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2020-10-26
Rimjhim, Roy, Pradeep Kumar, Prakash Singh, Jyoti.  2018.  Encircling the Base Station for Source Location Privacy in Wireless Sensor Networks. 2018 3rd International Conference on Computational Systems and Information Technology for Sustainable Solutions (CSITSS). :307–312.
Location Privacy breach in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) cannot be controlled by encryption techniques as all the communications are signal based. Signal strength can be analyzed to reveal many routing information. Adversary takes advantage of this and tracks the incoming packet to know the direction of the packet. With the information of location of origin of packets, the Source is also exposed which is generating packets on sensing any object. Thus, the location of subject is exposed. For protecting such privacy breaches, routing schemes are used which create anonymization or diverts the adversary. In this paper, we are using `Dummy' packets that will be inserted into real traffic to confuse the adversary. The dummy packets are such inserted that they encircle the Sink or Base Station. These Dummy packets are send with a value of TTL (Time To Live) field such that they travel only a few hops. Since adversary starts backtracking from the Sink, it will be trapped in the dummy traffic. In our protocol, we are confusing adversary without introducing any delay in packet delivery. Adversary uses two common methods for knowing the source i.e. Traffic Analysis and Back-tracing. Mathematically and experimentally, our proposal is sound for both type of methods. Overhead is also balanced as packets will not live long.
2019-09-05
Belozubova, A., Epishkina, A., Kogos, K..  2018.  Dummy Traffic Generation to Limit Timing Covert Channels. 2018 IEEE Conference of Russian Young Researchers in Electrical and Electronic Engineering (EIConRus). :1472-1476.

Covert channels are used to hidden transmit information and violate the security policy. What is more it is possible to construct covert channel in such manner that protection system is not able to detect it. IP timing covert channels are objects for research in the article. The focus of the paper is the research of how one can counteract an information leakage by dummy traffic generation. The covert channel capacity formula has been obtained in case of counteraction. In conclusion, the examples of counteraction tool parameter calculation are given.