Biblio

In this paper, the problem of misinformation propagation is studied for an Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) system in which an attacker seeks to inject false information in the IoBT nodes in order to compromise the IoBT operations. In the considered model, each IoBT node seeks to counter the misinformation attack by finding the optimal probability of accepting a given information that minimizes its cost at each time instant. The cost is expressed in terms of the quality of information received as well as the infection cost. The problem is formulated as a mean-field game with multiclass agents which is suitable to model a massive heterogeneous IoBT system. For this game, the mean-field equilibrium is characterized, and an algorithm based on the forward backward sweep method is proposed. Then, the finite IoBT case is considered, and the conditions of convergence of the equilibria in the finite case to the mean-field equilibrium are presented. Numerical results show that the proposed scheme can achieve a two-fold increase in the quality of information (QoI) compared to the baseline when the nodes are always transmitting.

In this paper, the problem of misinformation propagation is studied for an Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) system, in which an attacker seeks to inject false information in the IoBT nodes in order to compromise the IoBT operations. In the considered model, each IoBT node seeks to counter the misinformation attack by finding the optimal probability of accepting given information that minimizes its cost at each time instant. The cost is expressed in terms of the quality of information received as well as the infection cost. The problem is formulated as a mean-field game with multiclass agents, which is suitable to model a massive heterogeneous IoBT system. For this game, the mean-field equilibrium is characterized, and an algorithm based on the forward backward sweep method is proposed to find the mean-field equilibrium. Then, the finite-IoBT case is considered, and the conditions of convergence of the equilibria in the finite case to the mean-field equilibrium are presented. Numerical results show that the proposed scheme can achieve a 1.2-fold increase in the quality of information compared with a baseline scheme, in which the IoBT nodes are always transmitting. The results also show that the proposed scheme can reduce the proportion of infected nodes by 99% compared with the baseline.

In this paper, decentralized dynamic power allocation problem has been investigated for mobile ad hoc network (MANET) at tactical edge. Due to the mobility and self-organizing features in MANET and environmental uncertainties in the battlefield, many existing optimal power allocation algorithms are neither efficient nor practical. Furthermore, the continuously increasing large scale of the wireless connection population in emerging Internet of Battlefield Things (IoBT) introduces additional challenges for optimal power allocation due to the “Curse of Dimensionality”. In order to address these challenges, a novel Actor-Critic-Mass algorithm is proposed by integrating the emerging Mean Field game theory with online reinforcement learning. The proposed approach is able to not only learn the optimal power allocation for IoBT in a decentralized manner, but also effectively handle uncertainties from harsh environment at tactical edge. In the developed scheme, each agent in IoBT has three neural networks (NN), i.e., 1) Critic NN learns the optimal cost function that minimizes the Signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR), 2) Actor NN estimates the optimal transmitter power adjustment rate, and 3) Mass NN learns the probability density function of all agents' transmitting power in IoBT. The three NNs are tuned based on the Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov (FPK) and Hamiltonian-Jacobian-Bellman (HJB) equation given in the Mean Field game theory. An IoBT wireless network has been simulated to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. The results demonstrate that the actor-critic-mass algorithm can effectively approximate the probability distribution of all agents' transmission power and converge to the target SINR. Moreover, the optimal decentralized power allocation is obtained through integrated mean-field game theory with reinforcement learning.