Biblio

Bluetooth (BR/EDR) is a pervasive technology for wireless communication used by billions of devices. The Bluetooth standard includes a legacy authentication procedure and a secure authentication procedure, allowing devices to authenticate to each other using a long term key. Those procedures are used during pairing and secure connection establishment to prevent impersonation attacks. In this paper, we show that the Bluetooth specification contains vulnerabilities enabling to perform impersonation attacks during secure connection establishment. Such vulnerabilities include the lack of mandatory mutual authentication, overly permissive role switching, and an authentication procedure downgrade. We describe each vulnerability in detail, and we exploit them to design, implement, and evaluate master and slave impersonation attacks on both the legacy authentication procedure and the secure authentication procedure. We refer to our attacks as Bluetooth Impersonation AttackS (BIAS).Our attacks are standard compliant, and are therefore effective against any standard compliant Bluetooth device regardless the Bluetooth version, the security mode (e.g., Secure Connections), the device manufacturer, and the implementation details. Our attacks are stealthy because the Bluetooth standard does not require to notify end users about the outcome of an authentication procedure, or the lack of mutual authentication. To confirm that the BIAS attacks are practical, we successfully conduct them against 31 Bluetooth devices (28 unique Bluetooth chips) from major hardware and software vendors, implementing all the major Bluetooth versions, including Apple, Qualcomm, Intel, Cypress, Broadcom, Samsung, and CSR.

In the last decade, the request for Internet access in heterogeneous environments keeps on growing, principally in mobile platforms such as buses, airplanes and trains. Consequently, several extensions and schemes have been introduced to achieve seamless handoff of mobile networks from one subnet to another. Even with these enhancements, the problem of maintaining the security concerns and availability has not been resolved yet, especially, the absence of authentication mechanism between network entities in order to avoid vulnerability from attacks. To eliminate the threats on the interface between the mobile access gateway (MAG) and the mobile router (MR) in improving fast PMIPv6-based network mobility (IFP-NEMO) protocol, we propose a lightweight mutual authentication mechanism in improving fast PMIPv6-based network mobility scheme (LMAIFPNEMO). This scheme uses authentication, authorization and accounting (AAA) servers to enhance the security of the protocol IFP-NEMO which allows the integration of improved fast proxy mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6) in network mobility (NEMO). We use only symmetric cryptographic, generated nonces and hash operation primitives to ensure a secure authentication procedure. Then, we analyze the security aspect of the proposed scheme and evaluate it using the automated validation of internet security protocols and applications (AVISPA) software which has proved that authentication goals are achieved.