Biblio

For a long time, there have been a number of malicious APP discovery and detection services in the Android security field. There are multiple and multiple sensitive actions in most malicious apps. This paper is based on the research of dynamic and static detection technology to analyze the sensitive behaviors in APP, combined with automated testing technology to achieve automated detection, which can improve the detection efficiency and accuracy of malicious APP.

The exponential growth of the Internet and its users and the emergence of Web 2.0 have caused a large volume of textual data to be created. Automatic analysis of such data can be used in making decisions. As online text is created by different producers with different styles of writing, pre-processing is a necessity prior to any processes related to natural language tasks. An essential part of textual preprocessing prior to the recognition of the word vocabulary is normalization, which includes the correction of spaces that particularly in the Persian language this includes both full-spaces between words and half-spaces. Through the review of user comments within social media services, it can be seen that in many cases users do not adhere to grammatical rules of inserting both forms of spaces, which increases the complexity of the identification of words and henceforth, reducing the accuracy of further processing on the text. In this study, current issues in the normalization and tokenization of preprocessing tools within the Persian language and essentially identifying and correcting the separation of words are and the correction of spaces are proposed. The results obtained and compared to leading preprocessing tools highlight the significance of the proposed methodology.

Approaches for the automatic analysis of security policies on source code level cannot trivially be applied to binaries. This is due to the lacking high-level semantics of low-level object code, and the fundamental problem that control-flow recovery from binaries is difficult. We present a novel approach to recover the control-flow of binaries that is both safe and efficient. The key idea of our approach is to use the information contained in security mechanisms to approximate the targets of computed branches. To achieve this, we first define a restricted control transition intermediate language (RCTIL), which restricts the number of possible targets for each branch to a finite number of given targets. Based on this intermediate language, we demonstrate how a safe model of the control flow can be recovered without data-flow analyses. Our evaluation shows that that makes our solution more efficient than existing solutions.

Although the Android system has been continuously hardened against side-channel attacks, there are still plenty of APIs available that can be exploited. However, most side-channel analyses in the literature consider specifically chosen APIs (or resources) in the Android framework, after a manual analysis of APIs for possible information leaks has been performed. Such a manual analysis is a tedious, time consuming, and error-prone task, meaning that information leaks tend to be overlooked. To overcome this tedious task, we introduce SCANDROID, a framework that automatically profiles the Java-based Android API for possible information leaks. Events of interest, such as website launches, Google Maps queries, or application starts, are triggered automatically, and while these events are being triggered, the Java-based Android API is analyzed for possible information leaks that allow inferring these events later on. To assess the Android API for information leaks, SCANDROID relies on dynamic time warping. By applying SCANDROID on Android 8 (Android Oreo), we identified several Android APIs that allow inferring website launches, Google Maps queries, and application starts. The triggered events are by no means exhaustive but have been chosen to demonstrate the broad applicability of SCANDROID. Among the automatically identified information leaks are, for example, the java.io.File API, the android.os.storage.StorageManager API, and several methods within the android.net. Traffics tats API. Thereby, we identify the first side-channel leaks in the Android API on Android 8 (Android Oreo).