Biblio

Acoustic emanations of computer keyboards represent a serious privacy issue. As demonstrated in prior work, physical properties of keystroke sounds might reveal what a user is typing. However, previous attacks assumed relatively strong adversary models that are not very practical in many real-world settings. Such strong models assume: (i) adversary's physical proximity to the victim, (ii) precise profiling of the victim's typing style and keyboard, and/or (iii) significant amount of victim's typed information (and its corresponding sounds) available to the adversary. This paper presents and explores a new keyboard acoustic eavesdropping attack that involves Voice-over-IP (VoIP), called Skype & Type (S&T), while avoiding prior strong adversary assumptions. This work is motivated by the simple observation that people often engage in secondary activities (including typing) while participating in VoIP calls. As expected, VoIP software acquires and faithfully transmits all sounds, including emanations of pressed keystrokes, which can include passwords and other sensitive information. We show that one very popular VoIP software (Skype) conveys enough audio information to reconstruct the victim's input – keystrokes typed on the remote keyboard. Our results demonstrate that, given some knowledge on the victim's typing style and keyboard model, the attacker attains top-5 accuracy of 91.7% in guessing a random key pressed by the victim. Furthermore, we demonstrate that S&T is robust to various VoIP issues (e.g., Internet bandwidth fluctuations and presence of voice over keystrokes), thus confirming feasibility of this attack. Finally, it applies to other popular VoIP software, such as Google Hangouts.

Skype has been a typical choice for providing VoIP service nowadays and is well-known for its broad range of features, including voice-calls, instant messaging, file transfer and video conferencing, etc. Considering its wide application, from the viewpoint of ISPs, it is essential to identify Skype flows and thus optimize network performance and forecast future needs. However, in general, a host is likely to run multiple network applications simultaneously, which makes it much harder to classify each and every Skype flow from mixed traffic exactly. Especially, current techniques usually focus on host-level identification and do not have the ability to identify Skype traffic at the flow-level. In this paper, we first reveal the unique sequence signatures of Skype UDP flows and then implement a practical online system named SkyTracer for precise Skype traffic identification. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time to utilize the strong sequence signatures to carry out early identification of Skype traffic. The experimental results show that SkyTracer can achieve very high accuracy at fine-grained level in identifying Skype traffic.

Mobile Voice over Internet Protocol (mVoIP) applications have gained increasing popularity in the last few years, with millions of users communicating using such applications (e.g. Skype). Similar to other forms of Internet and telecommunications, mVoIP communications are vulnerable to both lawful and unauthorized interceptions. Encryption is a common way of ensuring the privacy of mVoIP users. To the best of our knowledge, there has been no academic study to determine whether mVoIP applications provide encrypted communications. In this paper, we examine Skype and nine other popular mVoIP applications for Android mobile devices, and analyze the intercepted communications to determine whether the captured voice and text communications are encrypted (or not). The results indicate that most of the applications encrypt text communications. However, voice communications may not be encrypted in six of the ten applications examined.