Samantray, Om Prakash, Tripathy, Satya Narayan, Das, Susanta Kumar.
2019.
A study to Understand Malware Behavior through Malware Analysis. 2019 IEEE International Conference on System, Computation, Automation and Networking (ICSCAN). :1–5.
Most of the malware detection techniques use malware signatures for detection. It is easy to detect known malicious program in a system but the problem arises when the malware is unknown. Because, unknown malware cannot be detected by using available known malware signatures. Signature based detection techniques fails to detect unknown and zero-day attacks. A novel approach is required to represent malware features effectively to detect obfuscated, unknown, and mutated malware. This paper emphasizes malware behavior, characteristics and properties extracted by different analytic techniques and to decide whether to include them to create behavioral based malware signature. We have made an attempt to understand the malware behavior using a few openly available tools for malware analysis.
Changazi, Sabir Ali, Shafi, Imran, Saleh, Khaled, Islam, M Hasan, Hussainn, Syed Muzammil, Ali, Atif.
2019.
Performance Enhancement of Snort IDS through Kernel Modification. 2019 8th International Conference on Information and Communication Technologies (ICICT). :155–161.
Performance and improved packet handling capacity against high traffic load are important requirements for an effective intrusion detection system (IDS). Snort is one of the most popular open-source intrusion detection system which runs on Linux. This research article discusses ways of enhancing the performance of Snort by modifying Linux key parameters related to NAPI packet reception mechanism within the Linux kernel networking subsystem. Our enhancement overcomes the current limitations related to NAPI throughput. We experimentally demonstrate that current default budget B value of 300 does not yield the best performance of Snort throughput. We show that a small budget value of 14 gives the best Snort performance in terms of packet loss both at Kernel subsystem and at the application level. Furthermore, we compare our results to those reported in the literature, and we show that our enhancement through tuning certain parameters yield superior performance.
Sun, Pengfei, Garcia, Luis, Zonouz, Saman.
2019.
Tell Me More Than Just Assembly! Reversing Cyber-Physical Execution Semantics of Embedded IoT Controller Software Binaries. 2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN). :349–361.
The safety of critical cyber-physical IoT devices hinges on the security of their embedded software that implements control algorithms for monitoring and control of the associated physical processes, e.g., robotics and drones. Reverse engineering of the corresponding embedded controller software binaries enables their security analysis by extracting high-level, domain-specific, and cyber-physical execution semantic information from executables. We present MISMO, a domain-specific reverse engineering framework for embedded binary code in emerging cyber-physical IoT control application domains. The reverse engineering outcomes can be used for firmware vulnerability assessment, memory forensics analysis, targeted memory data attacks, or binary patching for dynamic selective memory protection (e.g., important control algorithm parameters). MISMO performs semantic-matching at an algorithmic level that can help with the understanding of any possible cyber-physical security flaws. MISMO compares low-level binary symbolic values and high-level algorithmic expressions to extract domain-specific semantic information for the binary's code and data. MISMO enables a finer-grained understanding of the controller by identifying the specific control and state estimation algorithms used. We evaluated MISMO on 2,263 popular firmware binaries by 30 commercial vendors from 6 application domains including drones, self-driving cars, smart homes, robotics, 3D printers, and the Linux kernel controllers. The results show that MISMO can accurately extract the algorithm-level semantics of the embedded binary code and data regions. We discovered a zero-day vulnerability in the Linux kernel controllers versions 3.13 and above.
Yaswinski, Matthew R., Chowdhury, Md Minhaz, Jochen, Mike.
2019.
Linux Security: A Survey. 2019 IEEE International Conference on Electro Information Technology (EIT). :357–362.
