Biblio
A hardware Trojan (HT) denotes the malicious addition or modification of circuit elements. The purpose of this work is to improve the HT detection sensitivity in ICs using power side-channel analysis. This paper presents three detection techniques in power based side-channel analysis by increasing Trojan-to-circuit power consumption and reducing the variation effect in the detection threshold. Incorporating the three proposed methods has demonstrated that a realistic fine-grain circuit partitioning and an improved pattern set to increase HT activation chances can magnify Trojan detectability.
Process Variation (PV) may cause accuracy loss of the analog neural network (ANN) processors, and make it hard to be scaled down, as well as feasibility degrading. This paper first analyses the impact of PV on the performance of ANN chips. Then proposes an in-situ transfer learning method at system level to reduce PV's influence with low-precision back-propagation. Simulation results show the proposed method could increase 50% tolerance of operating point drift and 70% $\sim$ 100% tolerance of mismatch with less than 1% accuracy loss of benchmarks. It also reduces 66.7% memories and has about 50× energy-efficiency improvement of multiplication in the learning stage, compared with the conventional full-precision (32bit float) training system.
A physical unclonable function (PUF) is an integrated circuit (IC) that serves as a hardware security primitive due to its complexity and the unpredictability between its outputs and the applied inputs. PUFs have received a great deal of research interest and significant commercial activity. Public PUFs (PPUFs) address the crucial PUF limitation of being a secret-key technology. To some extent, the first generation of PPUFs are similar to SIMulation Possible, but Laborious (SIMPL) systems and one-time hardware pads, and employ the time gap between direct execution and simulation. The second PPUF generation employs both process variation and device aging which results in matched devices that are excessively difficult to replicate. The third generation leaves the analog domain and employs reconfigurability and device aging to produce digital PPUFs. We survey representative PPUF architectures, related public protocols and trusted information flows, and related testing issues. We conclude by identifying the most important, challenging, and open PPUF-related problems.