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2022-02-22
Bouyeddou, Benamar, Harrou, Fouzi, Sun, Ying.  2021.  Detecting Cyber-Attacks in Modern Power Systems Using an Unsupervised Monitoring Technique. 2021 IEEE 3rd Eurasia Conference on Biomedical Engineering, Healthcare and Sustainability (ECBIOS). :259–263.
Cyber-attacks detection in modern power systems is undoubtedly indispensable to enhance their resilience and guarantee the continuous production of electricity. As the number of attacks is very small compared to normal events, and attacks are unpredictable, it is not obvious to build a model for attacks. Here, only anomaly-free measurements are utilized to build a reference model for intrusion detection. Specifically, this study presents an unsupervised intrusion detection approach using the k-nearest neighbor algorithm and exponential smoothing monitoring scheme for uncovering attacks in modern power systems. Essentially, the k-nearest neighbor algorithm is implemented to compute the deviation between actual measurements and the faultless (training) data. Then, the exponential smoothing method is used to set up a detection decision-based kNN metric for anomaly detection. The proposed procedure has been tested to detect cyber-attacks in a two-line three-bus power transmission system. The proposed approach has been shown good detection performance.
2018-04-04
Lan, T., Wang, W., Huang, G. M..  2017.  False data injection attack in smart grid topology control: Vulnerability and countermeasure. 2017 IEEE Power Energy Society General Meeting. :1–5.
Cyber security is a crucial factor for modern power system as many applications are heavily relied on the result of state estimation. Therefore, it is necessary to assess and enhance cyber security for new applications in power system. As an emerging technology, smart grid topology control has been investigated in stability and reliability perspectives while the associated cyber security issue is not studied before. In successful false data injection attack (FDIA) against AC state estimation, attacker could alter online stability check result by decreasing real power flow measurement on the switching target line to undermine physical system stability in topology control. The physical impact of FDIA on system control operation and stability are illustrated. The vulnerability is discussed on perfect FDIA and imperfect FDIA against residue based bad data detection and corresponding countermeasure is proposed to secure critical substations in the system. The vulnerability and countermeasure are demonstrated on IEEE 24 bus reliability test system (RTS).