Biblio
Along with the development of the Windows operating system, browser applications to surf the internet are also growing rapidly. The most widely used browsers today are Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox. Both browsers have a username and password management feature that makes users login to a website easily, but saving usernames and passwords in the browser is quite dangerous because the stored data can be hacked using brute force attacks or read through a program. One way to get a username and password in the browser is to use a program that can read Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox login data from the computer's internal storage and then show those data. In this study, an attack will be carried out by implementing Rubber Ducky using BadUSB to run the ChromePass and PasswordFox program and the PowerShell script using the Arduino Pro Micro Leonardo device as a USB Password Stealer. The results obtained from this study are the username and password on Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox successfully obtained when the USB is connected to the target device, the average time of the attack is 14 seconds then sending it to the author's email.
The use of a very wide windows operating system is undeniably also followed by increasing attacks on the operating system. Universal Serial Bus (USB) is one of the mechanisms used by many people with plug and play functionality that is very easy to use, making data transfers fast and easy compared to other hardware. Some research shows that the Windows operating system has weaknesses so that it is often exploited by using various attacks and malware. There are various methods used to exploit the Windows operating system, one of them by using a USB device. By using a USB device, a criminal can plant a backdoor reverse shell to exploit the victim's computer just by connecting the USB device to the victim's computer without being noticed. This research was conducted by planting a reverse shell backdoor through a USB device to exploit the victim's device, especially the webcam and microphone device on the target computer. From 35 experiments that have been carried out, it was found that 83% of spying attacks using USB devices on the Windows operating system were successfully carried out.
Windows is one of the popular operating systems in use today, while Universal Serial Bus (USB) is one of the mechanisms used by many people with practical plug and play functions. USB has long been used as a vector of attacks on computers. One method of attack is Keylogger. The Keylogger can take advantage of existing vulnerabilities in the Windows 10 operating system attacks carried out in the form of recording computer keystroke activity without the victim knowing. In this research, an attack will be carried out by running a Powershell Script using BadUSB to be able to activate the Keylogger program. The script is embedded in the Arduino Pro Micro device. The results obtained in the Keyboard Injection Attack research using Arduino Pro Micro were successfully carried out with an average time needed to run the keylogger is 7.474 seconds with a computer connected to the internet. The results of the keylogger will be sent to the attacker via email.
In the past air-gapped systems that are isolated from networks have been considered to be very secure. Yet there have been reports of such systems being breached. These breaches have shown to use unconventional means for communication also known as covert channels such as Acoustic, Electromagnetic, Magnetic, Electric, Optical, and Thermal to transfer data. In this paper, a review of various attack methods that can compromise an air-gapped system is presented along with a summary of how efficient and dangerous a particular method could be. The capabilities of each covert channel are listed to better understand the threat it poses and also some countermeasures to safeguard against such attack methods are mentioned. These attack methods have already been proven to work and awareness of such covert channels for data exfiltration is crucial in various industries.
Modern computer peripherals are diverse in their capabilities and functionality, ranging from keyboards and printers to smartphones and external GPUs. In recent years, peripherals increasingly connect over a small number of standardized communication protocols, including USB, Bluetooth, and NFC. The host operating system is responsible for managing these devices; however, malicious peripherals can request additional functionality from the OS resulting in system compromise, or can craft data packets to exploit vulnerabilities within OS software stacks. Defenses against malicious peripherals to date only partially cover the peripheral attack surface and are limited to specific protocols (e.g., USB). In this paper, we propose Linux (e)BPF Modules (LBM), a general security framework that provides a unified API for enforcing protection against malicious peripherals within the Linux kernel. LBM leverages the eBPF packet filtering mechanism for performance and extensibility and we provide a high-level language to facilitate the development of powerful filtering functionality. We demonstrate how LBM can provide host protection against malicious USB, Bluetooth, and NFC devices; we also instantiate and unify existing defenses under the LBM framework. Our evaluation shows that the overhead introduced by LBM is within 1 μs per packet in most cases, application and system overhead is negligible, and LBM outperforms other state-of-the-art solutions. To our knowledge, LBM is the first security framework designed to provide comprehensive protection against malicious peripherals within the Linux kernel.
A privately owned smart device connected to a corporate network using a USB connection creates a potential channel for malware infection and its subsequent spread. For example, air-gapped (a.k.a. isolated) systems are considered to be the most secure and safest places for storing critical datasets. However, unlike network communications, USB connection streams have no authentication and filtering. Consequently, intentional or unintentional piggybacking of a malware infected USB storage or a mobile device through the air-gap is sufficient to spread infection into such systems. Our findings show that the contact rate has an exceptional impact on malware spread and destabilizing free malware equilibrium. This work proposes a USB authentication and delegation protocol based on radiofrequency identification (RFID) in order to stabilize the free malware equilibrium in air-gapped networks. The proposed protocol is modelled using Coloured Petri nets (CPN) and the model is verified and validated through CPN tools.
This research aims to identify some vulnerabilities of advanced persistent threat (APT) attacks using multiple simulated attacks in a virtualized environment. Our experimental study shows that while updating the antivirus software and the operating system with the latest patches may help in mitigating APTs, APT threat vectors could still infiltrate the strongest defenses. Accordingly, we highlight some critical areas of security concern that need to be addressed.
This paper introduces a newly developed Object-Oriented Open Software Architecture designed for supporting security applications, while leveraging on the capabilities offered by dedicated Open Hardware devices. Specifically, we target the SEcube™ platform, an Open Hardware security platform based on a 3D SiP (System on Package) designed and produced by Blu5 Group. The platform integrates three components employed for security in a single package: a Cortex-M4 CPU, a FPGA and an EAL5+ certified Smart Card. The Open Software Architecture targets both the host machine and the security device, together with the secure communication among them. To maximize its usability, this architecture is organized in several abstraction layers, ranging from hardware interfaces to device drivers, from security APIs to advanced applications, like secure messaging and data protection. We aim at releasing a multi-platform Open Source security framework, where software and hardware cooperate to hide to both the developer and the final users classical security concepts like cryptographic algorithms and keys, focusing, instead, on common operational security concepts like groups and policies.
To provide a comprehensive security analysis of modern networked systems, we need to take into account the combined effects of existing vulnerabilities and zero-day vulnerabilities. In addition to them, it is important to incorporate new vulnerabilities emerging from threats such as BYOD, USB file sharing. Consequently, there may be new dependencies between system components that could also create new attack paths, but previous work did not take into account those new attack paths in their security analysis (i.e., not all attack paths are taken into account). Thus, countermeasures may not be effective, especially against attacks exploiting the new attack paths. In this paper, we propose a Unified Vulnerability Risk Analysis Module (UV-RAM) to address the aforementioned problems by taking into account the combined effects of those vulnerabilities and capturing the new attack paths. The three main functionalities of UV-RAM are: (i) to discover new dependencies and new attack paths, (ii) to incorporate new vulnerabilities introduced and zero-day vulnerabilities into security analysis, and (iii) to formulate mitigation strategies for hardening the networked system. Our experimental results demonstrate and validate the effectiveness of UV-RAM.