Linux is used in a large variety of situations, from private homes on personal machines to businesses storing personal data on servers. This operating system is often seen as more secure than Windows or Mac OS X, but this does not mean that there are no security concerns to be had when running it. Attackers can crack simple passwords over a network, vulnerabilities can be exploited if firewalls do not close enough ports, and malware can be downloaded and run on a Linux system. In addition, sensitive information can be accessed through physical or network access if proper permissions are not set on the files or directories containing it. However, most of these attacks can be prevented by keeping a system up to date, maintaining a secure firewall, using an antivirus, making complex passwords, and setting strong file permissions. This paper presents a list of methods for securing a Linux system from both external and internal threats.
Criswell, John, Zhou, Jie, Gravani, Spyridoula, Hu, Xiaoyu.
2019.
PrivAnalyzer: Measuring the Efficacy of Linux Privilege Use. 2019 49th Annual IEEE/IFIP International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks (DSN). :593–604.
Operating systems such as Linux break the power of the root user into separate privileges (which Linux calls capabilities) and give processes the ability to enable privileges only when needed and to discard them permanently when the program no longer needs them. However, there is no method of measuring how well the use of such facilities reduces the risk of privilege escalation attacks if the program has a vulnerability. This paper presents PrivAnalyzer, an automated tool that measures how effectively programs use Linux privileges. PrivAnalyzer consists of three components: 1) AutoPriv, an existing LLVM-based C/C++ compiler which uses static analysis to transform a program that uses Linux privileges into a program that safely removes them when no longer needed, 2) ChronoPriv, a new LLVM C/C++ compiler pass that performs dynamic analysis to determine for how long a program retains various privileges, and 3) ROSA, a new bounded model checker that can model the damage a program can do at each program point if an attacker can exploit the program and abuse its privileges. We use PrivAnalyzer to determine how long five privileged open source programs retain the ability to cause serious damage to a system and find that merely transforming a program to drop privileges does not significantly improve security. However, we find that simple refactoring can considerably increase the efficacy of Linux privileges. In two programs that we refactored, we reduced the percentage of execution in which a device file can be read and written from 97% and 88% to 4% and 1%, respectively.
Astaburuaga, Ignacio, Lombardi, Amee, La Torre, Brian, Hughes, Carolyn, Sengupta, Shamik.
2019.
Vulnerability Analysis of AR.Drone 2.0, an Embedded Linux System. 2019 IEEE 9th Annual Computing and Communication Workshop and Conference (CCWC). :0666–0672.
The goal of this work was to identify and try to solve some of the vulnerabilities present in the AR Drone 2.0 by Parrot. The approach was to identify how the system worked, find and analyze vulnerabilities and flaws in the system as a whole and in the software, and find solutions to those problems. Analyzing the results of some tests showed that the system has an open WiFi network and the communication between the controller and the drone are unencrypted. Analyzing the Linux operating system that the drone uses, we see that "Pairing Mode" is the only way the system protects itself from unauthorized control. This is a feature that can be easily bypassed. Port scans reveal that the system has all the ports for its services open and exposed. This makes it susceptible to attacks like DoS and takeover. This research also focuses on some of the software vulnerabilities, such as Busybox that the drone runs. Lastly, this paper discuses some of the possible methods that can be used to secure the drone. These methods include securing the messages via SSH Tunnel, closing unused ports, and re-implementing the software used by the drone and the controller.
Gul, M. junaid, Rabia, Riaz, Jararweh, Yaser, Rathore, M. Mazhar, Paul, Anand.
2019.
Security Flaws of Operating System Against Live Device Attacks: A case study on live Linux distribution device. 2019 Sixth International Conference on Software Defined Systems (SDS). :154–159.
Live Linux distribution devices can hold Linux operating system for portability. Using such devices and distributions, one can access system or critical files, which otherwise cannot be accessed by guest or any unauthorized user. Events like file leakage before the official announcement. These announcements can vary from mobile companies to software industries. Damages caused by such vulnerabilities can be data theft, data tampering, or permanent deletion of certain records. This study uncovers the security flaws of operating system against live device attacks. For this study, we used live devices with different Linux distributions. Target operating systems are exposed to live device attacks and their behavior is recorded against different Linux distribution. This study also compares the robustness level of different operating system against such attacks.