Visible to the public Biblio

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2020-04-24
Jiang, He, Wang, Zhenhua, He, Haibo.  2019.  An Evolutionary Computation Approach for Smart Grid Cascading Failure Vulnerability Analysis. 2019 IEEE Symposium Series on Computational Intelligence (SSCI). :332—338.
The cyber-physical security of smart grid is of great importance since it directly concerns the normal operating of a system. Recently, researchers found that organized sequential attacks can incur large-scale cascading failure to the smart grid. In this paper, we focus on the line-switching sequential attack, where the attacker aims to trip transmission lines in a designed order to cause significant system failures. Our objective is to identify the critical line-switching attack sequence, which can be instructional for the protection of smart grid. For this purpose, we develop an evolutionary computation based vulnerability analysis framework, which employs particle swarm optimization to search the critical attack sequence. Simulation studies on two benchmark systems, i.e., IEEE 24 bus reliability test system and Washington 30 bus dynamic test system, are implemented to evaluate the performance of our proposed method. Simulation results show that our method can yield a better performance comparing with the reinforcement learning based approach proposed in other prior work.
2020-02-10
Lakshminarayana, Subhash, Belmega, E. Veronica, Poor, H. Vincent.  2019.  Moving-Target Defense for Detecting Coordinated Cyber-Physical Attacks in Power Grids. 2019 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids (SmartGridComm). :1–7.
This work proposes a moving target defense (MTD) strategy to detect coordinated cyber-physical attacks (CCPAs) against power grids. A CCPA consists of a physical attack, such as disconnecting a transmission line, followed by a coordinated cyber attack that injects false data into the sensor measurements to mask the effects of the physical attack. Such attacks can lead to undetectable line outages and cause significant damage to the grid. The main idea of the proposed approach is to invalidate the knowledge that the attackers use to mask the effects of the physical attack by actively perturbing the grid's transmission line reactances using distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. We identify the MTD design criteria in this context to thwart CCPAs. The proposed MTD design consists of two parts. First, we identify the subset of links for D-FACTS device deployment that enables the defender to detect CCPAs against any link in the system. Then, in order to minimize the defense cost during the system's operational time, we use a game-theoretic approach to identify the best subset of links (within the D-FACTS deployment set) to perturb which will provide adequate protection. Extensive simulations performed using the MATPOWER simulator on IEEE bus systems verify the effectiveness of our approach in detecting CCPAs and reducing the operator's defense cost.
2019-11-19
Khaledian, Parviz, Johnson, Brian K., Hemati, Saied.  2018.  Power Grid Security Improvement by Remedial Action Schemes Using Vulnerability Assessment Based on Fault Chains and Power Flow. 2018 IEEE International Conference on Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems (PMAPS). :1-6.

The risk of large-scale blackouts and cascading failures in power grids can be due to vulnerable transmission lines and lack of proper remediation techniques after recognizing the first failure. In this paper, we assess the vulnerability of a system using fault chain theory and a power flow-based method, and calculate the probability of large-scale blackout. Further, we consider a Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) to reduce the vulnerability of the system and to harden the critical components against intentional attacks. To identify the most critical lines more efficiently, a new vulnerability index is presented. The effectiveness of the new index and the impact of the applied RAS is illustrated on the IEEE 14-bus test system.

2019-10-02
Chao, H., Ringlee, R. J..  2018.  Analytical Challenges in Reliability and Resiliency Modeling. 2018 IEEE International Conference on Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems (PMAPS). :1–5.
A significant number of the generation, transmission and distribution facilities in the North America were designed and configured for serving electric loads and economic activities under certain reliability and resiliency requirements over 30 years ago. With the changing generation mix, the electric grid is tasked to deliver electricity made by fuel uncertain and energy limited resources. How adequate are the existing facilities to meet the industry expectations on reliability? What level of grid resiliency should be designed and built to sustain reliable electric services given the increasing exposure to frequent and lasting severe weather conditions? There is a need to review the modeling assumptions, operating and maintenance records before we can answer these questions.
2018-02-06
Gavgani, M. H., Eftekharnejad, S..  2017.  A Graph Model for Enhancing Situational Awareness in Power Systems. 2017 19th International Conference on Intelligent System Application to Power Systems (ISAP). :1–6.

As societies are becoming more dependent on the power grids, the security issues and blackout threats are more emphasized. This paper proposes a new graph model for online visualization and assessment of power grid security. The proposed model integrates topology and power flow information to estimate and visualize interdependencies between the lines in the form of line dependency graph (LDG) and immediate threats graph (ITG). These models enable the system operator to predict the impact of line outage and identify the most vulnerable and critical links in the power system. Line Vulnerability Index (LVI) and Line Criticality Index (LCI) are introduced as two indices extracted from LDG to aid the operator in decision making and contingency selection. This package can be useful in enhancing situational awareness in power grid operation by visualization and estimation of system threats. The proposed approach is tested for security analysis of IEEE 30-bus and IEEE 118-bus systems and the results are discussed.

2017-11-27
Yanbing, J., Ruiqiong, L., Shanxi, H. X., Peng, W..  2016.  Risk assessment of cascading failures in power grid based on complex network theory. 2016 14th International Conference on Control, Automation, Robotics and Vision (ICARCV). :1–6.

Cascading failure is an intrinsic threat of power grid to cause enormous cost of society, and it is very challenging to be analyzed. The risk of cascading failure depends both on its probability and the severity of consequence. It is impossible to analyze all of the intrinsic attacks, only the critical and high probability initial events should be found to estimate the risk of cascading failure efficiently. To recognize the critical and high probability events, a cascading failure analysis model for power transmission grid is established based on complex network theory (CNT) in this paper. The risk coefficient of transmission line considering the betweenness, load rate and changeable outage probability is proposed to determine the initial events of power grid. The development tendency of cascading failure is determined by the network topology, the power flow and boundary conditions. The indicators of expected percentage of load loss and line cut are used to estimate the risk of cascading failure caused by the given initial malfunction of power grid. Simulation results from the IEEE RTS-79 test system show that the risk of cascading failure has close relations with the risk coefficient of transmission lines. The value of risk coefficient could be useful to make vulnerability assessment and to design specific action to reduce the topological weakness and the risk of cascading failure of power grid.

2015-05-01
Yihai Zhu, Jun Yan, Yufei Tang, Sun, Y.L., Haibo He.  2014.  Resilience Analysis of Power Grids Under the Sequential Attack. Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on. 9:2340-2354.

The modern society increasingly relies on electrical service, which also brings risks of catastrophic consequences, e.g., large-scale blackouts. In the current literature, researchers reveal the vulnerability of power grids under the assumption that substations/transmission lines are removed or attacked synchronously. In reality, however, it is highly possible that such removals can be conducted sequentially. Motivated by this idea, we discover a new attack scenario, called the sequential attack, which assumes that substations/transmission lines can be removed sequentially, not synchronously. In particular, we find that the sequential attack can discover many combinations of substation whose failures can cause large blackout size. Previously, these combinations are ignored by the synchronous attack. In addition, we propose a new metric, called the sequential attack graph (SAG), and a practical attack strategy based on SAG. In simulations, we adopt three test benchmarks and five comparison schemes. Referring to simulation results and complexity analysis, we find that the proposed scheme has strong performance and low complexity.