Biblio
The mass integration and deployment of intelligent technologies within critical commercial, industrial and public environments have a significant impact on business operations and society as a whole. Though integration of these critical intelligent technologies pose serious embedded security challenges for technology manufacturers which are required to be systematically approached, in-line with international security regulations.This paper establish security foundation for such intelligent technologies by deriving embedded security requirements to realise the core security functions laid out by international security authorities, and proposing microarchitectural characteristics to establish cyber resilience in embedded systems. To bridge the research gap between embedded and operational security domains, a detailed review of existing embedded security methods, microarchitectures and design practises is presented. The existing embedded security methods have been found ad-hoc, passive and strongly rely on building and maintaining trust. To the best of our knowledge to date, no existing embedded security microarchitecture or defence mechanism provides continuity of data stream or security once trust has broken. This functionality is critical for embedded technologies deployed in critical infrastructure to enhance and maintain security, and to gain evidence of the security breach to effectively evaluate, improve and deploy active response and mitigation strategies. To this end, the paper proposes three microarchitectural characteristics that shall be designed and integrated into embedded architectures to establish, maintain and improve cyber resilience in embedded systems for next-generation critical infrastructure.
The Internet of Things (IoT) holds great potential for productivity, quality control, supply chain efficiencies and overall business operations. However, with this broader connectivity, new vulnerabilities and attack vectors are being introduced, increasing opportunities for systems to be compromised by hackers and targeted attacks. These vulnerabilities pose severe threats to a myriad of IoT applications within areas such as manufacturing, healthcare, power and energy grids, transportation and commercial building management. While embedded OEMs offer technologies, such as hardware Trusted Platform Module (TPM), that deploy strong chain-of-trust and authentication mechanisms, still they struggle to protect against vulnerabilities introduced by vendors and end users, as well as additional threats posed by potential technical vulnerabilities and zero-day attacks. This paper proposes a pro-active policy-based approach, enforcing the principle of least privilege, through hardware Security Policy Engine (SPE) that actively monitors communication of applications and system resources on the system communication bus (ARM AMBA-AXI4). Upon detecting a policy violation, for example, a malicious application accessing protected storage, it counteracts with predefined mitigations to limit the attack. The proposed SPE approach widely complements existing embedded hardware and software security technologies, targeting the mitigation of risks imposed by unknown vulnerabilities of embedded applications and protocols.