Visible to the public Biblio

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2023-05-12
Zhu, Lu, Wei, Yehua, Jiang, Haoran, Long, Jing.  2022.  CAN FD Message Authentication Enhances Parallel in-vehicle Applications Security. 2022 2nd International Conference on Intelligent Technology and Embedded Systems (ICITES). :155–160.
Controller Area Network with Flexible Data-rate(CAN FD) has the advantages of high bandwidth and data field length to meet the higher communication requirements of parallel in-vehicle applications. If the CAN FD lacking the authentication security mechanism is used, it is easy to make it suffer from masquerade attack. Therefore, a two-stage method based on message authentication is proposed to enhance the security of it. In the first stage, an anti-exhaustive message exchange and comparison algorithm is proposed. After exchanging the message comparison sequence, the lower bound of the vehicle application and redundant message space is obtained. In the second stage, an enhanced round accumulation algorithm is proposed to enhance security, which adds Message Authentication Codes(MACs) to the redundant message space in a way of fewer accumulation rounds. Experimental examples show that the proposed two-stage approach enables both small-scale and large-scale parallel in-vehicle applications security to be enhanced. Among them, in the Adaptive Cruise Control Application(ACCA), when the laxity interval is 1300μs, the total increased MACs is as high as 388Bit, and the accumulation rounds is as low as 40 rounds.
2020-07-20
Nishida, Kanata, Nozaki, Yusuke, Yoshikawa, Masaya.  2019.  Security Evaluation of Counter Synchronization Method for CAN Against DoS Attack. 2019 IEEE 8th Global Conference on Consumer Electronics (GCCE). :166–167.
MAC using a counter value in message authentication for in-vehicle network prevents replay attack. When synchronization deviation of the counter value occurs between the sender and receiver, a message cannot be authenticated correctly because the generated MACs are different. Thus, a counter synchronization method has been proposed. In addition, injection and replay attack of a synchronization message for the synchronization method have been performed. However, DoS attack on the synchronization method has not been conducted. This study performs DoS attack in order to evaluate security of the synchronization method. Experimental results reveal the vulnerability of the synchronization method against DoS attack.
2020-02-10
Rizvi, Syed, Imler, Jarrett, Ritchey, Luke, Tokar, Michael.  2019.  Securing PKES against Relay Attacks using Coordinate Tracing and Multi-Factor Authentication. 2019 53rd Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS). :1–6.

In most produced modern vehicles, Passive Keyless Entry and Start System (PKES), a newer form of an entry access system, is becoming more and more popular. The PKES system allows the consumer to enter within a certain range and have the vehicle's doors unlock automatically without pressing any buttons on the key. This technology increases the overall convenience to the consumer; however, it is vulnerable to attacks known as relay and amplified relay attacks. A relay attack consists of placing a device near the vehicle and a device near the key to relay the signal between the key and the vehicle. On the other hand, an amplified relay attack uses only a singular amplifier to increase the range of the vehicle sensors to reach the key. By exploiting these two different vulnerabilities within the PKES system, an attacker can gain unauthorized access to the vehicle, leading to damage or even stolen property. To minimize both vulnerabilities, we propose a coordinate tracing system with an additional Bluetooth communication channel. The coordinate tracing system, or PKES Forcefield, traces the authorized key's longitude and latitude in real time using two proposed algorithms, known as the Key Bearing algorithm and the Longitude and Latitude Key (LLK) algorithm. To further add security, a Bluetooth communication channel will be implemented. With an additional channel established, a second frequency can be traced within a secondary PKES Forcefield. The LLK Algorithm computes both locations of frequencies and analyzes the results to form a pattern. Furthermore, the PKES Forcefield movement-tracing allows a vehicle to understand when an attacker attempts to transmit an unauthenticated signal and blocks any signal from being amplified over a fixed range.