Biblio
The 911 emergency service belongs to one of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors in the United States. Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks launched from a mobile phone botnet pose a significant threat to the availability of this vital service. In this paper we show how attackers can exploit the cellular network protocols in order to launch an anonymized DDoS attack on 911. The current FCC regulations require that all emergency calls be immediately routed regardless of the caller's identifiers (e.g., IMSI and IMEI). A rootkit placed within the baseband firmware of a mobile phone can mask and randomize all cellular identifiers, causing the device to have no genuine identification within the cellular network. Such anonymized phones can issue repeated emergency calls that cannot be blocked by the network or the emergency call centers, technically or legally. We explore the 911 infrastructure and discuss why it is susceptible to this kind of attack. We then implement different forms of the attack and test our implementation on a small cellular network. Finally, we simulate and analyze anonymous attacks on a model of current 911 infrastructure in order to measure the severity of their impact. We found that with less than 6K bots (or \$100K hardware), attackers can block emergency services in an entire state (e.g., North Carolina) for days. We believe that this paper will assist the respective organizations, lawmakers, and security professionals in understanding the scope of this issue in order to prevent possible 911-DDoS attacks in the future.
With its high penetration rate and relatively good clock accuracy, smartphones are replacing watches in several market segments. Modern smartphones have more than one clock source to complement each other: NITZ (Network Identity and Time Zone), NTP (Network Time Protocol), and GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) including GPS. NITZ information is delivered by the cellular core network, indicating the network name and clock information. NTP provides a facility to synchronize the clock with a time server. Among these clock sources, only NITZ and NTP are updated without user interaction, as location services require manual activation. In this paper, we analyze security aspects of these clock sources and their impact on security features of modern smartphones. In particular, we investigate NITZ and NTP procedures over cellular networks (2G, 3G and 4G) and Wi-Fi communication respectively. Furthermore, we analyze several European, Asian, and American cellular networks from NITZ perspective. We identify three classes of vulnerabilities: specification issues in a cellular protocol, configurational issues in cellular network deployments, and implementation issues in different mobile OS's. We demonstrate how an attacker with low cost setup can spoof NITZ and NTP messages to cause Denial of Service attacks. Finally, we propose methods for securely synchronizing the clock on smartphones.
Sampling multiband radar signals is an essential issue of multiband/multifunction radar. This paper proposes a multiband quadrature compressive sampling (MQCS) system to perform the sampling at sub-Landau rate. The MQCS system randomly projects the multiband signal into a compressive multiband one by modulating each subband signal with a low-pass signal and then samples the compressive multiband signal at Landau-rate with output of compressive measurements. The compressive inphase and quadrature (I/Q) components of each subband are extracted from the compressive measurements respectively and are exploited to recover the baseband I/Q components. As effective bandwidth of the compressive multiband signal is much less than that of the received multiband one, the sampling rate is much less than Landau rate of the received signal. Simulation results validate that the proposed MQCS system can effectively acquire and reconstruct the baseband I/Q components of the multiband signals.
Sampling and reconstruction (S&R) are used in virtually all areas of science and technology. The classical sampling theorem is a theoretical foundation of S&R. However, for a long time, only sampling rates and ways of the sampled signals representation were derived from it. The fact that the design of S&R circuits (SCs and RCs) is based on a certain interpretation of the sampling theorem was mostly forgotten. The traditional interpretation of this theorem was selected at the time of the theorem introduction because it offered the only feasible way of S&R realization then. At that time, its drawbacks did not manifest themselves. By now, this interpretation has largely exhausted its potential and inhibits future progress in the field. This tutorial expands the theoretical foundation of S&R. It shows that the traditional interpretation, which is indirect, can be replaced by the direct one or by various combinations of the direct and indirect interpretations that enable development of novel SCs and RCs (NSCs and NRCs) with advanced properties. The tutorial explains the basic principles of the NSCs and NRCs design, their advantages, as well as theoretical problems and practical challenges of their realization. The influence of the NSCs and NRCs on the architectures of SDRs and CRs is also discussed.