Biblio

To restrict unauthorized access to the data of the website. Most of the web-based systems nowadays require users to verify themselves before accessing the website is authentic information. In terms of security, it is very important to take different security measures for the protection of the authentic data of the website. However, most of the authentication systems which are used on the web today have several security flaws. This document is based on the security of the previous schemes. Compared to the previous approaches, this “spoofed proof stateless session model” method offers superior security assurance in a scenario in which an attacker has unauthorized access to the data of the website. The various protocol models are being developed and implemented on the web to analyze the performance. The aim was to secure the authentic database backups of the website and prevent them from SQL injection attacks by using the read-only properties for the database. This limits potential harm and provides users with reasonable security safeguards when an attacker has an unauthorized read-only access to the website's authentic database. This scheme provides robustness to the disclosure of authentic databases. Proven experimental results show the overheads due to the modified authentication method and the insecure model.

Free text keystroke dynamics is a behavioral biometric that has the strong potential to offer unobtrusive and continuous user authentication. Unfortunately, due to the limited data availability, free text keystroke dynamics have not been tested adequately. Based on a novel large dataset of free text keystrokes from our ongoing data collection using behavior in natural settings, we present the first study to evaluate keystroke dynamics while respecting the temporal order of the data. Specifically, we evaluate the performance of different ways of forming a test sample using sessions, as well as a form of continuous authentication that is based on a sliding window on the keystroke time series. Instead of accumulating a new test sample of keystrokes, we update the previous sample with keystrokes that occur in the immediate past sliding window of n minutes. We evaluate sliding windows of 1 to 5, 10, and 30 minutes. Our best performer using a sliding window of 1 minute, achieves an FAR of 1% and an FRR of 11.5%. Lastly, we evaluate the sensitivity of the keystroke dynamics algorithm to short quick insider attacks that last only several minutes, by artificially injecting different portions of impostor keystrokes into the genuine test samples. For example, the evaluated algorithm is found to be able to detect insider attacks that last 2.5 minutes or longer, with a probability of 98.4%.