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2023-08-23
Chen, Zongyao, Bu, Xuhui, Guo, Jinli.  2022.  Model-free Adaptive Sliding Mode Control for Interconnected Power Systems under DoS Attacks. 2022 IEEE 11th Data Driven Control and Learning Systems Conference (DDCLS). :487—492.
In this paper, a new model-free adaptive sliding mode load frequency control (LFC) scheme is designed for inter-connected power systems, where modeling is difficult and suffers from load change disturbances and denial of service (DoS) attacks. The proposed algorithm only uses real-time I/O data of the power system to achieve a high control performance. Firstly, the dynamic linearization strategy is used to build a data-based model of the power system, and intermittent DoS attacks are modeled by limiting their duration and frequency. Secondly, the model-free adaptive sliding mode control (MFASMC) scheme is designed based on optimization theory and sliding mode reaching law, and its stability is analyzed. Finally, the three-area interconnected power system was selected to test the presented MFASMC scheme. Simulation data shows the effectiveness of the LFC algorithm in this paper.
2022-08-26
Khadarvali, S., Madhusudhan, V., Kiranmayi, R..  2021.  Load Frequency Control of Two Area System with Security Attack and Game Theory Based Defender Action Using ALO Tuned Integral Controller. 2021 International Conference on Computational Intelligence and Computing Applications (ICCICA). :1—5.

Cyber-attacks in electrical power system causes serious damages causing breakdown of few equipment to shutdown of the complete power system. Game theory is used as a tool to detect the cyber-attack in the power system recently. Interaction between the attackers and the defenders which is the inherent nature of the game theory is exploited to detect the cyber-attack in the power system. This paper implements the cyber-attack detection on a two-area power system controlled using the Load Frequency controller. Ant Lion Optimization is used to tune the integral controller applied in the Load Frequency Controller. Cyber-attacks that include constant injection, bias injection, overcompensation, and negative compensation are tested on the Game theory-based attack detection algorithm proposed. It is considered that the smart meters are attacked with the attacks by manipulating the original data in the power system. MATLAB based implementation is developed and observed that the defender action is satisfactory in the two-area system considered. Tuning of integral controller in the Load Frequency controller in the two-area system is also observed to be effective.

2022-08-12
Oshnoei, Soroush, Aghamohammadi, Mohammadreza.  2021.  Detection and Mitigation of Coordinate False DataInjection Attacks in Frequency Control of Power Grids. 2021 11th Smart Grid Conference (SGC). :1—5.
In modern power grids (PGs), load frequency control (LFC) is effectively employed to preserve the frequency within the allowable ranges. However, LFC dependence on information and communication technologies (ICTs) makes PGs vulnerable to cyber attacks. Manipulation of measured data and control commands known as false data injection attacks (FDIAs) can negatively affect grid frequency performance and destabilize PG. This paper investigates the frequency performance of an isolated PG under coordinated FDIAs. A control scheme based on the combination of a Kalman filter, a chi-square detector, and a linear quadratic Gaussian controller is proposed to detect and mitigate the coordinated FDIAs. The efficiency of the proposed control scheme is evaluated under two types of scaling and exogenous FDIAs. The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed control scheme has significant capabilities to detect and mitigate the designed FDIAs.
2021-05-13
Liu, Xinghua, Bai, Dandan, Jiang, Rui.  2020.  Load Frequency Control of Multi-area Power Systems under Deception Attacks*. 2020 Chinese Automation Congress (CAC). :3851–3856.
This paper investigated the sliding mode load frequency control (LFC) for an multi-area power system (MPS) under deception attacks (DA). A Luenberger observer is designed to obtain the state estimate of MPS. By using the Lyapunov-Krasovskii method, a sliding mode surface (SMS) is designed to ensure the stability. Then the accessibility analysis ensures that the trajectory of the MPS can reach the specified SMS. Finally, the serviceability of the method is explained by providing a case study.
2021-03-17
Kushal, T. R. B., Gao, Z., Wang, J., Illindala, M. S..  2020.  Causal Chain of Time Delay Attack on Synchronous Generator Control. 2020 IEEE Power Energy Society General Meeting (PESGM). :1—5.

Wide integration of information and communication technology (ICT) in modern power grids has brought many benefits as well as the risk of cyber attacks. A critical step towards defending grid cyber security is to understand the cyber-physical causal chain, which describes the progression of intrusion in cyber-space leading to the formation of consequences on the physical power grid. In this paper, we develop an attack vector for a time delay attack at load frequency control in the power grid. Distinct from existing works, which are separately focused on cyber intrusion, grid response, or testbed validation, the proposed attack vector for the first time provides a full cyber-physical causal chain. It targets specific vulnerabilities in the protocols, performs a denial-of-service (DoS) attack, induces the delays in control loop, and destabilizes grid frequency. The proposed attack vector is proved in theory, presented as an attack tree, and validated in an experimental environment. The results will provide valuable insights to develop security measures and robust controls against time delay attacks.

2021-03-15
Shahkar, S., Khorasani, K..  2020.  A Resilient Control Against Time-Delay Switch and Denial of Service Cyber Attacks on Load Frequency Control of Distributed Power Systems. 2020 IEEE Conference on Control Technology and Applications (CCTA). :718—725.

A time-delay switch (TDS) cyber attack is a deliberate attempt by malicious adversaries aiming at destabilizing a power system by impeding the communication signals to/from the centralized controller from/to the network sensors and generating stations that participate in the load frequency control (LFC). A TDS cyber attack can be targeting the sensing loops (transmitting network measurements to the centralized controller) or the control signals dispatched from the centralized controller to the governor valves of the generating stations. A resilient TDS control strategy is proposed and developed in this work that thwarts network instabilities that are caused by delays in the sensing loops, and control commands, and guarantees normal operation of the LFC mechanism. This will be achieved by augmenting the telemetered control commands with locally generated feedback control laws (i.e., “decentralized” control commands) taking measurements that are available and accessible at the power generating stations (locally) independent from all the telemetered signals to/from the centralized controller. Our objective is to devise a controller that is capable of circumventing all types of TDS and DoS (Denial of Service) cyber attacks as well as a broad class of False Data Injection (FDI) cyber attacks.

2020-10-06
Jacobs, Nicholas, Hossain-McKenzie, Shamina, Vugrin, Eric.  2018.  Measurement and Analysis of Cyber Resilience for Control Systems: An Illustrative Example. 2018 Resilience Week (RWS). :38—46.

Control systems for critical infrastructure are becoming increasingly interconnected while cyber threats against critical infrastructure are becoming more sophisticated and difficult to defend against. Historically, cyber security has emphasized building defenses to prevent loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability in digital information and systems, but in recent years cyber attacks have demonstrated that no system is impenetrable and that control system operation may be detrimentally impacted. Cyber resilience has emerged as a complementary priority that seeks to ensure that digital systems can maintain essential performance levels, even while capabilities are degraded by a cyber attack. This paper examines how cyber security and cyber resilience may be measured and quantified in a control system environment. Load Frequency Control is used as an illustrative example to demonstrate how cyber attacks may be represented within mathematical models of control systems, to demonstrate how these events may be quantitatively measured in terms of cyber security or cyber resilience, and the differences and similarities between the two mindsets. These results demonstrate how various metrics are applied, the extent of their usability, and how it is important to analyze cyber-physical systems in a comprehensive manner that accounts for all the various parts of the system.