find a large fraction of misconfigurations and insecurity issues in configuration of SOHO routers, which stand in sharp contrast to the awareness of the security and research communities to the vulnerabilities as well as a large body of work studying related topics.