| Title | False data injection attack in smart grid topology control: Vulnerability and countermeasure |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2017 |
| Authors | Lan, T., Wang, W., Huang, G. M. |
| Conference Name | 2017 IEEE Power Energy Society General Meeting |
| Keywords | AC state estimation, compositionality, Conferences, crucial factor, cyber security issue, false data injection attack, FDIA, Human Behavior, IEEE 24 bus reliability test system, Load flow, Metrics, modern power system, online stability check result, physical system stability, power engineering computing, power flow measurement, power system reliability, power system security, power system stability, power system state estimation, pubcrawl, real power flow measurement, reliability perspectives, renewable energy sources, residue based bad data detection, Resiliency, security of data, smart grid topology control, Smart grids, smart power grids, stability check, state estimation, Substations, system control operation, Topology, topology control, Transient analysis, vulnerability detection |
| Abstract | Cyber security is a crucial factor for modern power system as many applications are heavily relied on the result of state estimation. Therefore, it is necessary to assess and enhance cyber security for new applications in power system. As an emerging technology, smart grid topology control has been investigated in stability and reliability perspectives while the associated cyber security issue is not studied before. In successful false data injection attack (FDIA) against AC state estimation, attacker could alter online stability check result by decreasing real power flow measurement on the switching target line to undermine physical system stability in topology control. The physical impact of FDIA on system control operation and stability are illustrated. The vulnerability is discussed on perfect FDIA and imperfect FDIA against residue based bad data detection and corresponding countermeasure is proposed to secure critical substations in the system. The vulnerability and countermeasure are demonstrated on IEEE 24 bus reliability test system (RTS). |
| DOI | 10.1109/PESGM.2017.8274317 |
| Citation Key | lan_false_2017 |
False data injection attack in smart grid topology control: Vulnerability and countermeasure