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2015-05-01
Albasrawi, M.N., Jarus, N., Joshi, K.A., Sarvestani, S.S..  2014.  Analysis of Reliability and Resilience for Smart Grids. Computer Software and Applications Conference (COMPSAC), 2014 IEEE 38th Annual. :529-534.

Smart grids, where cyber infrastructure is used to make power distribution more dependable and efficient, are prime examples of modern infrastructure systems. The cyber infrastructure provides monitoring and decision support intended to increase the dependability and efficiency of the system. This comes at the cost of vulnerability to accidental failures and malicious attacks, due to the greater extent of virtual and physical interconnection. Any failure can propagate more quickly and extensively, and as such, the net result could be lowered reliability. In this paper, we describe metrics for assessment of two phases of smart grid operation: the duration before a failure occurs, and the recovery phase after an inevitable failure. The former is characterized by reliability, which we determine based on information about cascading failures. The latter is quantified using resilience, which can in turn facilitate comparison of recovery strategies. We illustrate the application of these metrics to a smart grid based on the IEEE 9-bus test system.

Yihai Zhu, Jun Yan, Yufei Tang, Sun, Y.L., Haibo He.  2014.  Resilience Analysis of Power Grids Under the Sequential Attack. Information Forensics and Security, IEEE Transactions on. 9:2340-2354.

The modern society increasingly relies on electrical service, which also brings risks of catastrophic consequences, e.g., large-scale blackouts. In the current literature, researchers reveal the vulnerability of power grids under the assumption that substations/transmission lines are removed or attacked synchronously. In reality, however, it is highly possible that such removals can be conducted sequentially. Motivated by this idea, we discover a new attack scenario, called the sequential attack, which assumes that substations/transmission lines can be removed sequentially, not synchronously. In particular, we find that the sequential attack can discover many combinations of substation whose failures can cause large blackout size. Previously, these combinations are ignored by the synchronous attack. In addition, we propose a new metric, called the sequential attack graph (SAG), and a practical attack strategy based on SAG. In simulations, we adopt three test benchmarks and five comparison schemes. Referring to simulation results and complexity analysis, we find that the proposed scheme has strong performance and low complexity.