Biblio

Random number generators (RNGs) has an extensive application area from cryptography to simulation software. Piecewise linear one-dimensional (PL1D) maps are commonly preferred structures used as the basis of RNGs due to their theoretically proven chaotic behavior and ease of implementation. In this work, a skew-tent map based RNG is designed by using the chaotic sampling method in TSMC 180 nm CMOS process. Simulation data of the designed RNG is validated by the statistical randomness tests of the FIPS-140-2 and NIST 800-22 suites. The proposed RNG has three key features: the generated bitstreams can fulfill the randomness tests without using any post processing methods; the proposed RNG has immunity against external interference thanks to the chaotic sampling method; and higher bitrates (4.8 Mbit/s) can be achieved with relatively low power consumption (9.8 mW). Thus, robust RNG systems can be built for high-speed security applications with low power by using the proposed architecture.

Intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) of information and communication devices is based on high-power electromagnetic environments far exceeding the device immunity to electromagnetic interference. IEMI dramatically alters the electromagnetic environment throughout the device by interfering with the electromagnetic waves inside the device and destroying low-tolerance integrated circuits (ICs) and other elements, thereby reducing the availability of the device. In contrast, in this study, by using a hardware Trojan (HT) that is quickly mountable by physically accessing the devices, to locally weaken the immunity of devices, and then irradiating electromagnetic waves of a specific frequency, only the attack targets are intentionally altered electromagnetically. Therefore, we propose a method that uses these electromagnetic changes to rewrite or generate data and commands handled within devices. Specifically, targeting serial communication systems used inside and outside the devices, the installation of an HT on the communication channel weakens local immunity. This shows that it is possible to generate an electrical signal representing arbitrary data on the communication channel by applying electromagnetic waves of sufficiently small output compared with the conventional IEMI and letting the IC process the data. In addition, we explore methods for countering such attacks.