Biblio

To solve the problem of an excessive number of component vulnerabilities and limited defense resources in industrial cyber physical systems, a method for analyzing security critical components of system is proposed. Firstly, the components and vulnerability information in the system are modeled based on SysML block definition diagram. Secondly, as SysML block definition diagram is challenging to support direct analysis, a block security dependency graph model is proposed. On this basis, the transformation rules from SysML block definition graph to block security dependency graph are established according to the structure of block definition graph and its vulnerability information. Then, the calculation method of component security importance is proposed, and a security critical component analysis tool is designed and implemented. Finally, an example of a Drone system is given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. The application of this method can provide theoretical and technical support for selecting key defense components in the industrial cyber physical system.

Complex military systems are typically cyber-physical systems which are the targets of high level threat actors, and must be able to operate within a highly contested cyber environment. There is an emerging need to provide a strong level of assurance against these threat actors, but the process by which this assurance can be tested and evaluated is not so clear. This paper outlines an initial framework developed through research for evaluating the cyber-worthiness of complex mission critical systems using threat models developed in SysML. The framework provides a visual model of the process by which a threat actor could attack the system. It builds on existing concepts from system safety engineering and expands on how to present the risks and mitigations in an understandable manner.

In the development process of critical systems, one of the main challenges is to provide early system validation and verification against vulnerabilities in order to reduce cost caused by late error detection. We propose in this paper an approach that, firstly allows formally describe system security specifications, thanks to our suggested extended attack tree. Secondly, static and dynamic system modeling by using a SysML connectivity profile to model error propagation is introduced. Finally, a model checker has been used in order to validate system specifications.