Biblio

Now-a-days Internet has become mostly content centric. Named Data Network (NDN) has emerged as a promising candidate to cope with the use of today's Internet. Several NDN features such as in-network caching, easier data forwarding, etc. in the routing method bring potential advantages over conventional networks. Despite the advantages, there are many challenges in NDN which are yet to be addressed. In this paper, we address two of such challenges in NDN routing: (1) Huge storage overhead in NDN router (2) High communication over-heads in the network during propagation of routing information updates. We propose changes in existing NDN routing with the aim to provide a low-overhead solution to these problems. Here instead of storing the Link State Data Base (LSDB) in all the routers, it is kept in selected special nodes only. The use of special nodes lowers down the overall storage and update overheads. We also provide supporting algorithms for data forwarding and update for grid network. The performance of the proposed method is evaluated in terms of storage and communication overheads. The results show the overheads are reduced by almost one third as compared to the existing routing method in NDN.

The threat of side-channels is becoming increasingly prominent for resource-constrained internet-connected devices. While numerous power side-channel countermeasures have been proposed, a promising approach to protect the non-invasive electromagnetic side-channel attacks has been relatively scarce. Today's availability of high-resolution electromagnetic (EM) probes mandates the need for a low-overhead solution to protect EM side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks. This work, for the first time, performs a white-box analysis to root-cause the origin of the EM leakage from an integrated circuit. System-level EM simulations with Intel 32 nm CMOS technology interconnect stack, as an example, reveals that the EM leakage from metals above layer 8 can be detected by an external non-invasive attacker with the commercially available state-of-the-art EM probes. Equipped with this `white-box' understanding, this work proposes S℡LAR: Signature aTtenuation Embedded CRYPTO with Low-Level metAl Routing, which is a two-stage solution to eliminate the critical signal radiation from the higher-level metal layers. Firstly, we propose routing the entire cryptographic core within the local lower-level metal layers, whose leakage cannot be picked up by an external attacker. Then, the entire crypto IP is embedded within a Signature Attenuation Hardware (SAH) which in turn suppresses the critical encryption signature before it routes the current signature to the highly radiating top-level metal layers. System-level implementation of the S℡LAR hardware with local lower-level metal routing in TSMC 65 nm CMOS technology, with an AES-128 encryption engine (as an example cryptographic block) operating at 40 MHz, shows that the system remains secure against EM SCA attack even after 1M encryptions, with 67% energy efficiency and 1.23× area overhead compared to the unprotected AES.