Biblio
The Air Force is shifting its cybersecurity paradigm from an information technology (IT)-centric toward a mission oriented approach. Instead of focusing on how to defend its IT infrastructure, it seeks to provide mission assurance by defending mission relevant cyber terrain enabling mission execution in a contested environment. In order to actively defend a mission in cyberspace, efforts must be taken to understand and document that mission's dependence on cyberspace and cyber assets. This is known as cyber terrain mission mapping. This paper seeks to define mission mapping and overview methodologies. We also analyze current tools seeking to provide cyber situational awareness through mission mapping or cyber dependency impact analysis and identify existing shortfalls.
In recent years, the usage of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for security-related purposes has increased, ranging from military applications to different areas of civil protection. The deployment of UAS can support security forces in achieving an enhanced situational awareness. However, in order to provide useful input to a situational picture, sensor data provided by UAS has to be integrated with information about the area and objects of interest from other sources. The aim of this study is to design a high-level data fusion component combining probabilistic information processing with logical and probabilistic reasoning, to support human operators in their situational awareness and improving their capabilities for making efficient and effective decisions. To this end, a fusion component based on the ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) Analytics Architecture (ISR-AA) [1] is presented, incorporating an object-oriented world model (OOWM) for information integration, an expressive knowledge model and a reasoning component for detection of critical events. Approaches for translating the information contained in the OOWM into either an ontology for logical reasoning or a Markov logic network for probabilistic reasoning are presented.
Software-defined networks offer a promising framework for the implementation of cross-layer data-centric security policies in military systems. An important aspect of the design process for such advanced security solutions is the thorough experimental assessment and validation of proposed technical concepts prior to their deployment in operational military systems. In this paper, we describe an OpenFlow-based testbed, which was developed with a specific focus on validation of SDN security mechanisms - including both the mechanisms for protecting the software-defined network layer and the cross-layer enforcement of higher level policies, such as data-centric security policies. We also present initial experimentation results obtained using the testbed, which confirm its ability to validate simulation and analytic predictions. Our objective is to provide a sufficiently detailed description of the configuration used in our testbed so that it can be easily re-plicated and re-used by other security researchers in their experiments.
This paper describes multiple system security engineering techniques for assessing system security vulnerabilities and discusses the application of these techniques at different system maturity points. The proposed vulnerability assessment approach allows a systems engineer to identify and assess vulnerabilities early in the life cycle and to continually increase the fidelity of the vulnerability identification and assessment as the system matures.
The lack of qualification of a common operating picture (COP) directly impacts the situational awareness of military Command and Control (C2). Since a commander is reliant on situational awareness information in order to make decisions regarding military operations, the COP needs to be trustworthy and provide accurate information for the commander to base decisions on the resultant information. If the COP's integrity is questioned, there is no definite way of defining its integrity. This paper looks into the integrity of the COP and how it can impact situational awareness. It discusses a potential solution to this problem on which future research can be based.
The United States, including the Department of Defense, relies heavily on information systems and networking technologies to efficiently conduct a wide variety of missions across the globe. With the ever-increasing rate of cyber attacks, this dependency places the nation at risk of a loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its critical information resources; degrading its ability to complete the mission. In this paper, we introduce the operational data classes for establishing situational awareness in cyberspace. A system effectively using our key information components will be able to provide the nation's leadership timely and accurate information to gain an understanding of the operational cyber environment to enable strategic, operational, and tactical decision-making. In doing so, we present, define and provide examples of our key classes of operational data for cyber situational awareness and present a hypothetical case study demonstrating how they must be consolidated to provide a clear and relevant picture to a commander. In addition, current organizational and technical challenges are discussed, and areas for future research are addressed.
Tactical communication networks lack infrastructure and are highly dynamic, resource-constrained, and commonly targeted by adversaries. Designing efficient and secure applications for this environment is extremely challenging. An increasing reliance on group-oriented, tactical applications such as chat, situational awareness, and real-time video has generated renewed interest in IP multicast delivery. However, a lack of developer tools, software libraries, and standard paradigms to achieve secure and reliable multicast impedes the potential of group-oriented communication and often leads to inefficient communication models. In this paper, we propose an architecture for secure and reliable group-oriented communication. The architecture utilizes NSA Suite B cryptography and may be appropriate for handling sensitive and DoD classified data up to SECRET. Our proposed architecture is unique in that it requires no infrastructure, follows NSA CSfC guidance for layered security, and leverages NORM for multicast data reliability. We introduce each component of the architecture and describe a Linux-based software prototype.
Persisting to ignore the consequences of Cyber Warfare will bring severe concerns to all people. Hackers and governments alike should understand the barriers of which their methods take them. Governments use Cyber Warfare to give them a tactical advantage over other countries, defend themselves from their enemies or to inflict damage upon their adversaries. Hackers use Cyber Warfare to gain personal information, commit crimes, or to reveal sensitive and beneficial intelligence. Although both methods can provide ethical uses, the equivalent can be said at the other end of the spectrum. Knowing and comprehending these devices will not only strengthen the ability to detect these attacks and combat against them but will also provide means to divulge despotic government plans, as the outcome of Cyber Warfare can be worse than the outcome of conventional warfare. The paper discussed the concept of ethics and reasons that led to use information technology in military war, the effects of using cyber war on civilians, the legality of the cyber war and ways of controlling the use of information technology that may be used against civilians. This research uses a survey methodology to overlook the awareness of Arab citizens towards the idea of cyber war, provide findings and evidences of ethics behind the offensive cyber warfare. Detailed strategies and approaches should be developed in this aspect. The author recommended urging the scientific and technological research centers to improve the security and develop defending systems to prevent the use of technology in military war against civilians.
Distributed and parallel applications are critical information technology systems in multiple industries, including academia, military, government, financial, medical, and transportation. These applications present target rich environments for malicious attackers seeking to disrupt the confidentiality, integrity and availability of these systems. Applying the military concept of defense cyber maneuver to these systems can provide protection and defense mechanisms that allow survivability and operational continuity. Understanding the tradeoffs between information systems security and operational performance when applying maneuver principles is of interest to administrators, users, and researchers. To this end, we present a model of a defensive maneuver cyber platform using Stochastic Petri Nets. This model enables the understanding and evaluation of the costs and benefits of maneuverability in a distributed application environment, specifically focusing on moving target defense and deceptive defense strategies.
Threat evaluation is concerned with estimating the intent, capability and opportunity of detected objects in relation to our own assets in an area of interest. To infer whether a target is threatening and to which degree is far from a trivial task. Expert operators have normally to their aid different support systems that analyze the incoming data and provide recommendations for actions. Since the ultimate responsibility lies in the operators, it is crucial that they trust and know how to configure and use these systems, as well as have a good understanding of their inner workings, strengths and limitations. To limit the negative effects of inadequate cooperation between the operators and their support systems, this paper presents a design proposal that aims at making the threat evaluation process more transparent. We focus on the initialization, configuration and preparation phases of the threat evaluation process, supporting the user in the analysis of the behavior of the system considering the relevant parameters involved in the threat estimations. For doing so, we follow a known design process model and we implement our suggestions in a proof-of-concept prototype that we evaluate with military expert system designers.
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