Biblio

Securing cyber-physical systems (CPS) and Internet of Things (IoT) systems requires the identification of how interdependence among existing atomic vulnerabilities may be exploited by an adversary to stitch together an attack that can compromise the system. Therefore, accurate attack graphs play a significant role in systems security. A manual construction of the attack graphs is tedious and error-prone, this paper proposes a model-checking-based automated attack graph generator and visualizer (A2G2V). The proposed A2G2V algorithm uses existing model-checking tools, an architecture description tool, and our own code to generate an attack graph that enumerates the set of all possible sequences in which atomic-level vulnerabilities can be exploited to compromise system security. The architecture description tool captures a formal representation of the networked system, its atomic vulnerabilities, their pre-and post-conditions, and security property of interest. A model-checker is employed to automatically identify an attack sequence in the form of a counterexample. Our own code integrated with the model-checker parses the counterexamples, encodes those for specification relaxation, and iterates until all attack sequences are revealed. Finally, a visualization tool has also been incorporated with A2G2V to generate a graphical representation of the generated attack graph. The results are illustrated through application to computer as well as control (SCADA) networks.

Remote attestation is a security technique through which a remote trusted party (i.e., Verifier) checks the trust-worthiness of a potentially untrusted device (i.e., Prover). In the Internet of Things (IoT) systems, the existing remote attestation protocols propose various approaches to detect the modified software and physical tampering attacks. However, in an inter-operable IoT system, in which IoT devices interact autonomously among themselves, an additional problem arises: a compromised IoT service can influence the genuine operation of other invoked service, without changing the software of the latter. In this paper, we propose a protocol for Remote Attestation of Distributed IoT Services (RADIS), which verifies the trust-worthiness of distributed IoT services. Instead of attesting the complete memory content of the entire interoperable IoT devices, RADIS attests only the services involved in performing a certain functionality. RADIS relies on a control-flow attestation technique to detect IoT services that perform an unexpected operation due to their interactions with a malicious remote service. Our experiments show the effectiveness of our protocol in validating the integrity status of a distributed IoT service.

Security attacks against Internet of Things (IoT) are on the rise and they lead to drastic consequences. Data confidentiality is typically based on a strong symmetric-key algorithm to guard against confidentiality attacks. However, there is a need to design an efficient lightweight cipher scheme for a number of applications for IoT systems. Recently, a set of lightweight cryptographic algorithms have been presented and they are based on the dynamic key approach, requiring a small number of rounds to minimize the computation and resource overhead, without degrading the security level. This paper follows this logic and provides a new flexible lightweight cipher, with or without chaining operation mode, with a simple round function and a dynamic key for each input message. Consequently, the proposed cipher scheme can be utilized for real-time applications and/or devices with limited resources such as Multimedia Internet of Things (MIoT) systems. The importance of the proposed solution is that it produces dynamic cryptographic primitives and it performs the mixing of selected blocks in a dynamic pseudo-random manner. Accordingly, different plaintext messages are encrypted differently, and the avalanche effect is also preserved. Finally, security and performance analysis are presented to validate the efficiency and robustness of the proposed cipher variants.