Biblio

Any software that runs malicious payloads on victims’ computers is referred to as malware. It is an increasing threat that costs people, businesses, and organizations a lot of money. Attacks on security have developed significantly in recent years. Malware may infiltrate both offline and online media, like: chat, SMS, and spam (email, or social media), because it has a built-in defensive mechanism and may conceal itself from antivirus software or even corrupt it. As a result, there is an urgent need to detect and prevent malware before it damages critical assets around the world. In fact, there are lots of different techniques and tools used to combat versus malware. In this paper, the malware samples were analyzing in the Virtual Box environment using in-depth analysis based on reverse engineering using advanced static malware analysis techniques. The results Obtained from malware analysis which represent a set of valuable information, all anti-malware and anti-virus program companies need for in order to update their products.

We present a new type of attack termed denial of engineering operations in which an attacker can interfere with the normal cycle of an engineering operation leading to a loss of situational awareness. Specifically, the attacker can deceive the engineering software during attempts to retrieve the ladder logic program from a programmable logic controller (PLC) by manipulating the ladder logic on the PLC, such that the software is unable to process it while the PLC continues to execute it successfully. This attack vector can provide sufficient cover for the attacker»s actual scenario to play out while the owner tries to understand the problem and reestablish positive operational control. To enable the forensic analysis and, eventually, eliminate the threat, we have developed the first decompiler for ladder logic programs. Ladder logic is a graphical programming language for PLCs that control physical processes such as power grid, pipelines, and chemical plants; PLCs are a common target of malicious modifications leading to the compromise of the control behavior (and potentially serious consequences). Our decompiler, Laddis, transforms a low-level representation to its corresponding high-level original representation comprising of graphical symbols and connections. The evaluation of the accuracy of the decompiler on the program of varying complexity demonstrates perfect reconstruction of the original program. We present three new attack scenarios on PLC-deployed ladder logic and demonstrate the effectiveness of the decompiler on these scenarios.