Biblio

We investigate a compressive sampling (CS) stepped frequency ground penetrating radar for detection of underground objects, which uses Bayesian estimation and a probabilistic model for the target support. Due to the underground targets being sparse, the B-scan is a sparse image. Using the CS principle, the stepped frequency radar is implemented using a subset of random frequencies at each antenna position. For image reconstruction we use Markov Chain and Markov Random Field models for the target support in the B-scan, where we also estimate the model parameters using the Expectation Maximization algorithm. The approach is tested using Web radar data obtained by measuring the signal responses scattered off land mine targets in a laboratory experimental setup. Our approach results in improved performance compared to the standard denoising algorithm for image reconstruction.

In this era of rapid network development, Internet of Things (IoT) security considerations receive a lot of attention from both the research and commercial sectors. With limited computation resource, unfriendly interface, and poor software implementation, legacy IoT devices are vulnerable to many infamous mal ware attacks. Moreover, the heterogeneity of IoT platforms and the diversity of IoT malware make the detection and classification of IoT malware even more challenging. In this paper, we propose to use printable strings as an easy-to-get but effective cross-platform feature to identify IoT malware on different IoT platforms. The discriminating capability of these strings are verified using a set of machine learning algorithms on malware family classification across different platforms. The proposed scheme shows a 99% accuracy on a large scale IoT malware dataset consisted of 120K executable fils in executable and linkable format when the training and test are done on the same platform. Meanwhile, it also achieves a 96% accuracy when training is carried out on a few popular IoT platforms but test is done on different platforms. Efficient malware prevention and mitigation solutions can be enabled based on the proposed method to prevent and mitigate IoT malware damages across different platforms.

We investigate an implementation of a compressive sampling (CS) stepped frequency ground penetrating radar. Due to the small number of targets, the B-scan is represented as a sparse image. Due to the nature of stepped frequency radar, smaller number of random frequencies can be used to obtain each A-scan (sparse delays). Also, the measurements obtained from different antenna positions can be reduced to a smaller number of random antenna positions. We also use the structure in the B-scan, i.e. the shape of the targets, which can be known, for instance, when detecting land mines. We demonstrate our method using radar data available from the Web from the land mine targets buried in the ground. We use group sparsity, i.e. we assume that the targets have some non-zero (and presumably known) dimension in the cross-range coordinate of the B-scan. For such targets, we also use the Markov chain model for the targets, where we simultaneously estimate the model parameters using the EMturboGAMP algorithm. Both approaches result in improved performance.

With the integration of computing, communication, and physical processes, the modern power grid is becoming a large and complex cyber physical power system (CPPS). This trend is intended to modernize and improve the efficiency of the power grid, yet it makes the CPPS vulnerable to potential cascading failures caused by cyber-attacks, e.g., the attacks that are originated by the cyber network of CPPS. To prevent these risks, it is essential to analyze how cyber-attacks can be conducted against the CPPS and how they can affect the power systems. In light of that General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) has been widely used in CPPS, this paper provides a case study by examining possible cyber-attacks against the cyber-physical power systems with GPRS-based SCADA system. We analyze the vulnerabilities of GPRS-based SCADA systems and focus on DoS attacks and message spoofing attacks. Furthermore, we show the consequence of these attacks against power systems by a simulation using the IEEE 9-node system, and the results show the validity of cascading failures propagated through the systems under our proposed attacks.