Biblio
In NATO, an attack on one is an attack on all. In recent years, this tenet has been extended to mean that a cyberattack on one is a cyberattack on all. But does what makes sense in the physical world also make sense if extended into cyberspace? And if there is virtue in collective cyberspace defense, is NATO necessarily the right grouping - in a world where, as far as the United States and the United Kingdom are concerned, more of what constitutes cyber defense circulates within the Five Eyes coalition rather than within NATO? To explore these issues, this essay moots the creation of a Baltic-area cyberspace alliance, considers what it would do, assesses its costs and benefits for its members, and concludes by considering whether such an alliance would be also be in the interest of the U.S. Keys to this discussion are (1) the distinction between what constitutes an “attack” in a medium where occupation may result and actions in media where occupation is (currently) meaningless and effects almost always reversible, (2) what collective defense should mean in cyberspace - and where responsibilities may be best discharged within the mix of hardness, pre-emption, and deterrence that constitute defense, (3) the relationship between cyberspace defense and information warfare defense, and (4) the relevance to alliance formation of the fact that while war is dull, dirty, and dangerous, cyber war is none of these three.
This paper considers the complex of models for the description, analysis, and modeling of group behavior by user actions in complex social systems. In particular, electoral processes can be considered in which preferences are selected from several possible ones. For example, for two candidates, the choice is made from three states: for the candidate A, for candidate B and undecided (candidate C). Thus, any of the voters can be in one of the three states, and the interaction between them leads to the transition between the states with some delay time intervals, which are one of the parameters of the proposed models. The dynamics of changes in the preferences of voters can be described graphically on diagram of possible transitions between states, on the basis of which is possible to write a system of differential kinetic equations that describes the process. The analysis of the obtained solutions shows the possibility of existence within the model, different modes of changing the preferences of voters. In the developed model of stochastic cellular automata with variable memory at each step of the interaction process between its cells, a new network of random links is established, the minimum and the maximum number of which is selected from a given range. At the initial time, a cell of each type is assigned a numeric parameter that specifies the number of steps during which will retain its type (cell memory). The transition of cells between states is determined by the total number of cells of different types with which there was interaction at the given number of memory steps. After the number of steps equal to the depth of memory, transition to the type that had the maximum value of its sum occurs. The effect of external factors (such as media) on changes in node types can set for each step using a transition probability matrix. Processing of the electoral campaign's sociological data of 2015-2016 at the choice of the President of the United States using the method of almost-periodic functions allowed to estimate the parameters of a set of models and use them to describe, analyze and model the group behavior of voters. The studies show a good correspondence between the data observed in sociology and calculations using a set of developed models. Under some sets of values of the coefficients in the differential equations and models of cellular automata are observed the oscillating and almost-periodic character of changes in the preferences of the electorate, which largely coincides with the real observations.
The United States and European Union have an increasing number of projects that are engaging end-use devices for improved grid capabilities. Areas such as building-to-grid and vehicle-to-grid are simple examples of these advanced capabilities. In this paper, we present an innovative concept study for a ship-to-grid integration. The goal of this study is to simulate a two-way power flow between ship(s) and the grid with GridLAB-D for the port of Kyllini in Greece, where a ship-to-shore interconnection was recently implemented. Extending this further, we explore: (a) the ability of ships to meet their load demand needs, while at berth, by being supplied with energy from the electric grid and thus powering off their diesel engines; and (b) the ability of ships to provide power to critical loads onshore. As a result, the ship-to-grid integration helps (a) mitigate environmental pollutants from the ships' diesel engines and (b) provide resilience to nearby communities during a power disruption due to natural disasters or man-made threats.
GENI (Global Environment for Network Innovations) is a National Science Foundation (NSF) funded program which provides a virtual laboratory for networking and distributed systems research and education. It is well suited for exploring networks at a scale, thereby promoting innovations in network science, security, services and applications. GENI allows researchers obtain compute resources from locations around the United States, connect compute resources using 100G Internet2 L2 service, install custom software or even custom operating systems on these compute resources, control how network switches in their experiment handle traffic flows, and run their own L3 and above protocols. GENI architecture incorporates cloud federation. With the federation, cloud resources can be federated and/or community of clouds can be formed. The heart of federation is user identity and an ability to “advertise” cloud resources into community including compute, storage, and networking. GENI administrators can carve out what resources are available to the community and hence a portion of GENI resources are reserved for internal consumption. GENI architecture also provides “stitching” of compute and storage resources researchers request. This provides L2 network domain over Internet2's 100G network. And researchers can run their Software Defined Networking (SDN) controllers on the provisioned L2 network domain for a complete control of networking traffic. This capability is useful for large science data transfer (bypassing security devices for high throughput). Renaissance Computing Institute (RENCI), a research institute in the state of North Carolina, has developed ORCA (Open Resource Control Architecture), a GENI control framework. ORCA is a distributed resource orchestration system to serve science experiments. ORCA provides compute resources as virtual machines and as well as baremetals. ORCA based GENI ra- k was designed to serve both High Throughput Computing (HTC) and High Performance Computing (HPC) type of computes. Although, GENI is primarily used in various universities and research entities today, GENI architecture can be leveraged in the commercial, aerospace and government settings. This paper will go over the architecture of GENI and discuss the GENI architecture for scientific computing experiments.
The United States has US CYBERCOM to protect the US Military Infrastructure and DHS to protect the nation's critical cyber infrastructure. These organizations deal with wide ranging issues at a national level. This leaves local and state governments to largely fend for themselves in the cyber frontier. This paper will focus on how to determine the threat to a community and what indications and warnings can lead us to suspect an attack is underway. To try and help answer these questions we utilized the concepts of Honey pots and Honey nets and extended them to a multi-organization concept within a geographic boundary to form a Honey Community. The initial phase of the research done in support of this paper was to create a fictitious community with various components to entice would-be attackers and determine if the use of multiple sectors in a community would aid in the determination of an attack.
Sony in United States and KHNP in South Korea were hit by a series of cyberattacks late in 2014 that were blamed on North Korea. U.S. president Obama responded strongly and positively as control tower, and led Sony do not surrender to hacker's demand. U.S government demonstrated retaliatory action against North Korea under the proportional principle, blacklisted 3 North Korean entities and 10 officials. That days, there was the outrage of internet of North Korea. In order to enhance the cyber security response capability, U.S created a new office, CTIIC and encouraged the development of ISAOs, and made Sanctions EO, Information Sharing EO etc. KHNP and the Ministry of Industry rectified incidents itself early period when cyber incident arose, and the situation did not recovered as quickly as desired. S. Korea had not retaliation actions, otherwise called for closer global cooperation against cyber-attacks. To enhance national cyber security and resilience, S. Korea government created the new post of presidential secretary for cyber security and draw up `Strengthening National Cyber Security Posture' initiative.
The United States, including the Department of Defense, relies heavily on information systems and networking technologies to efficiently conduct a wide variety of missions across the globe. With the ever-increasing rate of cyber attacks, this dependency places the nation at risk of a loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its critical information resources; degrading its ability to complete the mission. In this paper, we introduce the operational data classes for establishing situational awareness in cyberspace. A system effectively using our key information components will be able to provide the nation's leadership timely and accurate information to gain an understanding of the operational cyber environment to enable strategic, operational, and tactical decision-making. In doing so, we present, define and provide examples of our key classes of operational data for cyber situational awareness and present a hypothetical case study demonstrating how they must be consolidated to provide a clear and relevant picture to a commander. In addition, current organizational and technical challenges are discussed, and areas for future research are addressed.