Biblio

This Cognitive radio networks are vulnerable to specific intrusions due to the unique cognitive characteristics of these networks. This DoS attacks are known as the Primary User Emulation Attack and the Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification. If the intruder behavior is not statistically identical to the behavior of the primary users, intrusion detection techniques based on observing the energy of the received signals can be used. Both machine learning-based intrusion detection and sequential statistical analysis can be effectively applied. However, in some cases, statistical sequential analysis has some advantages in dealing with such challenges. This paper discusses aspects of using statistical sequential analysis methods to detect attacks in Cognitive radio networks.

Security incident handling and response are essen-tial parts of every organization's information and cyber security. Security incident handling consists of several phases, among which digital forensic analysis has an irreplaceable place. Due to particular digital evidence being recorded at a specific time, timelines play an essential role in analyzing this digital evidence. One of the vital tasks of the digital forensic investigator is finding relevant records in this timeline. This operation is performed manually in most cases. This paper focuses on the possibilities of automatically identifying digital evidence pertinent to the case and proposes a model that identifies this digital evidence. For this purpose, we focus on Windows operating system and the NTFS file system and use outlier detection (Local Outlier Factor method). Collected digital evidence is preprocessed, transformed to binary values, and aggregated by file system inodes and names. Subsequently, we identify digital records (file inodes, file names) relevant to the case. This paper analyzes the combinations of attributes, aggregation functions, local outlier factor parameters, and their impact on the resulting selection of relevant file inodes and file names.

Cost-effective and efficient sequencing technologies have resulted in massive genomic data availability. To compute on a large-scale genomic dataset, it is often required to outsource the dataset to the cloud. To protect data confidentiality, data owners encrypt sensitive data before outsourcing. Outsourcing enhances data owners to eliminate the storage management problem. Since genome data is large in volume, secure execution of researchers query is challenging. In this paper, we propose a method to securely perform count query on datasets containing genotype, phenotype, and numeric data. Our method modifies the prefix-tree proposed by Hasan et al. [1] to incorporate numerical data. The proposed method guarantees data privacy, output privacy, and query privacy. We preserve the security through encryption and garbled circuits. For a query of 100 single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNPs) sequence, we achieve query execution time approximately 3.5 minutes in a database of 1500 records. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first proposed secure framework that addresses heterogeneous biomedical data including numeric attributes.

Researchers develop bioassays following rigorous experimentation in the lab that involves considerable fiscal and highly-skilled-person-hour investment. Previous work shows that a bioassay implementation can be reverse engineered by using images or video and control signals of the biochip. Hence, techniques must be devised to protect the intellectual property (IP) rights of the bioassay developer. This study is the first step in this direction and it makes the following contributions: (1) it introduces use of a sieve-valve as a security primitive to obfuscate bioassay implementations; (2) it shows how sieve-valves can be used to obscure biochip building blocks such as multiplexers and mixers; (3) it presents design rules and security metrics to design and measure obfuscated biochips. We assess the cost-security trade-offs associated with this solution and demonstrate practical sieve-valve based obfuscation on real-life biochips.

Present security study involving analysis of manipulation of individual droplets of samples and reagents by digital microfluidic biochip has remarked that the biochip design flow is vulnerable to piracy attacks, hardware Trojans attacks, overproduction, Denial-of-Service attacks, and counterfeiting. Attackers can introduce bioprotocol manipulation attacks against biochips used for medical diagnosis, biochemical analysis, and frequent diseases detection in healthcare industry. Among these attacks, hardware Trojans have created a major threatening issue in its security concern with multiple ways to crack the sensitive data or alter original functionality by doing malicious operations in biochips. In this paper, we present a systematic algorithm for the assignment of checkpoints required for error-recovery of available bioprotocols in case of hardware Trojans attacks in performing operations by biochip. Moreover, it can guide the placement and timing of checkpoints so that the result of an attack is reduced, and hence enhance the security concerns of digital microfluidic biochips. Comparative study with traditional checkpoint schemes demonstrate the superiority of the proposed algorithm without overhead of the bioprotocol completion time with higher error detection accuracy.

Service composition is currently done by (hierarchical) orchestration and choreography. However, these approaches do not support explicit control flow and total compositionality, which are crucial for the scalability of service-oriented systems. In this paper, we propose exogenous connectors for service composition. These connectors support both explicit control flow and total compositionality in hierarchical service composition. To validate and evaluate our proposal, we present a case study based on the popular MusicCorp.