Biblio
This paper studies the principle of vulnerability generation and mechanism of cross-site scripting attack, designs a dynamic cross-site scripting vulnerabilities detection technique based on existing theories of black box vulnerabilities detection. The dynamic detection process contains five steps: crawler, feature construct, attacks simulation, results detection and report generation. Crawling strategy in crawler module and constructing algorithm in feature construct module are key points of this detection process. Finally, according to the detection technique proposed in this paper, a detection tool is accomplished in Linux using python language to detect web applications. Experiments were launched to verify the results and compare with the test results of other existing tools, analyze the usability, advantages and disadvantages of the detection method above, confirm the feasibility of applying dynamic detection technique to cross-site scripting vulnerabilities detection.
In this paper, we present an overview of the problems associated with the cross-site scripting (XSS) in the graphical content of web applications. The brief analysis of vulnerabilities for graphical files and factors responsible for making SVG images vulnerable to XSS attacks are discussed. XML treatment methods and their practical testing are performed. As a result, the set of rules for protecting the graphic content of the websites and prevent XSS vulnerabilities are proposed.
In recent years, with the advances in JavaScript engines and the adoption of HTML5 APIs, web applications begin to show a tendency to shift their functionality from the server side towards the client side, resulting in dense and complex interactions with HTML documents using the Document Object Model (DOM). As a consequence, client-side vulnerabilities become more and more prevalent. In this paper, we focus on DOM-sourced Cross-site Scripting (XSS), which is a kind of severe but not well-studied vulnerability appearing in browser extensions. Comparing with conventional DOM-based XSS, a new attack surface is introduced by DOM-sourced XSS where the DOM could become a vulnerable source as well besides common sources such as URLs and form inputs. To discover such vulnerability, we propose a detecting framework employing hybrid analysis with two phases. The first phase is the lightweight static analysis consisting of a text filter and an abstract syntax tree parser, which produces potential vulnerable candidates. The second phase is the dynamic symbolic execution with an additional component named shadow DOM, generating a document as a proof-of-concept exploit. In our large-scale real-world experiment, 58 previously unknown DOM-sourced XSS vulnerabilities were discovered in user scripts of the popular browser extension Greasemonkey.