Biblio
Proving secure compilation of partial programs typically requires back-translating an attack against the compiled program to an attack against the source program. To prove back-translation, one can syntactically translate the target attacker to a source one-i.e., syntax-directed back-translation-or show that the interaction traces of the target attacker can also be emitted by source attackers—i.e., trace-directed back-translation. Syntax-directed back-translation is not suitable when the target attacker may use unstructured control flow that the source language cannot directly represent. Trace-directed back-translation works with such syntactic dissimilarity because only the external interactions of the target attacker have to be mimicked in the source, not its internal control flow. Revealing only external interactions is, however, inconvenient when sharing memory via unforgeable pointers, since information about shared pointers stashed in private memory is not present on the trace. This made prior proofs unnecessarily complex, since the generated attacker had to instead stash all reachable pointers. In this work, we introduce more informative data-flow traces, combining the best of syntax- and trace-directed back-translation in a simpler technique that handles both syntactic dissimilarity and memory sharing well, and that is proved correct in Coq. Additionally, we develop a novel turn-taking simulation relation and use it to prove a recomposition lemma, which is key to reusing compiler correctness in such secure compilation proofs. We are the first to mechanize such a recomposition lemma in the presence of memory sharing. We use these two innovations in a secure compilation proof for a code generation compiler pass between a source language with structured control flow and a target language with unstructured control flow, both with safe pointers and components.
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) are drawing enormous attention in both commercial and military applications to facilitate dynamic wireless communications and deliver seamless connectivity due to their flexible deployment, inherent line-of-sight (LOS) air-to-ground (A2G) channels, and high mobility. These advantages, however, render UAV-enabled wireless communication systems susceptible to eavesdropping attempts. Hence, there is a strong need to protect the wireless channel through which most of the UAV-enabled applications share data with each other. There exist various error correction techniques such as Low Density Parity Check (LDPC), polar codes that provide safe and reliable data transmission by exploiting the physical layer but require high transmission power. Also, the security gap achieved by these error-correction techniques must be reduced to improve the security level. In this paper, we present deep learning (DL) enabled punctured LDPC codes to provide secure and reliable transmission of data for UAVs through the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel irrespective of the computational power and channel state information (CSI) of the Eavesdropper. Numerical result analysis shows that the proposed scheme reduces the Bit Error Rate (BER) at Bob effectively as compared to Eve and the Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) per bit value of 3.5 dB is achieved at the maximum threshold value of BER. Also, the security gap is reduced by 47.22 % as compared to conventional LDPC codes.
Image hash regimes have been widely used for authenticating content, recovery of images and digital forensics. In this article we propose a new algorithm for image haunting (SSL) with the most stable key points and regional features, strong against various manipulation of content conservation, including multiple combinatorial manipulations. In order to extract most stable keypoint, the proposed algorithm combines the Speed Up Robust Features (SURF) with Saliency detection. The keyboards and characteristics of the local area are then combined in a hash vector. There is also a sperate secret key that is randomly given for the hash vector to prevent an attacker from shaping the image and the new hash value. The proposed hacking algorithm shows that similar or initial images, which have been individually manipulated, combined and even multiple manipulated contents, can be visently identified by experimental result. The probability of collision between hacks of various images is almost nil. Furthermore, the key-dependent security assessment shows the proposed regime safe to allow an attacker without knowing the secret key not to forge or estimate the right havoc value.
JavaScript is a popular attack vector for releasing malicious payloads on unsuspecting Internet users. Authors of this malicious JavaScript often employ numerous obfuscation techniques in order to prevent the automatic detection by antivirus and hinder manual analysis by professional malware analysts. Consequently, this paper presents SAFE-DEOBS, a JavaScript deobfuscation tool that we have built. The aim of SAFE-DEOBS is to automatically deobfuscate JavaScript malware such that an analyst can more rapidly determine the malicious script's intent. This is achieved through a number of static analyses, inspired by techniques from compiler theory. We demonstrate the utility of SAFE-DEOBS through a case study on real-world JavaScript malware, and show that it is a useful addition to a malware analyst's toolset.
Now-a-days web applications are everywhere. Usually these applications are developed by database program which are often written in popular host programming languages such as C, C++, C\#, Java, etc., with embedded Structured Query Language (SQL). These applications are used to access and process crucial data with the help of Database Management System (DBMS). Preserving the sensitive data from any kind of attacks is one of the prime factors that needs to be maintained by the web applications. The SQL injection attacks is one of the important security threat for the web applications. In this paper, we propose a code-based analysis approach to automatically detect and prevent the possible SQL Injection Attacks (SQLIA) in a query before submitting it to the underlying database. This approach analyses the user input by assigning a complex number to each input element. It has two part (i) input clustering and (ii) safe (non-malicious) input identification. We provide a details discussion of the proposal w.r.t the literature on security and execution overhead point of view.