Biblio
A time-delay switch (TDS) cyber attack is a deliberate attempt by malicious adversaries aiming at destabilizing a power system by impeding the communication signals to/from the centralized controller from/to the network sensors and generating stations that participate in the load frequency control (LFC). A TDS cyber attack can be targeting the sensing loops (transmitting network measurements to the centralized controller) or the control signals dispatched from the centralized controller to the governor valves of the generating stations. A resilient TDS control strategy is proposed and developed in this work that thwarts network instabilities that are caused by delays in the sensing loops, and control commands, and guarantees normal operation of the LFC mechanism. This will be achieved by augmenting the telemetered control commands with locally generated feedback control laws (i.e., “decentralized” control commands) taking measurements that are available and accessible at the power generating stations (locally) independent from all the telemetered signals to/from the centralized controller. Our objective is to devise a controller that is capable of circumventing all types of TDS and DoS (Denial of Service) cyber attacks as well as a broad class of False Data Injection (FDI) cyber attacks.
With the growing use of the Robot Operating System (ROS), it can be argued that it has become a de-facto framework for developing robotic solutions. ROS is used to build robotic applications for industrial automation, home automation, medical and even automatic robotic surveillance. However, whenever ROS is utilized, security is one of the main concerns that needs to be addressed in order to ensure a secure network communication of robots. Cyber-attacks may hinder evolution and adaptation of most ROS-enabled robotic systems for real-world use over the Internet. Thus, it is important to address and prevent security threats associated with the use of ROS-enabled applications. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for securing ROS-enabled robotic system by integrating ROS with the Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) protocol. We manage to secure robots' network communications by providing authentication and data encryption, therefore preventing man-in-the-middle and hijacking attacks. We also perform real-world experiments to assess how the performance of a ROS-enabled robotic surveillance system is affected by the proposed approach.
Message Queue Telemetry Transport (MQTT) is widely accepted as a data exchange protocol in Internet of Things (IoT) environment. For security, MQTT supports Transport Layer Security (MQTT-TLS). However, MQTT-TLS provides thing-to-broker channel encryption only because data can still be exposed after MQTT broker. In addition, ACL becomes impractical due to the increasing number of rules for authorizing massive IoT devices. For solving these problems, we propose MQTT Thing-to-Thing Security (MQTT-TTS) which provides thing-to-thing security which prevents data leak. MQTT-TTS also provides the extensibility to include demanded security mechanisms for various security requirements. Moreover, the transparency of MQTT-TTS lets IoT application developers implementing secure data exchange with less programming efforts. Our MQTT-TTS implementation is available on https://github.com/beebit-sec/beebit-mqttc-sdk for evaluation.
Data analytics and telemetry have become paramount to monitoring and maintaining quality-of-service in addition to business analytics. Stream processing-a model where a network of operators receives and processes continuously arriving discrete elements-is well-suited for these needs. Current and previous studies and frameworks have focused on continuity of operations and aggregate performance metrics. However, real-time performance and tail latency are also important. Timing errors caused by either performance or failed communication faults also affect real-time performance more drastically than aggregate metrics. In this paper, we introduce redundancy in the stream data to improve the real-time performance and resiliency to timing errors caused by either performance or failed communication faults. We also address limitations in previous solutions using a fine-grained acknowledgment tracking scheme to both increase the effectiveness for resiliency to performance faults and enable effectiveness for failed communication faults. Our results show that fine-grained acknowledgment schemes can improve the tail and mean latencies by approximately 30%. We also show that these schemes can improve resiliency to performance faults compared to existing work. Our improvements result in 47.4% to 92.9% fewer missed deadlines compared to 17.3% to 50.6% for comparable topologies and redundancy levels in the state of the art. Finally, we show that redundancies of 25% to 100% can reduce the number of data elements that miss their deadline constraints by 0.76% to 14.04% for applications with high fan-out and by 7.45% up to 50% for applications with no fan-out.