Biblio
Routing security plays an important role in Mobile Ad hoc Networks (MANETs). Despite many attempts to improve its security, the routing procedure of MANETs remains vulnerable to attacks. Existing approaches offer support for detecting attacks or debugging in different routing phases, but many of them have not considered the privacy of the nodes during the anomalies detection, which depend on the central control program or a third party to supervise the whole network. In this paper, we present an approach called LAD which uses the raw logs of routers to construct control a flow graph and find the existing communication rules in MANETs. With the reasoning rules, LAD can detect both active and passive attacks launched during the routing phase. LAD can also protect the privacy of the nodes in the verification phase with the specific Merkle hash tree. Without deploying any special nodes to assist the verification, LAD can detect multiple malicious nodes by itself. To show that our approach can be used to guarantee the security of the MANETs, we deploy our experiment in NS3 as well as the practical router environment. LAD can improve the accuracy rate from 2.28% to 29.22%. The results show that LAD performs limited time and memory usages, high detection and low false positives.
Compared to other remote attestation methods, the binary-based approach is the most direct and complete one, but privacy protection has become an important problem. In this paper, we presented an Extended Hash Algorithm (EHA) for privacy protection based on remote attestation method. Based on the traditional Merkle Hash Tree, EHA altered the algorithm of node connection. The new algorithm could ensure the same result in any measure order. The security key is added when the node connection calculation is performed, which ensures the security of the value calculated by the Merkle node. By the final analysis, we can see that the remote attestation using EHA has better privacy protection and execution performance compared to other methods.