Biblio

This paper considers consensus-based distributed Kalman filtering subject to data-falsification attack, where Byzantine agents share manipulated data with their neighboring agents. The attack is assumed to be coordinated among the Byzantine agents and follows a linear model. The goal of the Byzantine agents is to maximize the network-wide estimation error while evading false-data detectors at honest agents. To that end, we propose a joint selection of Byzantine agents and covariance matrices of attack sequences to maximize the network-wide estimation error subject to constraints on stealthiness and the number of Byzantine agents. The attack strategy is then obtained by employing block-coordinate descent method via Boolean relaxation and backward stepwise based subset selection method. Numerical results show the efficiency of the proposed attack strategy in comparison with other naive and uncoordinated attacks.

We consider the problem of preserving the privacy of a set of private parameters while allowing inference of a set of public parameters based on observations from sensors in a network. We assume that the public and private parameters are correlated with the sensor observations via a linear model. We define the utility loss and privacy gain functions based on the Cramér-Rao lower bounds for estimating the public and private parameters, respectively. Our goal is to minimize the utility loss while ensuring that the privacy gain is no less than a predefined privacy gain threshold, by allowing each sensor to perturb its own observation before sending it to the fusion center. We propose methods to determine the amount of noise each sensor needs to add to its observation under the cases where prior information is available or unavailable.

We consider the problem of preserving the privacy of a set of private parameters while allowing inference of a set of public parameters based on observations from sensors in a network. We assume that the public and private parameters are correlated with the sensor observations via a linear model. We define the utility loss and privacy gain functions based on the Cramér-Rao lower bounds for estimating the public and private parameters, respectively. Our goal is to minimize the utility loss while ensuring that the privacy gain is no less than a predefined privacy gain threshold, by allowing each sensor to perturb its own observation before sending it to the fusion center. We propose methods to determine the amount of noise each sensor needs to add to its observation under the cases where prior information is available or unavailable.

The orthogonal matching pursuit (OMP) algorithm is a commonly used algorithm for recovering K-sparse signals x ∈ ℝn from linear model y = Ax, where A ∈ ℝm×n is a sensing matrix. A fundamental question in the performance analysis of OMP is the characterization of the probability that it can exactly recover x for random matrix A. Although in many practical applications, in addition to the sparsity, x usually also has some additional property (for example, the nonzero entries of x independently and identically follow the Gaussian distribution), none of existing analysis uses these properties to answer the above question. In this paper, we first show that the prior distribution information of x can be used to provide an upper bound on \textbackslashtextbar\textbackslashtextbarx\textbackslashtextbar\textbackslashtextbar21/\textbackslashtextbar\textbackslashtextbarx\textbackslashtextbar\textbackslashtextbar22, and then explore the bound to develop a better lower bound on the probability of exact recovery with OMP in K iterations. Simulation tests are presented to illustrate the superiority of the new bound.