Biblio

Equivalence checking is one of the most scalable and useful verification techniques in industry. NULL Convention Logic (NCL) circuits utilize dual-rail signals (i.e., two wires to represent one bit of DATA), where the wires are inverses of each other during a DATA wavefront. In this paper, a technique that exploits this invariant at NCL register boundaries is proposed to improve the efficiency of equivalence verification of NCL circuits.

Hardware Trojan threats caused by malicious designers and untrusted manufacturers have become one of serious issues in modern VLSI systems. In this paper, we show some experimental results to insert hardware Trojans into asynchronous circuits. As a result, the overhead of hardware Trojan insertion in asynchronous circuits may be small for malicious designers who have enough knowledge about the asynchronous circuits. In addition, we also show several Trojan detection methods using deep learning schemes which have been proposed to detect synchronous hardware Trojan in the netlist level. We apply them to asynchronous hardware Trojan circuits and show their results. They have a great potential to detect a hardware Trojan in asynchronous circuits.

Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have been designed for many security applications such as identification, authentication of devices and key generation, especially for lightweight electronics. Traditional approaches to enhancing security, such as hash functions, may be expensive and resource dependent. However, modelling attacks using machine learning (ML) show the vulnerability of most PUFs. In this paper, a combination of a 32-bit current mirror and 16-bit arbiter PUFs in 65nm CMOS technology is proposed to improve resilience against modelling attacks. Both PUFs are vulnerable to machine learning attacks and we reduce the output prediction rate from 99.2% and 98.8% individually, to 60%.